For the next two days, as desperate Afghans and foreign nationals attempted to flee the fallen country, the initial crowd of around 5,000 people overrunning the airport appeared to double every 12 hours.

The Taliban presence south of the airport, combined with their nightly movements throughout Kabul, suggested the possibility of a deliberate, coordinated effort to create a situation where US Marines would inadvertently kill civilians.

If this happened, Taliban fighters would, in theory, gain the favor of the civilians by appearing to “heroically” save Afghans from international forces.

Unpredictable and Messy

Our primary mission was to keep the runway open. We did this while snipers intermittently attacked our checkpoints and panicked civilians threatened to overrun the airport’s perimeter and runway.

When millions of lives are at stake and power is uncertain or nonexistent, the concept of law and order goes out the window. Mildly stated, our job was unpredictable and messy.

I wouldn’t have had a strong stance if you had asked me about non-lethal weapons before August 2021. My primary focus was on live fire and lethal combat relevant to any region where American forces might deploy.

I did not anticipate our combat environment would involve one of the largest air evacuations in world history combined with fixed-site security of what essentially became an island.

I could never have foreseen that we Marines would not be allowed to target our attackers. I damn sure didn’t anticipate that our unit would spend its last two weeks in Afghanistan standing post as partners alongside the same Taliban fighters that had been trying to kill us for over 20 years.

Need for Lethality

In the spring of 2021, our battalion left the United States well-trained before we deployed on a standard six-month rotation as a Marine Expeditionary Unit attached to a US Navy Amphibious Ready Group.

However, our tactics and training — and the equipment we prepared to use in combat — focused mostly on lethal, complex, direct-action missions.

While my Marines and I benefitted from learning how to get on and off a ship to raid an enemy position in a small window of time, we didn’t rely on those skills or the lethal munitions that accompanied them to control chaotic civilian crowds in and around Hamid Karzai International Airport (HKIA).

We needed more effective non-lethal weapons — which the US Department of Defense now calls intermediate force capabilities — and the training and experience to use them effectively.

Why Intermediate Force?

Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has accelerated the US national security policy shift from two decades of combat operations focused on counterterrorism and counterinsurgency towards the long-term mission of strategic deterrence against peer competitors.

In the South China Sea, US military leaders are preparing to counter an adversary with scalable capabilities ranging from precise lethality to less-than-lethal means.

Since January 2019, Russia has officially been developing weapons that will be mounted on unmanned aerial vehicles and robots and can produce not only kinetic lethal outcomes but also non-lethal acoustic, flashing, and irritating effects.

Intermediate force capabilities refer to a broad array of new and existing operational tools, including non-lethal weapons, that offer scalability between presence and lethality.

From increasing offensive capabilities along the electromagnetic spectrum to establishing a permanent degree of legally permissible actions — that could potentially include deadly force — peer adversaries are preparing for a range of force options.

These types of capabilities can contribute to accomplishing US strategic goals in regions of peer competition by enabling scalable, less-than-lethal tactics in complex situations, such as the one we confronted in Afghanistan.

The Battle of Hamid Karzai International Airport

On August 26, 2021, an Islamic State militant detonated a suicide vest HKIA’s Abbey Gate, killing 13 US service members and dozens of Afghan civilians.

Days later, America’s longest war ended with a massive airlift to evacuate hundreds of thousands of Americans, foreign citizens, and vulnerable Afghans. The US service members successfully conducted the airlift transporting men, women, and children from a hostile environment without using deadly force while keeping a hidden enemy at bay.

Almost two years later, few people appear to understand the amount of combat required to secure and maintain what was Afghanistan’s only functioning international airport for over two weeks.

Taliban units persistently attacked, with assaults halting only the day before US State Department authorities and Taliban representatives brokered a deal.

The resulting agreement mandated that US Marines stand post alongside the same Taliban soldiers who, moments before (and for more than two decades), were our sworn enemies. To say this was an uncomfortable and demoralizing experience would be among the century’s biggest understatements.

When I arrived in Kabul in mid-July 2021 as a special advisor to the commanding general who would be tasked with the evacuation, we were told we would be securing the airport at a time and date to be determined. I began preparing for that operation.

As it turned out, the Taliban offensive across Afghanistan, culminating with the fall of Kabul, decided the evacuation timeline rather than the US or coalition chain of command.

Despite multiple combat deployments, this was my first time carrying a cell phone in combat (we previously had satellite phones). Anytime I had the opportunity, I could call my wife and tell her I was still alive.

And when I called, she would ask me about the latest 30-second videos released on Twitter, Instagram, and TikTok that the public assumed to be the most authoritative sources of ground truth.

Video: People run on tarmac of Kabul international airport as a US military aircraft attempts to take off. pic.twitter.com/9qA36HS0WQ

— TOLOnews (@TOLOnews) August 16, 2021

Those viral snapshots from Afghans often portrayed events inaccurately by failing to provide the context of the firefight or airplane arrival right before someone’s smartphone camera started rolling. Misinformation was seemingly as rampant as the hysterical crowd and proliferated with stunning ease.

Like accurate information, non-lethal weapons need to impact an entire crowd to be effective. Although our unit had been through non-lethal weapons training before deployment, by the time we got to HKIA, there was no time left for training.

