For the first time since 2015, terrorists managed to strike the heart of the capital, challenging the already fragile stability of the region.

How the Attack Unfolded

Over the past two and a half years, JNIM has been noted as creeping closer to Bamako, indicating that the capital’s relative safety from terrorist violence was unlikely to last forever.

Soon after the sound of gunshots and explosions began echoing through the city on the morning of September 17, it was clear that terrorists had reached Bamako. These sounds marked the beginning of an hours-long JNIM assault on the Malian capital — one of the al-Qaeda affiliate’s most audacious and successful attacks to date.

Two locations were attacked almost simultaneously, with clashes first reported at a gendarmerie training school in Faladié. Fighting at the school, which lasted for over three hours, led to a majority of the purported 70 casualties.

A second group of fighters attacked Air Base 101, a government and military facility located on the southern perimeter of the civilian Modibo Keita International Airport in Sénou. Fighting lasted far longer at this base, and while JNIM killed far fewer security forces there, its fighters inflicted significant damage on buildings and planes.

Among the jets confirmed to have been damaged was the government’s Boeing 737, reported to have recently been used by leader Assimi Goïta, in addition to an aircraft used by the World Food Programme and one belonging to Sky Mali.

The images and footage of JNIM fighters freely wandering beside airplanes, as well as inside one of the country’s most strategically important sites, have served as compelling propaganda for the group.

By nightfall, the Malian military had repelled the attack and regained full control of the city. Malian authorities have not yet reported a casualty figure, admitting only that there had been “some” deaths, nor have they confirmed any of the speculated loss of aircraft.

JNIM, known to inflate its claims, reported having killed or wounded over 100 Malian and Russian military personnel, destroyed six military aircraft (including a drone), and disabled several others.

In final statement on Bamako attack, Al-Qaeda in Sahel (JNIM) claims go have killed and wounded over 100 of soldiers, destroyed 6 military aircraft including a drone, while partially disabling four. In addition dozens of military vehicles were burnt along other equipment #Mali https://t.co/9jtF7h8Vdt pic.twitter.com/jcJceC803E

— Paweł Wójcik (@SaladinAlDronni) September 17, 2024

The Attack’s Unique Dimensions

The attack on two such symbolic military sites sent a message to President Goïta. The assault on his former military base and images of a JNIM fighter setting fire to one of his planes underscore that the group has both the capability and desire to strike at Mali’s center of power.

Moreover, strictly attacking military targets, JNIM has again tried to differentiate itself from the junta, which it frequently accuses of killing civilians.

It is also telling that such a large-scale, coordinated attack was successful despite not targeting softer civilian targets.

JNIM’s success says much about the Malian security apparatus’ deficiencies, yet it equally reflects the group’s offensive capabilities, which have grown immeasurably over the past decade. JNIM’s evolution as a fighting force will undoubtedly continue further, much to the detriment of governments and militaries in the region.

Perhaps the most intriguing aspect was revealed following the attack when JNIM reported that the operation was conducted by two teams of inghimasi (suicide fighters) from the sub-group Katiba Macina.

Salman al-Bambari, an ethnic Bambara of Bamako’s main ethnic group, headed the first unit that struck the gendarmerie school. Abdul Salam al-Fulani, an ethnic Fulani, one of the most prominent ethnic groups in West Africa, targeted the airport.

Fulani involvement in this attack would not alarm a Bamako resident or a government official, for the ethnic group is often associated with jihadists across the region. Yet footage of al-Bambari’s pre-attack vows being recited in Bambara is far more unprecedented.

This footage of the two commanders is an implicit decision by JNIM to underscore their trans-ethnic makeup, as well as demonstrate that their message can resonate with individuals from any background.

JNIM and Goïta’s Junta: Two Contrasting Fortunes

The attack in Bamako is yet another recent high-profile victory JNIM has been able to claim in Mali, with the group participating in the humiliating defeat of Malian and Russian troops in Tinzaouaten close to the border with Algeria toward the end of July.

While JNIM continues to enjoy great success in Mali, the Goïta administration is facing its most challenging period yet. Despite a range of threats confronting the junta, it is its recent inaction that has arguably done the most to undermine its hold on power.

The fatal defeat at the hands of JNIM and The Permanent Strategic Framework for Peace, Security, and Development (CSP-PSD) in Tinzaouaten came largely as a result of the junta’s underestimation of the resources and manpower required to reestablish control over the area.

The defeat was a significant blow to the junta’s credibility, both domestically and internationally.

Evidence suggests that Goïta has sent another column from Gao to Kidal, from where it is anticipated to eventually head northward toward Tinzaouaten, with last week’s attack further raising the stakes for the military’s operations in northern Mali.

The importance of reclaiming the country’s north is often noted as being underappreciated by those in the West. However, how the junta has focused attention, personnel, and material on military operations against the CSP-DPA in northern Mali has come at a hefty price, with its heavy focus here playing a part in JNIM’s recent successes — including the attack on Bamako.

What Lies Ahead for Mali?

Tough decisions now lie ahead for the political leadership in Bamako.

Another major misstep could prove to be a fatal blow for Goïta, placing even more pressure on the success of Malian and Russian forces should they continue their touted northern incursion toward Tinzaouaten.

Yet a potential victory there will do little to solve the junta’s more existential threat of JNIM. Having now expanded and entrenched itself in the Koulikoro Region surrounding Bamako, the al-Qaeda affiliate will be difficult to displace, particularly if the government continues to deploy the same ineffective counterterrorism measures.

The attack on Bamako symbolizes the past failures of the Malian political leadership in combatting the violent extremist groups present inside its borders.

Unfortunately for the junta, this attack is likely also a look into the future. JNIM is likely to continue encroaching on the territory surrounding Bamako, gradually applying pressure on the capital via similar violent incursions, as well as through attacks on major roads leading to the city.

While the Malian government likely has the capacity to better defend the capital, doing so may come at the cost of protecting other strategically important locations in the country.

JNIM’s growing presence in southern Mali not only endangers Bamako and other major cities and towns, but also Mali’s gold mines, which are overwhelmingly found in the southern regions of Sikasso, Koulikoro, and Kayes.

The junta must now carefully balance these competing aims, for the loss of a town, city, gold mine, or other valuable sites could be the catalyst for yet another regime change.

Charlie Werb is an analyst, writer, and commentator focussing on sub-Saharan African security issues, with a particular emphasis on Islamist extremist groups in the region.

The views and opinions expressed here are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the editorial position of The Defense Post.

The Defense Post aims to publish a wide range of high-quality opinion and analysis from a diverse array of people – do you want to send us yours? Click here to submit an op-ed.

The post Bamako Breached: JNIM’s Capital Strike Signals Dangerous New Chapter for Mali appeared first on The Defense Post.

The ACFT, which emphasizes brute strength, appears to reinforce traditional gender stereotypes rather than accurately assess soldiers’ combat capabilities. This shift, introduced after women were allowed into combat roles, disproportionately disadvantages female soldiers while lowering the bar for men.

The Department of Defense (DoD) seems to be undermining Congressional mandates to integrate women into combat arms, setting fitness benchmarks that hinder both equality and readiness.

The decision to shift focus to raw strength under the ACFT comes at a politically charged moment in the military’s long struggle with gender roles. While the test was initially presented as a gender-neutral assessment, its implementation suggests a deliberate move to preserve male dominance in the military’s most elite ranks.

The study’s findings highlight how the ACFT’s standards fail to reflect the broad range of competencies necessary for effective combat, including teamwork, decision-making, and tasks that properly measure flexibility, agility, and endurance.

About the Study

This study is part of my graduate research while pursuing a master’s degree at the University of Oxford.

Having served in both Civil Affairs (Airborne) and Military Intelligence, I conducted this research with a focus on military readiness and gender equality in combat roles. With 21 years of military service, including leadership roles such as commanding a company of drill sergeants and deployments to Afghanistan and Qatar in support of combat operations, I drew on my experiences to critically examine the ACFT and its broader implications.

