JNIM (Support Group for Islam and Muslims) https://thedefensepost.com/tag/jnim-support-group-for-islam-and-muslims/ Your Gateway to Defense News Tue, 24 Sep 2024 05:07:21 +0000 en-US hourly 1 https://wordpress.org/?v=6.6.1 https://thedefensepost.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/10/cropped-defense-post-roundel-temp-32x32.png JNIM (Support Group for Islam and Muslims) https://thedefensepost.com/tag/jnim-support-group-for-islam-and-muslims/ 32 32 Bamako Breached: JNIM’s Capital Strike Signals Dangerous New Chapter for Mali https://thedefensepost.com/2024/09/24/mali-jnim-bamako-attack/?utm_source=rss&utm_medium=rss&utm_campaign=mali-jnim-bamako-attack Tue, 24 Sep 2024 05:05:52 +0000 https://thedefensepost.com/?p=85891 JNIM's successful attack on Mali's capital Bamako highlights the junta's inability to effectively counter the growing threat of militant groups.

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The attack on Mali’s capital Bamako by Jama’at Nasr al-Islam wal Muslimin (JNIM) marks a sobering milestone in the African country’s ongoing security crisis.

For the first time since 2015, terrorists managed to strike the heart of the capital, challenging the already fragile stability of the region.

How the Attack Unfolded

Over the past two and a half years, JNIM has been noted as creeping closer to Bamako, indicating that the capital’s relative safety from terrorist violence was unlikely to last forever.

Soon after the sound of gunshots and explosions began echoing through the city on the morning of September 17, it was clear that terrorists had reached Bamako. These sounds marked the beginning of an hours-long JNIM assault on the Malian capital — one of the al-Qaeda affiliate’s most audacious and successful attacks to date.

Two locations were attacked almost simultaneously, with clashes first reported at a gendarmerie training school in Faladié. Fighting at the school, which lasted for over three hours, led to a majority of the purported 70 casualties.

A second group of fighters attacked Air Base 101, a government and military facility located on the southern perimeter of the civilian Modibo Keita International Airport in Sénou. Fighting lasted far longer at this base, and while JNIM killed far fewer security forces there, its fighters inflicted significant damage on buildings and planes.

Among the jets confirmed to have been damaged was the government’s Boeing 737, reported to have recently been used by leader Assimi Goïta, in addition to an aircraft used by the World Food Programme and one belonging to Sky Mali.

The images and footage of JNIM fighters freely wandering beside airplanes, as well as inside one of the country’s most strategically important sites, have served as compelling propaganda for the group.

By nightfall, the Malian military had repelled the attack and regained full control of the city. Malian authorities have not yet reported a casualty figure, admitting only that there had been “some” deaths, nor have they confirmed any of the speculated loss of aircraft.

JNIM, known to inflate its claims, reported having killed or wounded over 100 Malian and Russian military personnel, destroyed six military aircraft (including a drone), and disabled several others.

The Attack’s Unique Dimensions

The attack on two such symbolic military sites sent a message to President Goïta. The assault on his former military base and images of a JNIM fighter setting fire to one of his planes underscore that the group has both the capability and desire to strike at Mali’s center of power.

Moreover, strictly attacking military targets, JNIM has again tried to differentiate itself from the junta, which it frequently accuses of killing civilians.

It is also telling that such a large-scale, coordinated attack was successful despite not targeting softer civilian targets.

JNIM’s success says much about the Malian security apparatus’ deficiencies, yet it equally reflects the group’s offensive capabilities, which have grown immeasurably over the past decade. JNIM’s evolution as a fighting force will undoubtedly continue further, much to the detriment of governments and militaries in the region.

Perhaps the most intriguing aspect was revealed following the attack when JNIM reported that the operation was conducted by two teams of inghimasi (suicide fighters) from the sub-group Katiba Macina.

Salman al-Bambari, an ethnic Bambara of Bamako’s main ethnic group, headed the first unit that struck the gendarmerie school. Abdul Salam al-Fulani, an ethnic Fulani, one of the most prominent ethnic groups in West Africa, targeted the airport.