We could only invent tactics on the ground. Initially, we spent two days and nights fist-fighting the hordes of Afghans to maintain control of the airport. Once that was accomplished, we had to maintain the “grind on the gates” with on-the-spot refresher training on Stinger grenades and improvised weapons of opportunity.

Defending the airport’s runway and main gates, our unit went through our advance team’s supply of Stinger grenades and tear gas canisters in a matter of hours.

In both military and civilian terminals, HKIA was a humanitarian disaster. Living conditions for Afghan civilians and US military forces alike were terrible. Refuse, flu, and COVID-19 were rampant. Afghans fought and assaulted each other for real and imagined evacuation opportunities. Military medical personnel treated everyone they could despite the repellant conditions and performed heroically.

Being in the middle of a national capital that had just fallen, standing shoulder-to-shoulder with that longtime enemy and lacking the permission to defend ourselves confidently compounded the palpable sense of terror and urgency. And yet, we completed the mission.

On multiple occasions, C-17s took off or landed with wings directly over our heads as we were restraining an Afghan crowd five meters — five meters — from the runway. In scenarios like these, intermediate force capabilities such as directed energy weapons would be far more useful than grenades and tear gas.

If US military personnel were trained on these systems and the systems were fielded to infantry battalions or Marine Expeditionary Units, they could have saved both Afghan and American lives.

Logistically speaking, the airlift evacuation from Afghanistan was among the most remarkable humanitarian achievements in history. Much has been written about the strategic failures that allowed the Taliban to take Kabul. Less has been said about the tactical and operational lessons learned from Marines and soldiers who endured the full spectrum of conflict.

For two weeks, the most dangerous place in Kabul changed by the hour. Sometimes it was Abbey Gate, where the suicide bombing happened. Other times it was the airport runway, where 200 US Marines pushed several thousand Afghan civilians beyond the flight line.

Other times again, it was the airport terminal, which sustained intermittent sniper fire. Simultaneously, Taliban units established checkpoints around the airport, including south of the main exit.

As we tried to funnel Afghan civilians who entered the airport perimeter out a gate, they realized they were trapped between Taliban bullets and American fists. Most chose our fists.

Intermediate Force for Future Operations

While the men and women I served with did everything within their ability to prepare for the mission, in hindsight, better tools could have been available that would have helped us accomplish the task.

The need to expand time and space while dealing with evolving threats requires further development and integration of force capabilities beyond lethality.

American battlefield leaders have a strategic, operational, and tactical obligation to provide forces with the ability to determine enemy intent at range, neutralize threats before they become lethal, and disrupt, delay, and impair enemies across all domains.

In situations such as infrastructure defense, intermediate force capabilities can help commanders expand decision time and space in ambiguous situations and help to prevent unnecessary destruction and loss of life.

Examples include acoustic hailers, active denial devices that warn or actively disperse individuals and crowds, and similar systems that could hamper or disable vehicles or vessels.

How would US forces accomplish an air evacuation from Taipei or any vulnerable city in the South China Sea? What technology would Americans use to defend and evacuate one of Vietnam’s small Spratly Island civilian settlements?

Consider the ongoing and ever-present risk of how an enemy can hide within and observe from a civilian population in any operational circumstance, including reconnaissance or counter-recon operations.

Even where force is warranted, experience shows that US military personnel have less of an issue of destroying a target and more challenges in defending against what cannot be identified or engaged.

Non-lethal weapons can reduce the risk of moral injury to the people whom US authorities ask to carry out complex missions.

At HKIA, the skills of chaplains were as crucial as combatants for young men and women to process the human tragedy as they decided who would live or die.

At one checkpoint towards the evacuation’s end, the momentum of the mostly male crowd pushed a young Afghan girl to the ground. As a US Marine reached down to help her, a Taliban soldier pointed his rifle at the infantryman, loudly reminding all parties that men were now forbidden to touch women publicly.

Although leadership diffused the tension and the girl stood up on her own, the incident provides a case study of how intermediate force options can help achieve operational goals.

Non-lethal weapons can mitigate strategic risk by providing warfighters with tools that can seize initiative without armed conflict. They offer options that operate below the level of armed conflict. They also provide options that are linked with lethal force and a means to escalate and de-escalate rather than simply projecting lethality in tense and decisive moments.

From the battalion commander to the lowest private, the men and women I worked with showed courage, bravery, and extreme valor. Knowing that daily they were deciding who lived and died in Afghanistan daily, these young men and women went out and risked their lives to do it because their sense of duty demanded it of them.

Training and equipping American forces with non-lethal weapons will give them every chance of succeeding when this inevitable event happens again.

Intermediate force options are necessary to compete against adversaries and enable American veterans to return from tomorrow’s battlefields, wherever they may be, as physically and psychologically intact as possible.

Bill Callen retired from the Marine Corps as a Marine Gunner after 23 years of service.

Prior to promotion to Gunner, Callen spent his time in the infantry, serving in the 1st, 2nd, and 3rd Marine Divisions.

In 2021, Gunner Callen was awarded the Gunner Henry Lewis Hulbert Trophy for Outstanding Leadership.

The views and opinions expressed here are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the editorial position of The Defense Post.