For this study, I used a mixed-method approach that included an extensive text analysis of Army combat manuals, interviews with senior officers, and a detailed survey of over 400 soldiers’ fitness test scores.

This allowed me to explore both the quantitative and qualitative dimensions of the ACFT’s impact, providing a comprehensive view of how fitness standards affect gender equality in the Army.

My research seeks to answer whether the ACFT’s design truly aligns with the physical demands of modern combat and whether it helps or hinders the integration of women into combat arms roles.

Disconnect Between Standards and Combat Readiness

Through text analysis of Army combat manuals, the study uncovers a clear disconnect between the ACFT’s focus on brute strength and the more nuanced skills required for battlefield success.

Through text analysis tools, researchers can systematically examine and quantify patterns within large amounts of information, offering insights into how these manuals prioritize various capabilities.

Army combat manuals prioritize capabilities that extend far beyond sheer physical power, raising questions about why the ACFT neglects these critical aspects. By elevating raw strength as the primary marker of fitness, the ACFT subtly redefines what it means to be combat-ready in a way that perpetuates gender inequality.

The most alarming revelation comes from data showing that the ACFT has significantly lowered fitness standards for men.

Under the previous Army Physical Fitness Test (APFT), far fewer men qualified as “highly fit.” Now, men are passing and maintain elite categories under the ACFT at unprecedented rates. For instance, in initial trials at Fort Sill, nearly every male soldier passed the ACFT, while 61 percent had previously failed the APFT.

The data points to an uncomfortable reality: the ACFT is less challenging for male physiology, giving men an unnecessary advantage under the guise of gender neutrality.

Survey data further illustrates this imbalance. Even after gender-normed scoring, men still outperformed women by 3.29 percent, despite the survey including a significant number of exceptionally fit women.

This finding underscores the deep flaws in the ACFT’s design, which continues to act as a barrier to women’s advancement in the military. The survey’s analysis of individual events, such as the shift from sit-ups to planks and the introduction of the hand-release push-up, raises serious questions about why the Army chose exercises that seem to disproportionately disadvantage women’s physiology.

The findings from the Baseline Soldier Physical Readiness Requirements Study (BSPRRS), which were used as the reasoning for including the plank and now discontinued leg tuck in the ACFT, contradict broader medical literature that traditionally uses sit-ups to assess core strength.

The hand-release push-up, which a RAND report found to have weaker validity in assessing upper body strength compared to traditional push-ups, requires repeated impact on female breast tissue, leading to unnecessary discomfort and potential performance challenges for women.

Similarly, the RAND study notes that while sit-ups have traditionally been used to measure core endurance, there is limited evidence supporting the plank exercise in this context, particularly in relation to military tasks. The report highlights the need for further analysis to validate the plank’s effectiveness.

The shift from sit-ups to the plank exercise disproportionately affects female soldiers. Sit-ups, by allowing women to leverage their typically stronger lower body muscles and wider base, result in closer scoring parity between genders whereas the plank requires greater shoulder stability and upper body strength.

This disparity in event selection raises serious concerns because it directly limits women’s opportunities for promotions, access to advanced military schools, and competitive positions within the Army.

As the largest branch of the US military, the Army’s adoption of this fitness test sets a precedent that could be closely followed by other service branches, potentially magnifying the impact on gender equity across the military.

Challenging Gender Norms in Combat Roles

The findings also challenge the necessity of requiring women to meet the same physical strength standards as men. The study argues that women can perform combat roles effectively without needing to match men’s strength. These insights call for an urgent reevaluation of the ACFT to ensure it aligns with the actual demands of combat and provides a fair assessment for all soldiers, regardless of gender.

What’s at stake here goes beyond fitness standards. The ACFT represents a battleground in the military’s ongoing debate over gender equality.

By implementing a test designed to favor male soldiers, the Army reinforces outdated gender norms at a time when the country is pushing for greater inclusivity in its armed forces. Congressional mandates aimed at promoting gender equity in the military are at odds with the direction the Army has taken with the ACFT, and the political fallout could be significant.

As pressure mounts on the military to address the ethical, legal, and practical implications of the ACFT, this study’s conclusions could drive sweeping reforms. By calling for gender-specific physical fitness tests alongside gender-neutral combat task assessments according to occupational specialty, the report advocates for a more equitable approach to physical readiness in the Army.

In a military environment where inclusivity and effectiveness are paramount, the ACFT needs to be rethought entirely to ensure that all soldiers are judged fairly and according to the real demands of modern warfare.

This battle over fitness standards isn’t just about physical capabilities — it’s a reflection of the Army’s deeper struggle to redefine its identity in a more diverse and inclusive future. The outcome of this struggle will determine whether the Army truly stands for equality or remains mired in outdated traditions that reinforce gender inequality.

Major Amy Forza, US Army Reserve, specializes in Civil Affairs (Airborne) and Military Intelligence. With 21 years of military service, she has served both as an enlisted soldier and a commissioned officer. She has held various leadership roles, including company command and multiple deployments in support of combat operations.

Amy has commanded a unit training Army Drill Sergeants and initial entry training soldiers. She served as an Intelligence and Operations Officer in Afghanistan and Qatar and has cultivated a deep understanding of the nuances of military training and fitness assessments.

Currently, she is pursuing a master’s degree at the University of Oxford.

Her article presents findings from her dissertation, which includes text analysis and survey data on the ACFT, highlighting the need for revisions to better align the test with the diverse operational demands of modern military engagements.

The views and opinions expressed here are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the editorial position of The Defense Post.

The Defense Post aims to publish a wide range of high-quality opinion and analysis from a diverse array of people – do you want to send us yours? Click here to submit an op-ed.

The post The Army’s Fitness Test: A Political Battlefield Over Gender Equality appeared first on The Defense Post.

Today, the service faces perhaps its toughest-ever challenges to gaining and maintaining control of the air, and it must rise to meet those challenges. This is the USAF’s sacred, non-negotiable commitment to the nation. Failure is not an option.

Air Force senior leaders must unequivocally commit to this founding purpose, in both word and deed, beginning with a commitment to the Next Generation Air Dominance (NGAD) program — the initiative to create a “family of systems” to ensure continued ability to control the air. Otherwise, one must question why the nation has an Air Force. 

The Importance of Air Superiority

Air superiority is the bedrock of American military operations. It provides boundless options for the US military and its allies and partners, allowing air, maritime, and land forces to operate unimpeded by enemy threats. Without it, friendly forces are left vulnerable, dependent on the whims of adversaries.

The historical record is clear: for seven-plus decades, the US Air Force consistently maintained air superiority over every battlefield where it was called upon. This dominance enabled other Air Force missions, such as mobility, intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance (ISR), and strike operations, while also allowing land and naval forces to maneuver in their domains without fear of being either surveilled or attacked from above.

Today, new challenges are leading some to question the viability of the Air Force’s foundational mission — including some of the Department’s most senior leaders. These views are misguided.

Arguments Against the Air Force’s Core Purpose

 Common themes voiced by air superiority naysayers include ubiquitous sensing, allowing adversaries to find and fix air force assets on the ground and in the air, and voluminous, precise long-range fires, allowing adversaries to effectively target air force assets in the air and on the ground at scale.

Naysayers also cite the proliferation of affordable unmanned systems that allow state and non-state actors to “flood the zone” with countless low-cost systems to overwhelm traditional, higher-priced air superiority assets, including ground-based missile defense systems, as justification for their position.

The ongoing conflict between Ukraine and Russia – one in which neither side has gained control of the air – is used as a common validation of these arguments. This analysis draws the exact opposite lessons the US Air Force must learn.