Fulani involvement in this attack would not alarm a Bamako resident or a government official, for the ethnic group is often associated with jihadists across the region. Yet footage of al-Bambari’s pre-attack vows being recited in Bambara is far more unprecedented.

This footage of the two commanders is an implicit decision by JNIM to underscore their trans-ethnic makeup, as well as demonstrate that their message can resonate with individuals from any background.

JNIM and Goïta’s Junta: Two Contrasting Fortunes

The attack in Bamako is yet another recent high-profile victory JNIM has been able to claim in Mali, with the group participating in the humiliating defeat of Malian and Russian troops in Tinzaouaten close to the border with Algeria toward the end of July.

While JNIM continues to enjoy great success in Mali, the Goïta administration is facing its most challenging period yet. Despite a range of threats confronting the junta, it is its recent inaction that has arguably done the most to undermine its hold on power.

The fatal defeat at the hands of JNIM and The Permanent Strategic Framework for Peace, Security, and Development (CSP-PSD) in Tinzaouaten came largely as a result of the junta’s underestimation of the resources and manpower required to reestablish control over the area.

The defeat was a significant blow to the junta’s credibility, both domestically and internationally.

Evidence suggests that Goïta has sent another column from Gao to Kidal, from where it is anticipated to eventually head northward toward Tinzaouaten, with last week’s attack further raising the stakes for the military’s operations in northern Mali.

The importance of reclaiming the country’s north is often noted as being underappreciated by those in the West. However, how the junta has focused attention, personnel, and material on military operations against the CSP-DPA in northern Mali has come at a hefty price, with its heavy focus here playing a part in JNIM’s recent successes — including the attack on Bamako.

Malian President Assimi Goita
Malian President Assimi Goita. Photo: Jin Liangkuai /Xinhua via AFP

What Lies Ahead for Mali?

Tough decisions now lie ahead for the political leadership in Bamako.

Another major misstep could prove to be a fatal blow for Goïta, placing even more pressure on the success of Malian and Russian forces should they continue their touted northern incursion toward Tinzaouaten.

Yet a potential victory there will do little to solve the junta’s more existential threat of JNIM. Having now expanded and entrenched itself in the Koulikoro Region surrounding Bamako, the al-Qaeda affiliate will be difficult to displace, particularly if the government continues to deploy the same ineffective counterterrorism measures.

The attack on Bamako symbolizes the past failures of the Malian political leadership in combatting the violent extremist groups present inside its borders.

Unfortunately for the junta, this attack is likely also a look into the future. JNIM is likely to continue encroaching on the territory surrounding Bamako, gradually applying pressure on the capital via similar violent incursions, as well as through attacks on major roads leading to the city.

While the Malian government likely has the capacity to better defend the capital, doing so may come at the cost of protecting other strategically important locations in the country.

JNIM’s growing presence in southern Mali not only endangers Bamako and other major cities and towns, but also Mali’s gold mines, which are overwhelmingly found in the southern regions of Sikasso, Koulikoro, and Kayes.

The junta must now carefully balance these competing aims, for the loss of a town, city, gold mine, or other valuable sites could be the catalyst for yet another regime change.


Headshot Charlie WerbCharlie Werb is an analyst, writer, and commentator focussing on sub-Saharan African security issues, with a particular emphasis on Islamist extremist groups in the region.


The views and opinions expressed here are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the editorial position of The Defense Post.

The Defense Post aims to publish a wide range of high-quality opinion and analysis from a diverse array of people – do you want to send us yours? Click here to submit an op-ed.

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Al-Qaeda-Linked Jihadist Group Claims Rare Attack on Mali Capital https://thedefensepost.com/2024/09/18/jihadists-claim-attack-mali-capital/?utm_source=rss&utm_medium=rss&utm_campaign=jihadists-claim-attack-mali-capital Wed, 18 Sep 2024 04:54:07 +0000 https://thedefensepost.com/?p=85383 An Al-Qaeda-linked jihadist group claimed responsibility for a deadly attack in Mali's capital that saw them temporarily take control of part of the international airport.