The Defense Post aims to publish a wide range of high-quality opinion and analysis from a diverse array of people – do you want to send us yours? Click here to submit an op-ed.

The post On the Need for Intermediate Force: Operational Lessons From the Afghanistan Evacuation appeared first on The Defense Post.

But despite appearances, this development is not progress: it augurs more sovereign “piracy” by the enemies of free nations.

Of course, we should all be overjoyed that Wall Street Journal reporter Evan Gershkovich, Marine Paul Whelan, and the independent radio journalist Alsu Kurmasheva have returned to the US, and that Kara-Murza and two other Russian dissidents were saved.

But the price for their release was huge: an FSB colonel who assassinated a Chechen national in Germany, another FSB agent who laundered money for the Kremlin, an operative who hacked into computers to make trades netting millions for Vladimir Putin’s coffers, another Russian agent who moved American ammunition into Russia, and four confirmed Russian spies held in western prisons.

Asymmetric Swaps

These are in no way symmetric swaps: Russians convicted of very serious crimes in impartial jury trials are increasingly being traded for completely innocent Western journalists, businesspersons, and athletes who were snatched at Putin’s command and convicted many months after capture in Russian kangaroo courts.

The same was true when American basketball star Brittany Griner was exchanged for Russian arms dealer Vicktor Bout, nicknamed “the merchant of death.”

These moves are nothing like the US-Soviet swaps during the 20th century Cold War, when actual American operatives and military agents were captured in Russia. We are trading innocents for hardened criminals involved in enabling totalitarian systems of mass murder.

The same holds for Biden’s September 2023 decision to release over $6 billion in Iranian assets, which were held sequestered in a South Korean account, in exchange for five innocent Americans held for years without just cause by Iran’s totalitarian theocracy.

Rather than “prisoner exchanges,” we should be calling them “criminals for hostages swaps.”

Hostage Diplomacy

The glaring problem with such “hostage diplomacy” is obvious: as Senator Mitt Romney said of the Iran deal, the appearance of paying more than $1 billion for each American freed will only encourage more hostage-taking.

Putin will be further emboldened to order more Russian agents and proxies to carry out assassinations, hacking, fraud, weapons trafficking, and attacks on democratic election systems because he can retrieve any of his agents who are caught and convicted: all he has to do is snatch some innocent Americans, Germans, or other Western citizens to use as bargaining chips.

This is a losing spiral: sovereign hostage-taking has been increasing for years, just like ransomware, and it is a bipartisan problem no matter who is in the White House. In 1985, Ronald Reagan infamously sent arms to Iran in exchange for US hostages held in Lebanon as part of an illegal complex larger deal. Short-term gain leads to long-term pain.

The situation is similar when terrorist groups take hostages. In his 2018 book on terrorism, economist and game theory expert Todd Sandler notes one study that found that 2.62 “additional abductions” resulted from concessions to get one hostage back.

The International Center for Counter-Terrorism concludes that rewarding terrorist kidnappers can “encourage imitation and become contagious.”

This is why, ironically, the Biden administration earlier this year began seriously considering a ban on paying ransomware attackers to release computing systems they have seized. But the White House and congressional leaders failed to follow through on this, caving to pressure from corporations and local governments that fear having no recourse when their systems are breached.

New International Hostage Game

Of course, hostage-taking has been part of warfare and hostile relations among nations for many centuries.

Yet medieval kings and queens responded very differently than Western authorities do now: when their innocent citizens were captured and held, they would often snatch innocents from the other side to use as bargaining chips.

Western nations have not done this because our systems of justice are not dictatorial and include habeas corpus, which is the basic right to a speedy and impartial trial. Thus, as Keir Giles from Chatham House told Newsweek, Putin can retrieve his “murderers, spies, and criminals” by taking Western hostages to trade for them, knowing that the US cannot “respond in kind.”

This central asymmetry is now the reason why the US and its allies are losing so badly in the new international hostage game.

To even the scales, American presidents may have to consider detaining Russians or Iranians of interest to their regimes whenever those dictators grab innocent Americans. This would require suspending habeas corpus for those foreign nationals we hold under special reprisal orders, and exchanging only them – not Russians, Iranians, or Chinese operatives already convicted of major crimes – in exchange for American victims.

In other words, we would need to copy Putin’s tactic of “stockpiling” prominent Americans to use as bargaining chips.

For example, when Putin seized and held Griner to use as a pawn in exchange for Russian criminals justly convicted in the US, we could have responded by seizing three more Russians closely connected with the Kremlin and suspected of shady dealings. Indefinite detentions of select foreign nationals held for months or years without trial might sound extreme; yet without such reprisals, we will see more innocent victims in Griner’s and Gershkovich’s former situation.

Legal Reforms

We could further strengthen this tit-for-tat response with legal reforms that also beat ransomware.

Outlawing all forms of payment for taking innocent American hostages and seizing control of computer systems is the most essential step. The law should include “waivers” or presidential permissions to pay only when hundreds of lives or hundreds of billions in assets are at stake, and should include criminal penalties for its violation, given the desperation payers endure.

When such a law is strictly enforced, sovereign adversaries seizing computers or human hostages will eventually realize that they are wasting their time and resources on such efforts.