It is true neither Ukraine nor Russia has achieved air superiority, resulting in a protracted, land-centric war of attrition, and it is equally true the challenge of controlling the skies over any potential battlefield in the Indo-Pacific is daunting, but these are actually arguments for and not against investments such as NGAD.

The failures of both Russia and Ukraine are not due to ubiquitous sensing, long-range fires, or swarms of drones but rather to fundamental flaws in the “Soviet way of war.”

Both Russian and Ukrainian Air Forces are treated as artillery arms of the land force rather than independent pieces of an integrated joint force executing a campaign to achieve strategic objectives. Failures on both sides to effectively organize, train, equip, and utilize their Air Forces has resulted in the current stalemate.

The lesson is not to walk away from the tools necessary to control the air domain in favor of fielding more drone and counter-drone capability. Rather, the USAF should double down on ensuring its Airmen have what is needed to effectively gain air superiority as rapidly as possible at the outset of any conflict. This begins with the NGAD program.

Pacing, Not Chasing, Threats

America’s adversaries are committed to matching our technology, and they are building a network of ubiquitous sensors and precise long-range fires in the hope we will flinch. Without a commitment to NGAD, we play right into their hands.

If the US Air Force chases rather than paces the threat, it is doomed to fail.

Pacing the threat requires a commitment to building and fielding the most capable air superiority force that the US, allies, and partner industries can produce… a commitment to NGAD.

NGAD Cuts – The Wrong Message

 Unfortunately, recent cuts to the NGAD program raise serious concerns about the Air Force’s commitment to its founding purpose. Furthermore, such cuts negatively incentivize sister services to divert precious investment dollars to “cover down” on an Air Force responsibility rather than investing in securing their primary fighting domains.

To wit, the Army, Navy, and Marine Corps have each increased investments in long-range fires and associated enabling infrastructure, as well as enhanced defensive measures, all under the assumption the Air Force can no longer provide air cover for the Joint team.

The Role of Policy

 The most capable Air Force is useless if its hands are tied with policy constraints. Military leaders must advise policymakers on the authorities required to gain and maintain air superiority vis-a-vis a peer competitor. Investments are useless if policymakers are not committed to unleashing the power of their Airmen.

Harnessing Innovative Technologies

On August 5, Gen (ret) Mark Milley and Eric Schmidt released an article in Foreign Affairs Online titled “America Isn’t Ready for the Wars of the Future.”

While I agree with their points on the need to leverage artificial intelligence and drones, reform the Department of Defense’s acquisition system, and capitalize on the US’ one-of-a-kind innovation ecosystem for the good of national defense, I disagree that the era of “shock and awe” campaigns is finished.

Technology changes, as the authors duly noted, but the principles of war have proven timeless. A commitment to NGAD is a commitment to arming America’s Airmen with the exact game-changing technologies advocated by Gen Milley and Mr. Schmidt.

Conclusion

Air Force senior leaders must reaffirm their commitment to the Service’s core mission of controlling the air by providing Airmen with the tools necessary to accomplish the mission, beginning NGAD.

Fielding NGAD arms policymakers with a credible deterrent, assures America’s allies and partners, and allows sister services to focus investments on core missions in their domains.

General Charles S. Corcoran is a retired US Air Force Major General with over 31 years of military service, culminating in his most recent role as Assistant Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations at USAF Headquarters (HQ) in Washington, DC.

Prior to that position, General Corcoran was the Commander of the US Air Force Warfare Center, Nellis Air Force Base, Nevada.

The views and opinions expressed here are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the editorial position of The Defense Post.

The Defense Post aims to publish a wide range of high-quality opinion and analysis from a diverse array of people – do you want to send us yours? Click here to submit an op-ed.

The post Will Budget Cuts Compromise the US Air Force’s Air Superiority? appeared first on The Defense Post.

For the next two days, as desperate Afghans and foreign nationals attempted to flee the fallen country, the initial crowd of around 5,000 people overrunning the airport appeared to double every 12 hours.

The Taliban presence south of the airport, combined with their nightly movements throughout Kabul, suggested the possibility of a deliberate, coordinated effort to create a situation where US Marines would inadvertently kill civilians.

If this happened, Taliban fighters would, in theory, gain the favor of the civilians by appearing to “heroically” save Afghans from international forces.

Unpredictable and Messy

Our primary mission was to keep the runway open. We did this while snipers intermittently attacked our checkpoints and panicked civilians threatened to overrun the airport’s perimeter and runway.

When millions of lives are at stake and power is uncertain or nonexistent, the concept of law and order goes out the window. Mildly stated, our job was unpredictable and messy.

I wouldn’t have had a strong stance if you had asked me about non-lethal weapons before August 2021. My primary focus was on live fire and lethal combat relevant to any region where American forces might deploy.

I did not anticipate our combat environment would involve one of the largest air evacuations in world history combined with fixed-site security of what essentially became an island.

I could never have foreseen that we Marines would not be allowed to target our attackers. I damn sure didn’t anticipate that our unit would spend its last two weeks in Afghanistan standing post as partners alongside the same Taliban fighters that had been trying to kill us for over 20 years.

Need for Lethality

In the spring of 2021, our battalion left the United States well-trained before we deployed on a standard six-month rotation as a Marine Expeditionary Unit attached to a US Navy Amphibious Ready Group.

However, our tactics and training — and the equipment we prepared to use in combat — focused mostly on lethal, complex, direct-action missions.

While my Marines and I benefitted from learning how to get on and off a ship to raid an enemy position in a small window of time, we didn’t rely on those skills or the lethal munitions that accompanied them to control chaotic civilian crowds in and around Hamid Karzai International Airport (HKIA).

We needed more effective non-lethal weapons — which the US Department of Defense now calls intermediate force capabilities — and the training and experience to use them effectively.

Why Intermediate Force?

Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has accelerated the US national security policy shift from two decades of combat operations focused on counterterrorism and counterinsurgency towards the long-term mission of strategic deterrence against peer competitors.

In the South China Sea, US military leaders are preparing to counter an adversary with scalable capabilities ranging from precise lethality to less-than-lethal means.

Since January 2019, Russia has officially been developing weapons that will be mounted on unmanned aerial vehicles and robots and can produce not only kinetic lethal outcomes but also non-lethal acoustic, flashing, and irritating effects.

Intermediate force capabilities refer to a broad array of new and existing operational tools, including non-lethal weapons, that offer scalability between presence and lethality.

From increasing offensive capabilities along the electromagnetic spectrum to establishing a permanent degree of legally permissible actions — that could potentially include deadly force — peer adversaries are preparing for a range of force options.

These types of capabilities can contribute to accomplishing US strategic goals in regions of peer competition by enabling scalable, less-than-lethal tactics in complex situations, such as the one we confronted in Afghanistan.

The Battle of Hamid Karzai International Airport

On August 26, 2021, an Islamic State militant detonated a suicide vest HKIA’s Abbey Gate, killing 13 US service members and dozens of Afghan civilians.

Days later, America’s longest war ended with a massive airlift to evacuate hundreds of thousands of Americans, foreign citizens, and vulnerable Afghans. The US service members successfully conducted the airlift transporting men, women, and children from a hostile environment without using deadly force while keeping a hidden enemy at bay.

Almost two years later, few people appear to understand the amount of combat required to secure and maintain what was Afghanistan’s only functioning international airport for over two weeks.

Taliban units persistently attacked, with assaults halting only the day before US State Department authorities and Taliban representatives brokered a deal.

The resulting agreement mandated that US Marines stand post alongside the same Taliban soldiers who, moments before (and for more than two decades), were our sworn enemies. To say this was an uncomfortable and demoralizing experience would be among the century’s biggest understatements.

When I arrived in Kabul in mid-July 2021 as a special advisor to the commanding general who would be tasked with the evacuation, we were told we would be securing the airport at a time and date to be determined. I began preparing for that operation.