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An Al-Qaeda-linked jihadist group on Tuesday claimed responsibility for a deadly attack in Mali’s capital Bamako that saw them temporarily take control of part of the international airport.

Images broadcast on the communication channels of the Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal Muslimeen (JNIM) group showed fighters strolling around and firing randomly into the windows of the presidential hangar in the airport complex.

The country’s general staff later said that the attack killed a number of military personnel but did not give a detailed toll.

It confirmed that a gendarmes’ training center and the city’s airport were targeted.

The hangar usually hosts official guests and the head of state of the West African country, which has been under military rule since coups in 2020 and 2021.

One video showed a fighter calmly firing at the engine of an aircraft, while in others thick smoke could be seen rising from the airport and the hangar of the presidential plane.

“This cowardly and treacherous attack caused some loss of human lives on our side,” including some trainee military police, the general staff said in a statement read out on state television, adding that the attack had been repelled.

“This situation was rapidly brought under control,” it said. “The combing of the area is ongoing.”

Details about the surprise attack were scarce throughout the day, after volleys of gunfire interspersed with explosions broke out at around 5:00 am (0500 GMT).

JNIM said on its communication channels that a “special operation” targeted “the military airport and the training centre of the Malian gendarmes in the centre of the Malian capital” at dawn.

It said the attack caused “huge human and material losses and the destruction of several military aircraft.”

Unverified videos circulating on social media showed charred bodies on the ground.

Bamako is normally spared the sort of attacks that occur almost daily in some parts of the West African country.

Jihadists struck a nearby military camp in 2022. In 2016, gunmen attacked a Bamako hotel housing the former European training mission of the Malian army, with no casualties reported among the mission staff.

Heavy Exchanges of Fire

With the flow of information restricted under the ruling junta, details on how Tuesday’s attack was carried out and its results are sketchy.

Heavy exchanges of fire took place early afternoon near the police station controlling access to the civilian airport terminal, security, and airport officials told AFP on condition of anonymity.

An intelligence source said the attackers used rocket launchers.

The firing seemed to have stopped by mid-afternoon, an AFP correspondent said.

Earlier, the army said that the situation was “under control” after what it called a foiled infiltration attempt by “terrorists” into the military police base.

The junta-led authorities generally use the term “terrorists” to describe jihadists and separatists in the north of the country.

“The terrorists have been neutralised. The sweep is continuing,” the army’s chief of staff, General Oumar Diarra, said on state television.

Images broadcast by the public TV channel showed around 20 blindfolded prisoners sitting on the floor with their hands tied.

The army urged the population to remain calm.

Diarra spoke only of “slightly complex infiltration attempts” at the training center, with no mention of the claimed assault on the military airport.

The police training camp is a few minutes from the airport district, where the military facility neighbors the civilian one.

Regional Unrest

Poor and landlocked Mali has since 2012 been ravaged by different factions affiliated with Al-Qaeda and the Islamic State group, as well as by self-declared defense forces and bandits.

The violence has spilled over into neighboring Burkina Faso and Niger.

Mali has been ruled by a military junta since back-to-back coups in 2020 and 2021.

Under junta leader Colonel Assimi Goita, Mali broke a long-standing alliance with European partners and former colonial power France, turning instead to Russia and its Wagner mercenary group for support.

The military government last year also ordered the withdrawal of the UN stabilization mission, MINUSMA, and in January ended a 2015 peace agreement with separatist groups in the north.

Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger — the latter two also now under military leadership — formed their own Sahel alliance a year ago, and all pledged to leave the regional bloc ECOWAS.

The worsening security situation in Mali has been compounded by a humanitarian and economic crisis.

The military leaders have pledged to regain control of the entire country.

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Benin at Crossroads: Urgent Measures Needed to Combat Rising Terrorism https://thedefensepost.com/2024/08/14/benin-strategies-combat-terrorism/?utm_source=rss&utm_medium=rss&utm_campaign=benin-strategies-combat-terrorism Wed, 14 Aug 2024 09:40:34 +0000 https://www.thedefensepost.com/?p=82675 Benin must take urgent action as extremist violence skyrockets, with militant groups exploiting local grievances and weak government policies, turning the nation into a new terrorism hotspot in West Africa.