So we should reconsider the policy announced by President Barack Obama in June 2015, which he broke and both Donald Trump and Biden rejected, that “the United States government will make no concessions to individuals or groups holding US nationals hostage.”

While this policy should not apply to exchanging prisoners of war, it can deter civilian hostage-taking because returning foreign civilians seized in reprisal is not a “concession.”

Beyond banning paying ransoms in all forms, we need to punish rogue regimes that snatch our citizens as political prisoners with other reprisals — such as destruction of military assets and even detention of their own friends working in the US.

The ultimate solution is to rid the Earth altogether of dictators who take innocents as political hostages, but that will probably require a global alliance of democratic nations of the sort outlined in my book, A League of Democracies.

John Davenport is Professor of Philosophy and Peace & Justice Studies at Fordham University.

He is the author of The Democracy Amendments, available through Amazon.com.

The views and opinions expressed here are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the editorial position of The Defense Post.

The Defense Post aims to publish a wide range of high-quality opinion and analysis from a diverse array of people – do you want to send us yours? Click here to submit an op-ed.

The post Why the US and Its Allies Are Losing the New International Hostage Game appeared first on The Defense Post.

Benin, which only recorded its first incident of extremist violence in 2019, is among the continent’s countries being increasingly impacted by terrorism. The number of recorded attacks has risen year-on-year since, reaching 20 incidents in 2022 before doubling last year. The Beninese military labeled 2023’s drastic uptick as “the sharpest rise in extremist attacks in Africa.”

An overwhelming share of this activity has occurred in the Park W-Arly-Pendjari Complex, a vast 1.7 million hectares (4.2 million acres) of land that makes up West Africa’s largest protected wilderness.

The sheer size of this area, alongside its location on the periphery of one of the world’s most violent regions, means Benin has struggled to halt the growing presence of Jama’at Nasr al-Islam wal Muslimin (JNIM), and to a lesser extent Islamic State-Sahel.

Kidnappings in Benin

Evidence of JNIM’s growing presence in Benin is also visible in the country’s increasing rate of kidnappings.

Last year saw northern Benin record at least 75 kidnapping (or attempted kidnapping) incidents, just over triple the number recorded in 2022, which itself witnessed a total higher than the combined number of recorded cases nationwide between 2016 and 2021.

The implications are grave, with kidnappings serving as one of the initial tactics violent extremist organizations frequently deploy to assert presence. Indeed, both JNIM and Islamic State-Sahel typically begin their encroachment into fresh territory by forging alliances with local actors. However, for those less willing to cooperate, methods designed to coerce and intimidate, such as kidnappings, will be used.

This is because they can provide much-needed intel on the local terrain, strike fear into local communities, and announce the presence of an extremist organization as a legitimate violent actor, as well as an additional source of income.

Perhaps most importantly, kidnappings help gradually erode the belief that the state is the primary security provider.

Pre-Existing Grievances

JNIM has found success in northern Benin over recent years, but this says as much about the group’s capabilities as it does about some of the Beninese government policies. JNIM’s expansion would have been far more difficult without the pre-existing grievances in the W-Arly-Pendjari Complex and surrounding areas.

A series of land reforms and sedentarization laws aimed at modernizing its agro-pastoral industry and conserving the local ecosystem, as well as the closure of the Park Complex to the public after two French tourists were kidnapped several years ago, have all been accused of exacerbating farmer and pastoral grievances and conflicts.

JNIM has been able to leverage some of these frustrations to expand deeper into the Park Complex, in turn allowing it to become an increasingly dominant actor in Benin.

Underscoring this notion is a recent study carried out in the Atakora Department, which houses the Pendjari National Park and the largest section of Benin’s border with Burkina Faso. Fieldwork found that 20 percent of participants personally knew someone who had joined JNIM, while 45 percent reported seeing JNIM in their community, and 30 percent had personally interacted with JNIM militants.

Benin now finds itself at a crossroads, although there are several steps the country should take to try to tackle the growing threat posed by violent extremist organizations in its territory.

Address Socio-Economic Pressures

In the Park W-Arly-Pendjari Complex, the government should better address the socio-economic pressures facing farmer and pastoralist communities, even if it comes at a slight environmental cost.

This can be done by declassifying segments of the park’s buffer zones for these communities to use, which would likely alleviate overall levels of conflict and competition.

While this could be a short-term solution, a comprehensive strategy aimed at providing sustainable economic opportunities to the affected areas in northern Benin should also be considered.

Military Cooperation With Neighbors

Benin must also increase military cooperation with Burkina Faso and Niger, the latter of whom the country is currently embroiled in a lengthy diplomatic spat with. With their relationship fraught and Niger facing its own issues with violent extremist organizations, Niamey is unlikely to prioritize terrorist activity near its border with Benin.

This fallout does not only rule out military assistance and cooperation, it has also meant that Niger has kept its side of the border closed for almost a year now. Until reopened, local communities in northern Benin that once relied on cross-border trade will continue to be negatively impacted, further creating socio-economic conditions that are conducive to violent extremists.

While facing its own extensive issues with extremism, Nigeria will be concerned that JNIM militants from the Sahel have transited through Benin and settled in the western Kainji Lake National Park. The threat here is relatively nascent compared to elsewhere in Nigeria, meaning Abuja potentially has a window of opportunity to combat JNIM before it morphs into a far larger threat.