As it turned out, the Taliban offensive across Afghanistan, culminating with the fall of Kabul, decided the evacuation timeline rather than the US or coalition chain of command.

Despite multiple combat deployments, this was my first time carrying a cell phone in combat (we previously had satellite phones). Anytime I had the opportunity, I could call my wife and tell her I was still alive.

And when I called, she would ask me about the latest 30-second videos released on Twitter, Instagram, and TikTok that the public assumed to be the most authoritative sources of ground truth.

Video: People run on tarmac of Kabul international airport as a US military aircraft attempts to take off. pic.twitter.com/9qA36HS0WQ

— TOLOnews (@TOLOnews) August 16, 2021

Those viral snapshots from Afghans often portrayed events inaccurately by failing to provide the context of the firefight or airplane arrival right before someone’s smartphone camera started rolling. Misinformation was seemingly as rampant as the hysterical crowd and proliferated with stunning ease.

Like accurate information, non-lethal weapons need to impact an entire crowd to be effective. Although our unit had been through non-lethal weapons training before deployment, by the time we got to HKIA, there was no time left for training.

We could only invent tactics on the ground. Initially, we spent two days and nights fist-fighting the hordes of Afghans to maintain control of the airport. Once that was accomplished, we had to maintain the “grind on the gates” with on-the-spot refresher training on Stinger grenades and improvised weapons of opportunity.

Defending the airport’s runway and main gates, our unit went through our advance team’s supply of Stinger grenades and tear gas canisters in a matter of hours.

In both military and civilian terminals, HKIA was a humanitarian disaster. Living conditions for Afghan civilians and US military forces alike were terrible. Refuse, flu, and COVID-19 were rampant. Afghans fought and assaulted each other for real and imagined evacuation opportunities. Military medical personnel treated everyone they could despite the repellant conditions and performed heroically.

Being in the middle of a national capital that had just fallen, standing shoulder-to-shoulder with that longtime enemy and lacking the permission to defend ourselves confidently compounded the palpable sense of terror and urgency. And yet, we completed the mission.

On multiple occasions, C-17s took off or landed with wings directly over our heads as we were restraining an Afghan crowd five meters — five meters — from the runway. In scenarios like these, intermediate force capabilities such as directed energy weapons would be far more useful than grenades and tear gas.

If US military personnel were trained on these systems and the systems were fielded to infantry battalions or Marine Expeditionary Units, they could have saved both Afghan and American lives.

Logistically speaking, the airlift evacuation from Afghanistan was among the most remarkable humanitarian achievements in history. Much has been written about the strategic failures that allowed the Taliban to take Kabul. Less has been said about the tactical and operational lessons learned from Marines and soldiers who endured the full spectrum of conflict.

For two weeks, the most dangerous place in Kabul changed by the hour. Sometimes it was Abbey Gate, where the suicide bombing happened. Other times it was the airport runway, where 200 US Marines pushed several thousand Afghan civilians beyond the flight line.

Other times again, it was the airport terminal, which sustained intermittent sniper fire. Simultaneously, Taliban units established checkpoints around the airport, including south of the main exit.

As we tried to funnel Afghan civilians who entered the airport perimeter out a gate, they realized they were trapped between Taliban bullets and American fists. Most chose our fists.

Intermediate Force for Future Operations

While the men and women I served with did everything within their ability to prepare for the mission, in hindsight, better tools could have been available that would have helped us accomplish the task.

The need to expand time and space while dealing with evolving threats requires further development and integration of force capabilities beyond lethality.

American battlefield leaders have a strategic, operational, and tactical obligation to provide forces with the ability to determine enemy intent at range, neutralize threats before they become lethal, and disrupt, delay, and impair enemies across all domains.

In situations such as infrastructure defense, intermediate force capabilities can help commanders expand decision time and space in ambiguous situations and help to prevent unnecessary destruction and loss of life.

Examples include acoustic hailers, active denial devices that warn or actively disperse individuals and crowds, and similar systems that could hamper or disable vehicles or vessels.

How would US forces accomplish an air evacuation from Taipei or any vulnerable city in the South China Sea? What technology would Americans use to defend and evacuate one of Vietnam’s small Spratly Island civilian settlements?

Consider the ongoing and ever-present risk of how an enemy can hide within and observe from a civilian population in any operational circumstance, including reconnaissance or counter-recon operations.

Even where force is warranted, experience shows that US military personnel have less of an issue of destroying a target and more challenges in defending against what cannot be identified or engaged.

Non-lethal weapons can reduce the risk of moral injury to the people whom US authorities ask to carry out complex missions.

At HKIA, the skills of chaplains were as crucial as combatants for young men and women to process the human tragedy as they decided who would live or die.

At one checkpoint towards the evacuation’s end, the momentum of the mostly male crowd pushed a young Afghan girl to the ground. As a US Marine reached down to help her, a Taliban soldier pointed his rifle at the infantryman, loudly reminding all parties that men were now forbidden to touch women publicly.

Although leadership diffused the tension and the girl stood up on her own, the incident provides a case study of how intermediate force options can help achieve operational goals.

Non-lethal weapons can mitigate strategic risk by providing warfighters with tools that can seize initiative without armed conflict. They offer options that operate below the level of armed conflict. They also provide options that are linked with lethal force and a means to escalate and de-escalate rather than simply projecting lethality in tense and decisive moments.

From the battalion commander to the lowest private, the men and women I worked with showed courage, bravery, and extreme valor. Knowing that daily they were deciding who lived and died in Afghanistan daily, these young men and women went out and risked their lives to do it because their sense of duty demanded it of them.

Training and equipping American forces with non-lethal weapons will give them every chance of succeeding when this inevitable event happens again.

Intermediate force options are necessary to compete against adversaries and enable American veterans to return from tomorrow’s battlefields, wherever they may be, as physically and psychologically intact as possible.

Bill Callen retired from the Marine Corps as a Marine Gunner after 23 years of service.

Prior to promotion to Gunner, Callen spent his time in the infantry, serving in the 1st, 2nd, and 3rd Marine Divisions.

In 2021, Gunner Callen was awarded the Gunner Henry Lewis Hulbert Trophy for Outstanding Leadership.

The views and opinions expressed here are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the editorial position of The Defense Post.

The Defense Post aims to publish a wide range of high-quality opinion and analysis from a diverse array of people – do you want to send us yours? Click here to submit an op-ed.

The post On the Need for Intermediate Force: Operational Lessons From the Afghanistan Evacuation appeared first on The Defense Post.

Tshisekedi emphasized the critical role of US leadership in addressing the DRC’s security challenges. He requested US assistance to achieve lasting stability and ended by advocating for stronger US-DRC and US-Africa partnerships for mutual development.

This development could be the United States’ green light to stop a regional war in one of Africa’s largest countries.

Why DRC Needs Support

For decades, the eastern region of the DRC has been a battlefield, with approximately six million people killed and over six million more internally displaced since 1996.

While the conflict’s roots are deep and complex, violence from Rwandan-linked rebel groups, such as the March 23 Movement (M23), continues to undermine the security of the Congolese population.

To exacerbate the crisis, over 100 non-state armed groups remain active, raising fears of a devastating regional conflict between the DRC and Rwanda.

As of July 2024, the M23 — an ethnic Tutsi-led insurgent group fighting against Congolese forces — is the primary force in ongoing violence, continuing its push over Goma, a key city in eastern DRC, and disrupting regional security dynamics.

This has compelled DRC’s armed forces to refocus its efforts on Goma and reduce presence in other areas. The Southern African Development Community Mission in the DRC (SAMIDRC) escalated its support, deploying extra troops and resources to help stabilize the area.

Shifting Landscape of Support

When the Congolese government ended the UN mission in the country in July 2023 and ordered all troops to leave by the end of 2024, the peacekeeping burden shifted to regional actors. Countries such as Burundi, Angola, South Africa, Kenya, Uganda, and South Sudan are now taking steps to mediate the conflict and promote stability.