To do so, it will need to cooperate intensely with Benin, and even shoulder more of the burden in attempting to tackle this cross-border threat. Indeed, there is evidence that bandits from Nigeria are now crossing into JNIM-held zones in Benin, underscoring how failing to address this issue will benefit extremist groups traditionally found on opposite sides of the shared border.

Nigeria has ample experience combatting such groups, even if its success in doing so is limited, meaning it must share its experience and knowledge with Benin to implement an effective counter-terrorism strategy that can address all facets of the insecurity multiplying across their shared border.

Western Community Should Help

Finally, the Western community should play a more proactive role in helping Benin.

This should be done via a mixture of civilian and military initiatives. While improving the capacities and size of the Beninese security apparatus will be helpful in fighting extremist groups, providing an outlet for disenfranchised members to leave their groups will be equally productive in the long run.

The US and EU should set up and sponsor disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration programs immediately, as they do elsewhere in the region.

The fate of Benin remains unclear, although it is evident that if trends of the past few years are allowed to progress at their current rates, the country will likely suffer a similar fate as some of its West African peers — many of whom contain some of the highest levels of terrorism and violence in the world.

Charlie Werb is an analyst, writer, and commentator focussing on sub-Saharan African security issues, with a particular emphasis on Islamist extremist groups in the region.

The views and opinions expressed here are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the editorial position of The Defense Post.

The Defense Post aims to publish a wide range of high-quality opinion and analysis from a diverse array of people – do you want to send us yours? Click here to submit an op-ed.

The post Benin at Crossroads: Urgent Measures Needed to Combat Rising Terrorism appeared first on The Defense Post.

Touted as the world’s first fully automatic artillery, the 155mm/52 caliber Elbit Systems gun is intended to be a replacement for hundreds of M109s in the Israeli Artillery Corps.

“The relevance and dominance of artillery fire are evident in warfare,” IDF’s chief artillery officer Brig, Gen. Yair Natans said.

“We have taken yet another significant step towards integrating the ‘Roem’ into the diverse firepower capabilities wielded by corps commanders to assist maneuvering forces — close and lethal support that eliminates many enemies and protects soldiers in various arenas,” he added.

“The ‘Roem’ is part of the reinforcement processes of all ground artillery systems, including rockets, missiles, and remotely piloted aircraft.”

More Advanced, Mobile

The wheeled system is more mobile than the tracked M109, with a greater firing range of up to 40 kilometers (25 miles).

According to The Judean, the gun’s European variant will have an even greater firing range of up to 80 kilometers (50 miles).

It features a modified Oshkosh 10×10 military truck chassis, including an armored cabin at the front for blast and mine protection.

Additional Features

The howitzer can transition from travel to fire mode in 60 seconds, and has a firing rate of eight rounds per minute.

The Roem is manned by a crew of three and is capable of “automatic loading and laying of the gun system, rapid in-and-out action times and high rate of fire,” according to Elbit.

Additionally, it can reportedly fire multiple shells sequentially at different trajectories for a salvo effect on a target.

The post Israel Fields ‘World’s First Fully Automatic’ 155mm Howitzer appeared first on The Defense Post.

Deputy Prime Minister Iryna Vereshchuk revealed on social media that Kyiv’s forces were able to neutralize a Russian S-300 missile system in an unspecified Russian territory.

She said the historic strike was achieved on the first day of being allowed to use donated weapons to strike deep into Russia.

“It burns well. This is a Russian S-300. On Russian territory,” she wrote.

Vereshchuk, who also serves as the Minister for the Reintegration of Temporarily Occupied Territories of Ukraine, did not say which Western weapon was responsible for the kill.

Long Overdue?

The milestone was reported amid an increasing number of countries allowing Ukraine to use their donated weapons for strikes deep into Russia.

Kyiv previously claimed that it could not strike Russian troops massing near their border because of the restrictions on the long-range weapons supplied by the West.

However, Ukraine’s allies have slowly lifted their policies, with Germany, Sweden, Poland, Canada, and Denmark now supporting Ukrainian strikes on Russian territory.

“It is completely within the rules of war that a country that is attacked must be able to answer for itself,” Danish Foreign Minister Lars Lokke Rasmussen said.

The US has also recently given Kyiv some considerations, including granting broader use of its supplied weapons but only to defend the embattled Kharkiv region.

About the S-300

The S-300 is a Soviet-era surface-to-air missile system currently in service with both the Russian and Ukrainian military.

It is designed to shoot down hostile aircraft, drones, and incoming cruise and ballistic missiles at a maximum range of 150 kilometers (93 miles).

It was the same missile that accidentally hit Poland in 2022 — a strike initially blamed on Moscow but was later found to have been caused by a Ukrainian mishap.

It was also the weapon used by Syria to strike Israeli Air Force jets two years ago.

The post Ukraine Reports First Kill Inside Russia Using Western Weapons appeared first on The Defense Post.

Complete air supremacy does not equate to victory on the ground or at sea, and our enemies quickly figure out our political and moral limitations.

Vietnam is a good example.