On the diplomatic front, an open-ended ceasefire was announced on July 30 at the initiative of Angola and the African Union, which came into effect on August 4. The US stated it was prepared to assist in the enforcement and supervision of the ceasefire.

As the UN phases out its operations, the Armed Forces of the DRC (FARDC), the Southern African Development Community Mission in the DRC, and The Wazalendo — a group of irregular fighters allied with FARDC and opposed to M23 — are stepping in to fill the security void.

The FARDC is tasked with maintaining stability and countering armed groups. At the same time, SAMIDRC’s regional force aims to support these efforts and ensure a coordinated approach to peacekeeping and conflict resolution in the region.

With increased military assistance, Washington would strengthen its diplomatic relationships, contribute to regional stability, reaffirm its commitment to global security, and prevent a potential regional war with Rwanda.

US Intervention Would Be Hit for Moscow

The United States should not allow Russia to establish a foothold in the DRC as it has in other conflict regions.

Russian paramilitaries are notorious for committing atrocities against civilians in their counter-terrorism operations. Nevertheless, countries like Libya, Mali, and the Central African Republic are increasingly turning to Moscow as their primary security partner.

The US investing in the DRC would counterbalance Russia’s expanding influence on the continent, preventing it from securing a stronger position in Central Africa. By forging closer relations with the DRC, the United States could deter the country from pursuing military alliances with Russia, which is known to provide affordable yet potentially destabilizing military aid.

By providing the security the DRC desperately needs, the US could demonstrate its genuine commitment to the well-being of African nations beyond the pursuit of resources like oil and gold, as Russia has historically done.

By providing the Congolese military with assistance, including training, weapons, intelligence, and equipment, the US can give the DRC an alternative to Russia and create a safer environment for Congolese citizens.

Improving DRC-US Ties Could Be Mutually Beneficial

Improving relations between the US and the DRC could benefit both nations.

President Tshisekedi urgently needs support to fight rebels, and US investment in the DRC could help build a strong partnership that promotes trade, democratic values, and peace.

Supporting the DRC in its fight against armed groups would also help curb the spread of violence and extremism in Africa, preventing global repercussions.

For reference, the ISIS-affiliated Allied Democratic Forces has been a significant source of violence and instability in eastern DRC. In 2023, the militant group was responsible for over 1,000 fatalities, making it the deadliest threat to civilians in the region.

Moreover, a stable DRC can become a more reliable trading partner, contributing to the diversification of supply chains and reducing dependency on less stable regions.

Economically, the DRC holds an estimated $24 trillion in untapped mineral reserves, including significant quantities of cobalt and copper essential for electric vehicle batteries and other technologies vital to the green energy transition.

In return, the US can support the DRC through infrastructure, healthcare, and governance investments. In 2022, a memorandum of understanding between the US, DRC, and Zambia aimed to develop a cross-border value chain for electric vehicle batteries, highlighting the mutual benefits of such partnerships. This agreement helps the DRC economically and assists America in securing a stable supply of cobalt and copper, reducing reliance on China.

Additionally, Washington can help combat the illicit trade and exploitation of minerals like gold and tantalum, which finance the conflict in the DRC. Reports by the UN and civil society show that traders, sometimes aided by armed groups, transport and export significant quantities of these minerals from the DRC.

By investing in the stabilization and development of the DRC, the US can proactively mitigate these risks at their source.

Looking Forward

The DRC deserves a brighter future, free from violence and instability. By providing targeted military aid and policies aimed at humanitarian and diplomacy efforts, the US can become a powerful force for peace.

This strategic investment can significantly weaken Moscow’s influence in Africa while empowering the Congolese people to build a secure and prosperous nation.

Investing in the DRC aligns with the values of life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness, extending these ideals beyond America’s borders and contributing to a better world.

Avery Warfield is an analyst at a sub-Saharan Africa-based consulting firm.

He has extensive international experience living and working in the United States, France, Mauritania, Uganda, Kenya, and Senegal.

Avery holds a degree in Politics & International Affairs from Wake Forest University.

The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not reflect the opinions of the US government or any other entity.

The views and opinions expressed here are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the editorial position of The Defense Post.

The Defense Post aims to publish a wide range of high-quality opinion and analysis from a diverse array of people – do you want to send us yours? Click here to submit an op-ed.

The post Funding DRC’s Army Would Prevent a Regional War, Not Start One appeared first on The Defense Post.

But despite appearances, this development is not progress: it augurs more sovereign “piracy” by the enemies of free nations.

Of course, we should all be overjoyed that Wall Street Journal reporter Evan Gershkovich, Marine Paul Whelan, and the independent radio journalist Alsu Kurmasheva have returned to the US, and that Kara-Murza and two other Russian dissidents were saved.

But the price for their release was huge: an FSB colonel who assassinated a Chechen national in Germany, another FSB agent who laundered money for the Kremlin, an operative who hacked into computers to make trades netting millions for Vladimir Putin’s coffers, another Russian agent who moved American ammunition into Russia, and four confirmed Russian spies held in western prisons.

Asymmetric Swaps

These are in no way symmetric swaps: Russians convicted of very serious crimes in impartial jury trials are increasingly being traded for completely innocent Western journalists, businesspersons, and athletes who were snatched at Putin’s command and convicted many months after capture in Russian kangaroo courts.

The same was true when American basketball star Brittany Griner was exchanged for Russian arms dealer Vicktor Bout, nicknamed “the merchant of death.”

These moves are nothing like the US-Soviet swaps during the 20th century Cold War, when actual American operatives and military agents were captured in Russia. We are trading innocents for hardened criminals involved in enabling totalitarian systems of mass murder.

The same holds for Biden’s September 2023 decision to release over $6 billion in Iranian assets, which were held sequestered in a South Korean account, in exchange for five innocent Americans held for years without just cause by Iran’s totalitarian theocracy.

Rather than “prisoner exchanges,” we should be calling them “criminals for hostages swaps.”

Hostage Diplomacy

The glaring problem with such “hostage diplomacy” is obvious: as Senator Mitt Romney said of the Iran deal, the appearance of paying more than $1 billion for each American freed will only encourage more hostage-taking.

Putin will be further emboldened to order more Russian agents and proxies to carry out assassinations, hacking, fraud, weapons trafficking, and attacks on democratic election systems because he can retrieve any of his agents who are caught and convicted: all he has to do is snatch some innocent Americans, Germans, or other Western citizens to use as bargaining chips.

This is a losing spiral: sovereign hostage-taking has been increasing for years, just like ransomware, and it is a bipartisan problem no matter who is in the White House. In 1985, Ronald Reagan infamously sent arms to Iran in exchange for US hostages held in Lebanon as part of an illegal complex larger deal. Short-term gain leads to long-term pain.

The situation is similar when terrorist groups take hostages. In his 2018 book on terrorism, economist and game theory expert Todd Sandler notes one study that found that 2.62 “additional abductions” resulted from concessions to get one hostage back.

The International Center for Counter-Terrorism concludes that rewarding terrorist kidnappers can “encourage imitation and become contagious.”

This is why, ironically, the Biden administration earlier this year began seriously considering a ban on paying ransomware attackers to release computing systems they have seized. But the White House and congressional leaders failed to follow through on this, caving to pressure from corporations and local governments that fear having no recourse when their systems are breached.

New International Hostage Game

Of course, hostage-taking has been part of warfare and hostile relations among nations for many centuries.

Yet medieval kings and queens responded very differently than Western authorities do now: when their innocent citizens were captured and held, they would often snatch innocents from the other side to use as bargaining chips.