By the early 1970s, the US had nearly complete air supremacy over North Vietnam. However, because the North Vietnamese embedded critical military infrastructure among civilians, American air strikes only made minimal strategic difference. In a time of domestic dissidence, the US could not decisively impact the war with air power alone.

Amphibious Raid

In 1972, I was a Marine Corps Second Lieutenant. I wrote an article for the Marine Corps Gazette suggesting we could break the stalemate with a massive amphibious raid into North Vietnam.

I proposed a 60 to 90-day incursion that would destroy their standing army, military infrastructure, and ports. I advocated a sea-based option because the Vietnamese insurgents would be less likely to disrupt our lines of communications and would never know where we would strike next.

It was the Cold War, and most American policymakers feared a large-scale incursion would bring intervention by the Soviet Union or China. I argued that by the time either of those could effectively intervene the Marines would be gone and that it would take Hanoi years before it would be able to launch a successful invasion of South Vietnam.

I believed this would give the South time to build an effective, productive, and Western-oriented democracy such as South Korea was becoming.

Not surprisingly, the administration was unwilling to take strategic advice from a Second Lieutenant and the country’s mood would not have supported major military action. By 1975, South Vietnam had collapsed under a Northern invasion.

Many Americans who did not live through that period (and some who did) believe Saigon fell to Viet Cong peasants armed only with AK-47s and rocket-propelled grenades. In actuality, the South was overrun by a modern combined arms North Vietnamese army using tanks, artillery, and Soviet-built anti-aircraft missiles — exactly the army that my concept would have killed in the cradle.

It would have worked then, and it would work now in Yemen if we still had the Navy and Marine Corps to accomplish it.

Lacking Capabilities

For a smart opponent, hiding missile and drone launchers in civilian areas is an effective strategy when we limit ourselves to attacks by air. It gets much harder when units are on the ground and capable of hunting down the sites without killing civilians.

In the early 1970s, the US Navy was capable of landing two full Marine Corps divisions armed with tanks and the bridging capability to cross any river in Vietnam while destroying its entire capability to project power into the South.

Today, the Navy would be hard-pressed to land a single Marine Expeditionary Brigade. The Marine Corps no longer has tanks or the assault bridging and breaching capability to project and sustain military operations much beyond a narrow beachhead.

The Marines did this to themselves under the direction of a commandant who misinterpreted the emerging nature of war, and the Navy went along with it.

‘Send in the Marines’

There should be a lesson here for the Biden administration. If things continue the way they are, the only way the Houthi missile and drone threat in the Red Sea can be halted is if the Iranians can convince their surrogates to stop.

The US Navy has not reached that level of humiliation since the early days of the war on the Barbary pirates in the 19th century. The US Navy/Marine Corps power projection capability is at its lowest since December 7, 1941.

This is the second time in the last four years that we have had to hope that our enemies would get us out of a situation that we ourselves created through our own ineptitude.

When America used to get itself in difficulty overseas, presidents could say “send in the Marines.” Biden has been reduced to sending in the Iranians… or appealing to the Taliban.

Gary Anderson served as the Chief of Plans (G-5) of the Marine Corps Expeditionary Force responsible for the Indo-Pacific area.

He lectures on Alternative Analysis at the George Washington University’s Elliott School of International Affairs.

The views and opinions expressed here are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the editorial position of The Defense Post.

The Defense Post aims to publish a wide range of high-quality opinion and analysis from a diverse array of people – do you want to send us yours? Click here to submit an op-ed.

The post Why We Can’t Beat the Houthis appeared first on The Defense Post.

However, for whatever reason, if one were motivated to do so, I would recommend the following strategy.

The Plan in Theory

First, I would not reveal my plans during my confirmation hearing as Commandant of the Marine Corps. That would alert the traditionalists among the retired Marines and friends of Marines who might oppose my appointment. Once confirmed and installed, I would present my real plan, proceeding confidently and decisively.

Let’s say my concept would involve a radical transformation of the Marine Corps from a worldwide force in readiness into a service primarily focused on deterring or fighting a war with China. I would issue my Commandant’s Planning Guidance to that effect and direct my combat development command to set up a series of war games that would support my plan.

I would use a small group of trusted agents to run the games and make sure that they supported the concept. I would ensure that anyone participating in the games signed non-disclosure agreements, and I would classify the process so that no dissenting opinions would be let loose. I would then declare that the results validated my concept.

Next, I would divest the Marine Corps of what I considered to be legacy capabilities no longer needed for the implementation of my plan. These divestitures would include all tanks, all its heavy engineer and assault breaching capabilities, much of the conventional artillery, its vaunted snipers, and about a third of the aviation assets.

Knowing that many retired Marines and friends of Marines would object to this radical departure from the Marine Corps’ traditional force-in-readiness posture, I would direct my public affairs people to dismiss them as hopeless reactionaries.

I would be confident that I was hitting all the right political bases. The administration has identified China as the nation’s pacing threat. I would be saving Congress billions by divesting unneeded capabilities.

There would be a few potential obstacles. The combatant commanders of global theaters might object to my taking away capabilities that they need in their war plans. More embarrassingly, the commander of the Indo-Pacific theater might object that he or she did not need my concept. However, I could be fairly confident that the “general officers’ protective association” would prevent them from airing this dirty laundry in public.