Western nations have not done this because our systems of justice are not dictatorial and include habeas corpus, which is the basic right to a speedy and impartial trial. Thus, as Keir Giles from Chatham House told Newsweek, Putin can retrieve his “murderers, spies, and criminals” by taking Western hostages to trade for them, knowing that the US cannot “respond in kind.”

This central asymmetry is now the reason why the US and its allies are losing so badly in the new international hostage game.

To even the scales, American presidents may have to consider detaining Russians or Iranians of interest to their regimes whenever those dictators grab innocent Americans. This would require suspending habeas corpus for those foreign nationals we hold under special reprisal orders, and exchanging only them – not Russians, Iranians, or Chinese operatives already convicted of major crimes – in exchange for American victims.

In other words, we would need to copy Putin’s tactic of “stockpiling” prominent Americans to use as bargaining chips.

For example, when Putin seized and held Griner to use as a pawn in exchange for Russian criminals justly convicted in the US, we could have responded by seizing three more Russians closely connected with the Kremlin and suspected of shady dealings. Indefinite detentions of select foreign nationals held for months or years without trial might sound extreme; yet without such reprisals, we will see more innocent victims in Griner’s and Gershkovich’s former situation.

Legal Reforms

We could further strengthen this tit-for-tat response with legal reforms that also beat ransomware.

Outlawing all forms of payment for taking innocent American hostages and seizing control of computer systems is the most essential step. The law should include “waivers” or presidential permissions to pay only when hundreds of lives or hundreds of billions in assets are at stake, and should include criminal penalties for its violation, given the desperation payers endure.

When such a law is strictly enforced, sovereign adversaries seizing computers or human hostages will eventually realize that they are wasting their time and resources on such efforts.

So we should reconsider the policy announced by President Barack Obama in June 2015, which he broke and both Donald Trump and Biden rejected, that “the United States government will make no concessions to individuals or groups holding US nationals hostage.”

While this policy should not apply to exchanging prisoners of war, it can deter civilian hostage-taking because returning foreign civilians seized in reprisal is not a “concession.”

Beyond banning paying ransoms in all forms, we need to punish rogue regimes that snatch our citizens as political prisoners with other reprisals — such as destruction of military assets and even detention of their own friends working in the US.

The ultimate solution is to rid the Earth altogether of dictators who take innocents as political hostages, but that will probably require a global alliance of democratic nations of the sort outlined in my book, A League of Democracies.

John Davenport is Professor of Philosophy and Peace & Justice Studies at Fordham University.

He is the author of The Democracy Amendments, available through Amazon.com.

The views and opinions expressed here are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the editorial position of The Defense Post.

The Defense Post aims to publish a wide range of high-quality opinion and analysis from a diverse array of people – do you want to send us yours? Click here to submit an op-ed.

The post Why the US and Its Allies Are Losing the New International Hostage Game appeared first on The Defense Post.

Benin, which only recorded its first incident of extremist violence in 2019, is among the continent’s countries being increasingly impacted by terrorism. The number of recorded attacks has risen year-on-year since, reaching 20 incidents in 2022 before doubling last year. The Beninese military labeled 2023’s drastic uptick as “the sharpest rise in extremist attacks in Africa.”

An overwhelming share of this activity has occurred in the Park W-Arly-Pendjari Complex, a vast 1.7 million hectares (4.2 million acres) of land that makes up West Africa’s largest protected wilderness.

The sheer size of this area, alongside its location on the periphery of one of the world’s most violent regions, means Benin has struggled to halt the growing presence of Jama’at Nasr al-Islam wal Muslimin (JNIM), and to a lesser extent Islamic State-Sahel.

Kidnappings in Benin

Evidence of JNIM’s growing presence in Benin is also visible in the country’s increasing rate of kidnappings.

Last year saw northern Benin record at least 75 kidnapping (or attempted kidnapping) incidents, just over triple the number recorded in 2022, which itself witnessed a total higher than the combined number of recorded cases nationwide between 2016 and 2021.

The implications are grave, with kidnappings serving as one of the initial tactics violent extremist organizations frequently deploy to assert presence. Indeed, both JNIM and Islamic State-Sahel typically begin their encroachment into fresh territory by forging alliances with local actors. However, for those less willing to cooperate, methods designed to coerce and intimidate, such as kidnappings, will be used.

This is because they can provide much-needed intel on the local terrain, strike fear into local communities, and announce the presence of an extremist organization as a legitimate violent actor, as well as an additional source of income.

Perhaps most importantly, kidnappings help gradually erode the belief that the state is the primary security provider.

Pre-Existing Grievances

JNIM has found success in northern Benin over recent years, but this says as much about the group’s capabilities as it does about some of the Beninese government policies. JNIM’s expansion would have been far more difficult without the pre-existing grievances in the W-Arly-Pendjari Complex and surrounding areas.

A series of land reforms and sedentarization laws aimed at modernizing its agro-pastoral industry and conserving the local ecosystem, as well as the closure of the Park Complex to the public after two French tourists were kidnapped several years ago, have all been accused of exacerbating farmer and pastoral grievances and conflicts.

JNIM has been able to leverage some of these frustrations to expand deeper into the Park Complex, in turn allowing it to become an increasingly dominant actor in Benin.

Underscoring this notion is a recent study carried out in the Atakora Department, which houses the Pendjari National Park and the largest section of Benin’s border with Burkina Faso. Fieldwork found that 20 percent of participants personally knew someone who had joined JNIM, while 45 percent reported seeing JNIM in their community, and 30 percent had personally interacted with JNIM militants.

Benin now finds itself at a crossroads, although there are several steps the country should take to try to tackle the growing threat posed by violent extremist organizations in its territory.

Address Socio-Economic Pressures

In the Park W-Arly-Pendjari Complex, the government should better address the socio-economic pressures facing farmer and pastoralist communities, even if it comes at a slight environmental cost.

This can be done by declassifying segments of the park’s buffer zones for these communities to use, which would likely alleviate overall levels of conflict and competition.

While this could be a short-term solution, a comprehensive strategy aimed at providing sustainable economic opportunities to the affected areas in northern Benin should also be considered.

Military Cooperation With Neighbors

Benin must also increase military cooperation with Burkina Faso and Niger, the latter of whom the country is currently embroiled in a lengthy diplomatic spat with. With their relationship fraught and Niger facing its own issues with violent extremist organizations, Niamey is unlikely to prioritize terrorist activity near its border with Benin.

This fallout does not only rule out military assistance and cooperation, it has also meant that Niger has kept its side of the border closed for almost a year now. Until reopened, local communities in northern Benin that once relied on cross-border trade will continue to be negatively impacted, further creating socio-economic conditions that are conducive to violent extremists.

While facing its own extensive issues with extremism, Nigeria will be concerned that JNIM militants from the Sahel have transited through Benin and settled in the western Kainji Lake National Park. The threat here is relatively nascent compared to elsewhere in Nigeria, meaning Abuja potentially has a window of opportunity to combat JNIM before it morphs into a far larger threat.

To do so, it will need to cooperate intensely with Benin, and even shoulder more of the burden in attempting to tackle this cross-border threat. Indeed, there is evidence that bandits from Nigeria are now crossing into JNIM-held zones in Benin, underscoring how failing to address this issue will benefit extremist groups traditionally found on opposite sides of the shared border.

Nigeria has ample experience combatting such groups, even if its success in doing so is limited, meaning it must share its experience and knowledge with Benin to implement an effective counter-terrorism strategy that can address all facets of the insecurity multiplying across their shared border.

Western Community Should Help

Finally, the Western community should play a more proactive role in helping Benin.

This should be done via a mixture of civilian and military initiatives. While improving the capacities and size of the Beninese security apparatus will be helpful in fighting extremist groups, providing an outlet for disenfranchised members to leave their groups will be equally productive in the long run.

The US and EU should set up and sponsor disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration programs immediately, as they do elsewhere in the region.