Finally, I would have my director of combat development designated as my preferred replacement. Because of his complicity in my approach, he would look foolish trying to reverse it.

My legacy would be ensured.

How It Has Played Out

Fortunately, I never became Commandant of the Marine Corps. Unfortunately, General David Berger did. With his concept, dubbed Force Design (FD) 2030, he transformed the Marine Corps from a worldwide force in readiness to a service primarily aimed at deterring, or if necessary, fighting a war against China in the South China Sea.

Since his concept did not require large-scale amphibious landings, General Berger released the navy from its requirement to provide the Marine Corps with a division’s worth (two Expeditionary Brigades) of amphibious shipping. This was a savvy move as it got buy-in from the navy’s carrier and submarine admirals.

To give Berger credit, this was a brilliant political approach. The Biden administration has identified China as the pacing threat to national security.

Berger’s plan to “divest to invest” to procure the anti-ship missiles needed to implement FD 2030 would save the nation billions in the short run. Although the divestiture was done without any guaranteed quid pro quo, General Berger apparently believed a grateful nation would reward the Marine Corps for its generosity.

The Results

Things have not gone well for FD 2030 in the past year. Before he left office, General Berger was forced to admit that the Navy-Marine Corps team could not respond to contingencies in Sudan and Turkey due to a lack of amphibious shipping.

Congress has belatedly realized something may be wrong, and the current Defense Authorization Act has mandated a second look at FD 2030.

An exhaustive study by a group of retired senior Marine Corps generals revealed the war games justifying FD 2030 were manipulated to produce positive results. General Berger’s concept was built on a house of cards. He reduced the Marine Corps to something between coastal artillery and naval infantry.

General Eric Smith, Berger’s chosen successor, has obviously felt the heat and recently changed the name to “Force Design,” but this is like changing the name of the Titanic after it hit the iceberg.

If the congressional study confirms what the retired generals suspect, several things should be done. General Smith is not a well man and should be medically retired. One of the recently retired general officers who objected to FD 2030 should be returned to active duty and appointed as commandant to sort out the mess. That will be difficult; Berger left chaos in his wake.

Gary Anderson served as the Chief of Plans (G-5) of the Marine Corps Expeditionary Force responsible for the Indo-Pacific area.

He lectures on Alternative Analysis at the George Washington University’s Elliott School of International Affairs.

The views and opinions expressed here are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the editorial position of The Defense Post.

The Defense Post aims to publish a wide range of high-quality opinion and analysis from a diverse array of people – do you want to send us yours? Click here to submit an op-ed.

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An indefinite delivery pre-solicitation contract has been notified to upgrade the vehicle with the Elbit Systems Iron Fist Active Protection System (APS).

A total of nine US Army Bradley brigades, or 1,242 vehicles, could be outfitted with the second-gen APS, starting with those operating in Europe, Janes revealed, citing sources.

Testing Since 2018

The US Army faced problems when it began testing the platform with the APS in 2018, mainly related to the ignition system in the interceptor.

Since 2021, the faults have been rectified, resulting in improved performance.

“We’ve gotten to the point where we’ve demonstrated that we have fixed those issues, and we’ve gotten a significant maturity level and performance demonstration within the system,” General Dynamics official Tim Neaves told Defense News in 2021.

Iron Fist APS

The Isreali-made Iron First comprises an active electronically scanned array radar and an optional passive infrared detector, and lightweight explosive projectile interceptors.

Interceptors are launched upon detecting incoming threats, including anti-tank guided missiles, rocket-propelled grenades, and tank-fired high-explosive anti-tank ammunition.

The interceptors explode near the munition and at a distance from the vehicle to minimize damage.

Other Bradley Upgrades

Raytheon was awarded a $154-million contract last month to deliver Commander’s Independent Viewer (CIV) systems for the vehicle.

Including an infrared camera, the CIV provides a 360-degree view to the vehicle operator for targeting and oversight operations.

Last year, Elbit was awarded a contract to supply gunner hand stations for the Bradley fleet.

The post US Army Proposes Upgrading Bradleys With Iron Fist APS  appeared first on The Defense Post.

A significant factor in their geopolitical strife is the need for air superiority over the Aegean. Numerous incidents have taken place over the Aegean Sea with frequent Turkish Air Force violations — some nearly causing war.

Already having some of the best pilots in NATO, the Hellenic Republic is making strides in bilateral ties, which have allowed Athens to purchase new-generation aircraft while Ankara’s air capabilities have remained stagnant.

Greco-Turkish Dispute

In the aftermath of the catastrophic 1919-1922 Greco-Turkish War, the original Treaty of Sevres that partitioned mainland Asia Minor between various nations was replaced by the Kemalist-backed Treaty of Lausanne.

In the treaty, the Hellenic Republic recognized all territories of the Republic of Turkey in return for Ankara’s recognition of the Greek sovereignty of the Aegean Isles. Articles 8 and 12 established Athens’ sovereignty and territorial claims over the Aegean Isles, save for Imbros and Tenedos that were given to Ankara.

The treaty has hold for several decades, but air and maritime violations by Turkey are frequent. Turkey, which boasts NATO’s second-biggest military, is also one of the alliance’s few members with a force projection capability.