The fate of Benin remains unclear, although it is evident that if trends of the past few years are allowed to progress at their current rates, the country will likely suffer a similar fate as some of its West African peers — many of whom contain some of the highest levels of terrorism and violence in the world.

Charlie Werb is an analyst, writer, and commentator focussing on sub-Saharan African security issues, with a particular emphasis on Islamist extremist groups in the region.

The views and opinions expressed here are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the editorial position of The Defense Post.

The Defense Post aims to publish a wide range of high-quality opinion and analysis from a diverse array of people – do you want to send us yours? Click here to submit an op-ed.

The post Benin at Crossroads: Urgent Measures Needed to Combat Rising Terrorism appeared first on The Defense Post.

Deliberately using civilians as shields for fighters has been a tactic that has worked since the 1990s, and Western militaries have not come up with an effective counter.

In the future, the Israelis should consider the development of advanced non-lethal weapons — and so should we.

X Unit

Those of us who fought in Somalia in 1993 saw the first deliberate use of civilians to mask and protect armed gunmen. The movie Black Hawk Down effectively shows this tactic.

As the Marine Corps studied the lessons learned from the conflict, we determined that non-lethal weapons should be part of our tool kit. As the director of our newly-formed Experimental Unit (X Unit), one of my jobs was to explore the possibility of using such arms.

The task became more immediate when the UN asked for help in evacuating the remaining UN forces from the failed mission in Somalia. General Tony Zinni (then a Lieutenant General) was tasked with using his First Marine Expeditionary Force staff as the nucleus of the Joint Task Force designated to accomplish the evacuation.

As a veteran of the first Somali incursion, Zinni asked the X-Unit to look into using some developmental experimental systems. This led me on a coast-to-coast search of government labs to see what was available.

If I found something the general deemed interesting, he would send a Marine Corps transport aircraft to the lab to pick it up, to include whatever scientist who knew how it worked.

If the system seemed potentially useful, we did cultural war games to determine how the Somalis might react. Zinni picked a few of the systems and trained his troops on them.

None of the selected systems were particularly decisive, but he made excellent use of psychological warfare in BBC radio interviews, which the Somalis avidly followed, portraying them as exotic and potentially very dangerous.

The ploy worked and Somali crowds and gunmen were much more reluctant to interfere with the subsequent evacuation. This contributed to the relatively bloodless success of what came to be known as Operation United Shield.

Non-Lethal Weapon Development

After Somalia, the Marine Corps lobbied for more effective non-lethal weapons. Congress eventually funded a Joint Non-Lethal Weapons Directorate (JNLWD) at Quantico, Virginia.

The JLNWD developed a directed energy weapon, the Active Denial System (ADS), which is designed to keep crowds away from US troops by making them feel searing heat without actually harming them.

If you stay behind a clearly designated line, the system will not be used. Those who cross the line will suffer the consequences. The rest should get the picture. ADS has never been used militarily because the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq did not require its use.

However, those of us in the X-Unit continued to work on using non-lethal weapons to clear buildings in urban combat where fighters and civilians were intermixed. We thought we found a technology in ultrasound, but it was omni directional; this would require us to deliver it to the target location by a robot.

The project was given impetus when UN peacekeepers in former the Yugoslavia were taken hostage by insurgents in a mountain ski chalet in Sarajevo. We tested candidate robots at the ski resort of Whiteface Mountain in the Adirondacks (site of the 1980 Winter Olympics). While we found an acceptable robot, unfortunately the ultrasound non-lethal device proved to be insufficient.

Animal testing showed that it merely irritated rather than incapacitated the monkeys. We deemed it unsatisfactory for military or law enforcement use. This appears to be the technology that the Russians are using to harass US diplomats and intelligence officials.

Future Combat

In actuality, there is a potential technology that can cause fighters and non-combatants to be incapacitated in buildings so that armed fighters can be sorted out.

It is a variation on the ADS system that can cause the immediate incapacitating effect of heat prostration. The technology’s current state requires the power source to be carried on a tractor-trailer sized platform, but reducing it is a mere technical challenge.

There may be an eventual truce in Gaza, but it will not last forever. In addition, we Americans will likely face similar urban warfare problems in the future. We could help the Israelis and ourselves by developing non-lethal weapons.

Gary Anderson served as the Chief of Plans (G-5) of the Marine Corps Expeditionary Force responsible for the Indo-Pacific area. He was the Director of the X Unit, which evolved into the Marine Corps Warfighting Lab. When he retired, he was the Lab’s Chief of Staff.

He lectures on Alternative Analysis at the George Washington University’s Elliott School of International Affairs.

The views and opinions expressed here are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the editorial position of The Defense Post.

The Defense Post aims to publish a wide range of high-quality opinion and analysis from a diverse array of people – do you want to send us yours? Click here to submit an op-ed.

The post Non-Lethal Weapons Could Help Israel and the US in Future Urban Combat appeared first on The Defense Post.

Its primary focus is advancing Australia’s submarine capabilities and fostering greater technological and intelligence sharing among the three members. However, there is a strong argument for extending the framework to include South Korea.

Such an expansion would not only bolster the collective defense posture against rising regional threats but also enhance the strategic balance in East Asia.

South Korea’s Geopolitical Positioning

South Korea’s strategic location makes it a crucial player in East Asian security dynamics.

Sharing a border with North Korea and being close to China, South Korea occupies a vital position. It acts as a frontline state against North Korean aggression and counterbalances Beijing’s expanding regional influence.

The Korean Peninsula has long been a hotspot for tensions and conflicts, making the stability and security of South Korea essential for the broader region. By integrating South Korea into AUKUS, the alliance could significantly enhance its strategic depth and operational reach in East Asia.

Alliance With US

South Korea is a key ally of the United States, with longstanding military and economic ties. The US-South Korea alliance, formalized through the 1953 Mutual Defense Treaty, has been a cornerstone of regional security for decades.

Incorporating South Korea into AUKUS would enhance interoperability and coordination among these allies, creating a more cohesive and formidable defense posture in the region.

It would also reaffirm America’s commitment to the security of its allies and partners in the Indo-Pacific, sending a strong message of solidarity and resolve.

Countering North Korean Threats

Pyongyang’s nuclear and missile programs pose a significant threat to regional stability. The regime’s continued development of nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles, along with its unpredictable behavior, has heightened tensions and insecurity.

The recent summit between Vladimir Putin and Kim Jong-un highlights the potential for increased military and technological cooperation between North Korea and Russia, raising concerns among Western allies.

By including Seoul in AUKUS, the alliance could integrate South Korea’s advanced military capabilities and intelligence assets, providing a more robust deterrent against North Korean provocations. Furthermore, South Korea’s expertise in dealing with North Korean threats, both conventional and unconventional, would be invaluable in enhancing the alliance’s overall readiness and response capabilities.

Balancing Chinese Influence

China’s assertive policies in the South China Sea and its increasing military presence have raised concerns among neighboring countries.

A broader AUKUS framework would send a strong message of unity and resolve, serving as a counterweight to Chinese expansionism.

It would also provide a more balanced and comprehensive approach to addressing the challenges posed by China’s rise, including its economic coercion, cyber activities, and maritime assertiveness.

Advanced Military Technology

South Korea’s advanced defense industry, particularly in missile defense, cybersecurity, and naval capabilities, would complement AUKUS’ technological ambitions.

South Korea has been a leader in developing cutting-edge military technologies and has a robust defense industrial base. Joint development and sharing of these technologies within the framework would enhance its collective defense capabilities.

This cooperation could include advanced radar systems, unmanned systems, artificial intelligence, and electronic warfare, providing a technological edge in countering current and future threats.

Submarine Warfare

South Korea has been developing its own submarine capabilities, including plans for nuclear-powered submarines. Submarine warfare is critical to modern naval strategy, providing stealth, endurance, and striking power.

Collaborating under the AUKUS framework could accelerate Seoul’s efforts, providing access to expertise and technology from the US and UK.

This collaboration would enhance South Korea’s submarine fleet and contribute to the overall submarine warfare capabilities of AUKUS. It would also foster greater interoperability and joint operational planning among the allied navies, enhancing their ability to conduct coordinated and effective maritime operations.

Economic Partnerships

Strengthening defense ties under AUKUS would also bolster economic relationships. South Korea’s advanced technological sector and solid industrial base could lead to collaborative projects and financial benefits for all parties involved.

Defense cooperation often spills over into other sectors, fostering innovation, investment, and trade. Joint ventures and collaborative research and development projects could create new opportunities for economic growth and technological advancement.

Moreover, a closer defense partnership would enhance supply chain security and resilience, particularly in critical sectors such as semiconductors, rare earth elements, and advanced materials.

Diplomatic Leverage

An expanded AUKUS would enhance diplomatic leverage in regional and international forums. This united front could drive more effective policy coordination on issues such as non-proliferation, trade security, and regional stability.

By presenting a cohesive and united stance, the alliance could exert greater influence on the international stage, shaping the regional security architecture and promoting a rules-based order.

It would also provide a platform for addressing other global challenges, such as climate change, humanitarian crises, and pandemics.

Expanding AUKUS

Expanding AUKUS to include South Korea represents a strategic opportunity to enhance regional security, counterbalance rising threats, and foster greater technological and economic collaboration. South Korea’s inclusion would not only strengthen the alliance’s military capabilities and deterrence posture but also promote a more integrated and resilient approach to the complex security challenges in the Indo-Pacific.

In an era of shifting power dynamics and emerging threats, highlighted by the recent Putin-Kim Jong-un summit, a broader AUKUS alliance with South Korea would serve as a powerful pillar of stability and security.

By leveraging the strengths and capabilities of all member states, such an expanded alliance would be better positioned to uphold peace, stability, and prosperity in the Indo-Pacific and beyond.

Jihoon Yu is a research fellow at the Korea Institute for Defense Analyses.

Jihoon was a member of the Task Force for South Korea’s light aircraft carrier project and Jangbogo-III submarine project. He is the main author of the ROK Navy’s Navy Vision 2045.

His areas of expertise include the ROK-US alliance, the ROK-Europe security cooperation, national security, maritime security, and maritime strategy.

He earned his BA in International Relations from the ROK Naval Academy, MA in National Security Affairs from the US Naval Postgraduate School, and a PhD in Political Science from Syracuse University.

Yonghan Park is an associate research fellow at the Korea Institute for Defense Analyses and North Korean Military Division.

His expertise includes North Korean military and naval security.

He received his PhD at the Department of North Korean Studies at Korea University.

The views and opinions expressed here are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the editorial position of The Defense Post.

The Defense Post aims to publish a wide range of high-quality opinion and analysis from a diverse array of people – do you want to send us yours? Click here to submit an op-ed.

The post Enhancing AUKUS: The Strategic Case for Including South Korea appeared first on The Defense Post.

Leveraging advanced ground-based air defense systems and effectively blending into local terrain, Kyiv has managed to neutralize a numerically superior air force.

Ukraine’s innovative use of mobile air defense units, effective tactics, and integration of advanced technologies have redefined modern warfare, showing the importance of mobility, adaptability, and international collaboration in defense strategies.

Lessons Learned

From the Donbas to Kyiv, Ukraine’s mobile air defense systems have effectively denied the enemy air superiority. Tactics such as camouflaging within surroundings and the “shoot-and-scoot” method have proven particularly successful.

These strategies have disrupted traditional aerial assaults and demonstrated that mobility and adaptability are essential for contemporary air defense. The ability to rapidly reposition and conceal air defense units has allowed Ukrainian forces to remain effective despite being outmatched in terms of sheer numbers and firepower.

The conflict has highlighted the logistical and tactical challenges of large-scale air operations. Russia’s difficulties in organizing massed air refueling operations illustrate the complexities modern air forces face.

The war also pointed to the need for stand-off precision-guided munitions, which are essential for both defensive and offensive operations. Maintaining adequate supplies of these munitions is crucial for modern military engagements that require high accuracy and minimal collateral damage.

Ukraine’s foresight in air defense preparation has also been noteworthy. The early dispersion of assets and acquisition of Man-Portable Air-Defense Systems (MANPADS) along with establishing a highly functional layered defense effectively countered Russian air capabilities.

By spreading out their air defense assets and maintaining a high degree of mobility, Ukrainian forces have been able to present a constantly shifting target set to Russian attackers, increasing their survivability and effectiveness.

Game Changer

The integration of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), precision-guided munitions, and mobile air defense systems marks a shift toward a new era of warfare. Advanced manned strike platforms are no longer apex predators in modern combat.

The rising threat of drone attacks necessitates increased readiness and maneuverability of air defense systems. As a result, electronic warfare has become essential, focusing on direct combat against enemy UAVs, including their destruction.

The ability to disrupt or destroy enemy UAVs before they can carry out their missions is increasingly seen as a critical capability for any modern military force.

Russia adapted to these tactical developments with an emphasis on radar coverage and air defense capabilities, particularly against low-altitude drones, reflecting the evolving nature of aerial threats.

To fortify defenses against UAVs, Moscow has expanded its radar network and integrated advanced systems such as the Tor-M2, Buk-M2, Buk-M3, and S-300 PM-4. These systems, alongside electronic warfare measures, are designed to disrupt the links between drones and their operators.

This trend indicates that the prolific use of UAVs is already changing the requirements for air defense systems and planning military operations involving aviation.

Need to Adapt

The ongoing conflict in Ukraine highlights the importance of international collaboration in defense strategy and technology sharing. The deployment of advanced Western air defense systems alongside Ukraine’s own solutions has created a multi-layered defense network, challenging traditional concepts of air superiority.

As drones integrate artificial intelligence and mass-produced expendable UAVs increase in autonomous capabilities, the need for cost-effective ground-based air defense systems capable of engaging drone swarms and advanced missile threats becomes more pressing.

Balancing the cost of defense with the potential damage that a drone swarm can inflict is crucial. This requires innovative solutions that ensure both economic efficiency and robust defensive capabilities.

The evolution of aerial threats necessitates a shift in military strategies and technologies. Unmanned systems, enhanced radar coverage, and advanced electronic warfare capabilities are now at the forefront of national defense agendas.

Modern military forces must adapt to these changes to maintain operational effectiveness and protect critical assets. As warfare evolves, integrating innovative technologies and international cooperation will be key to developing resilient and adaptable defense systems capable of countering emerging threats.

Way Forward

The war in Ukraine illustrates the need for modernization of air defense capabilities and new doctrinal approaches to address the challenges of modern warfare.

It is clear that in the future, air defense must integrate multiple systems and capabilities. This includes not only traditional radar and missile systems but also electronic warfare, cyber defenses, and counter-UAV technologies. An integrated and layered approach to air defense can create a more resilient and effective defensive network capable of responding to a wide range of threats.

The effectiveness of mobile air defense systems may well prompt a reevaluation of air defense strategies worldwide, emphasizing the need for mobility, concealment, adaptability, and technological superiority.

As the world watches, the lessons learned from the Ukrainian theater of war are setting new standards for how nations prepare for, engage in, and ultimately deter aggression from the skies.

Lieutenant General Keith J. Stalder is a retired United States Marine Corps general, who commanded the United States Marine Corps Forces Pacific in 2008-2010.

He is the founder of KSA Integration, a consulting firm that offers services in business process improvement, data analytics, and warrior care.

Dean Patterson is a retired Marine Corps Colonel, who has commanded aviation command and control units at the Squadron and Group level.

He is KSA’s Senior Advisor for Ground-Based Air Defense.

The views and opinions expressed here are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the editorial position of The Defense Post.

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