Due to unstable governments that led to internal conflicts and corruption, Greece struggled to keep up with Turkey’s military might. The countries came close to war, particularly during the 1974 Turkish invasion of Cyprus, the S-300 dispute, and the Imia Crisis.

Feeling emboldened by Greece’s stagnation, Turkey has regressed from Mustafa Kemal’s original policies, and Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s AKP party has dreams of Neo-Ottomanism, which directly threatens Greece’s sovereignty.

Athens Upgrades Air Force

Greece, realizing it could not keep up with Turkey’s population in a ground war, instead focused on naval and air power. Turkey has a solid and large navy as their responsibility includes rivaling Russia’s Black Sea Fleet. For this, Greece’s military doctrine shifted to complete aerial supremacy.

Already having top-ranked NATO pilots with extensive pilot training, the Hellenic Air Force is currently being revamped with state-of-the-art warplanes.

In early 2022, Athens purchased six Rafale fighter jets from Paris. Consolidating a defensive alliance with Greece against Turkish threats that coincide with French interests, France has helped revamp the Hellenic military.

Turkey’s ploy to purchase the Russian S-400 missile defense system is Ankara’s most significant foreign policy blunder, as the country has been barred from the F-35 program, while Greece was welcomed in. Athens is also supplemented with the Mirage 2000 and modernized F-16s.

Ankara’s Shortfalls and Attempts to Rebuild

Attempting to mirror Greece’s growing aerial capabilities, Turkey is currently faltering for assorted reasons.

Erdogan’s growing authoritarian government is not just affecting Turkish citizens but also the military. As with any hybrid regime, government purges lead to stagnation with military capabilities.

In the aftermath of the 2016 failed coup, Erdogan ordered military purges in the military. One of the wings directly affected was the air force, which remains stagnant.

Sense of Urgency in Turkey

The Turkish government and military analysts are coming to terms with Greece’s growing aerial warfare capabilities, which is causing a sense of panic in the country.

If Turkey cannot modernize its aircraft, particularly the F-16s, by 2025, Greece will have the edge on air superiority, retired Turkish Air Force Commander General Abidin Unal said earlier this month.

One could argue Turkey’s two year-long blackmail towards Sweden’s NATO membership is not because of Stockholm’s amnesty towards Kurdish and Turkish dissidents but to get America’s attention.

On January 27, the US government lifted the F-16 block on Turkey and approved the $23 billion sale of 40 of the jet towards modernization of the Turkish Air Force, which all but hinted Sweden’s near two-year hold on NATO membership was tied to the standoff between Washington and Ankara.

On the same day, Washington also approved the $8.6 billion sale of F-35s to Greece, which Ankara is still barred from, showing equilibrium has not been reached in Turkey’s relations with the US.

However, US Senator Victoria Nuland opened the possibility of Turkey rejoining the F-35 program if Ankara were to give up the Russian-made S-400 missile defense system.

Nevertheless, even with a friendship understanding between Greek Prime Minister Kyriakos Mitsotakis and Erdogan, conflict can ensue between both countries, particularly over Cyprus.

Unless Turkey can somehow find its way back into equilibrium with top Western partners, such as the US and France, it will lose the fight for aerial dominance with Greece.

Julian McBride is a forensic anthropologist, former Marine, and journalist born in New York.

He reports and documents the plight of people around the world affected by conflicts, rogue geopolitics, and war, and also tells the stories of war victims whose voices are never heard.

Julian is the founder and director of the Reflections of War Initiative (ROW), an anthropological NGO which aims to tell the stories of the victims of war through art therapy.

As a former Marine, he uses this technique not only to help heal PTSD but also to share people’s stories through art, which conveys “the message of the
brutality of war better than most news organizations.”

The views and opinions expressed here are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the editorial position of The Defense Post.

The Defense Post aims to publish a wide range of high-quality opinion and analysis from a diverse array of people – do you want to send us yours? Click here to submit an op-ed.

The post The Fight for Air Superiority in the Aegean appeared first on The Defense Post.

The effort saved approximately $50,000 per round and added 10 years to the anti-aircraft missile’s service life.

Moreover, the missile has been equipped with new technology to deal with unmanned aerial systems, “a threat that Stinger was not originally designed for decades ago,” the US Army said.

The Stinger modernization effort includes “running them through a myriad of tests, breaking down the missile, replacing critical aging components, and inserting new technology to extend the shelf life 10 years.”

Ukraine War Intensified Effort

The effort began in 2017 at McAlester Army Ammunition Plant (MCAAP) as part of the Stinger Service Life Extension Program.

Russia’s invasion of Ukraine intensified the effort, with the service approving funds for the refurbishment of 2,700 obsolete missiles in the summer of 2022 to bolster the active inventory. 

Program Executive Office, Missiles and Space, and MCAAP were funded for the task, with an early estimate of refurbishing 1,100 missiles (approximately 40 percent).

MCAAP, however, has exceeded the early estimate with the refurbishment of 70 percent of the missiles four months ahead of the proposed 16-month schedule.

Stinger Developments 

Meanwhile, the US Army has awarded Raytheon a contract to produce 1,300 Stingers to replenish the missiles sent to Ukraine.

The service is also soliciting developers for a potential replacement of the man-portable missiles, first inducted in the early 1980s.

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