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The speed at which terrorist groups have proliferated throughout Africa over the past two decades can hardly be overemphasized. In 2023, reported deaths from militant Islamist violence in the region rose by roughly 20 percent — jumping from 19,412 in 2022 to 23,322 the following year.

Benin, which only recorded its first incident of extremist violence in 2019, is among the continent’s countries being increasingly impacted by terrorism. The number of recorded attacks has risen year-on-year since, reaching 20 incidents in 2022 before doubling last year. The Beninese military labeled 2023’s drastic uptick as “the sharpest rise in extremist attacks in Africa.”

An overwhelming share of this activity has occurred in the Park W-Arly-Pendjari Complex, a vast 1.7 million hectares (4.2 million acres) of land that makes up West Africa’s largest protected wilderness.

The sheer size of this area, alongside its location on the periphery of one of the world’s most violent regions, means Benin has struggled to halt the growing presence of Jama’at Nasr al-Islam wal Muslimin (JNIM), and to a lesser extent Islamic State-Sahel.

Kidnappings in Benin

Evidence of JNIM’s growing presence in Benin is also visible in the country’s increasing rate of kidnappings.

Last year saw northern Benin record at least 75 kidnapping (or attempted kidnapping) incidents, just over triple the number recorded in 2022, which itself witnessed a total higher than the combined number of recorded cases nationwide between 2016 and 2021.

The implications are grave, with kidnappings serving as one of the initial tactics violent extremist organizations frequently deploy to assert presence. Indeed, both JNIM and Islamic State-Sahel typically begin their encroachment into fresh territory by forging alliances with local actors. However, for those less willing to cooperate, methods designed to coerce and intimidate, such as kidnappings, will be used.

This is because they can provide much-needed intel on the local terrain, strike fear into local communities, and announce the presence of an extremist organization as a legitimate violent actor, as well as an additional source of income.

Perhaps most importantly, kidnappings help gradually erode the belief that the state is the primary security provider.

A 1st lieutenant from the Benin 1st Commando Parachute Battalion calibrates his binoculars
A 1st lieutenant from the Benin 1st Commando Parachute Battalion calibrates his binoculars. Photo: Tech. Sgt. Jael Laborn/US Air Force

Pre-Existing Grievances

JNIM has found success in northern Benin over recent years, but this says as much about the group’s capabilities as it does about some of the Beninese government policies. JNIM’s expansion would have been far more difficult without the pre-existing grievances in the W-Arly-Pendjari Complex and surrounding areas.

series of land reforms and sedentarization laws aimed at modernizing its agro-pastoral industry and conserving the local ecosystem, as well as the closure of the Park Complex to the public after two French tourists were kidnapped several years ago, have all been accused of exacerbating farmer and pastoral grievances and conflicts.

JNIM has been able to leverage some of these frustrations to expand deeper into the Park Complex, in turn allowing it to become an increasingly dominant actor in Benin.

Underscoring this notion is a recent study carried out in the Atakora Department, which houses the Pendjari National Park and the largest section of Benin’s border with Burkina Faso. Fieldwork found that 20 percent of participants personally knew someone who had joined JNIM, while 45 percent reported seeing JNIM in their community, and 30 percent had personally interacted with JNIM militants.

Benin now finds itself at a crossroads, although there are several steps the country should take to try to tackle the growing threat posed by violent extremist organizations in its territory.

A squad of soldiers from the Benin 1st Commando Parachute Battalion advance on an enemy position during a Joint Combined Exchange Training scenario.
A squad of soldiers from the Benin 1st Commando Parachute Battalion advance on an enemy position during a Joint Combined Exchange Training scenario. Photo: Tech. Sgt. Jael Laborn/US Air Force

Address Socio-Economic Pressures

In the Park W-Arly-Pendjari Complex, the government should better address the socio-economic pressures facing farmer and pastoralist communities, even if it comes at a slight environmental cost.

This can be done by declassifying segments of the park’s buffer zones for these communities to use, which would likely alleviate overall levels of conflict and competition.

While this could be a short-term solution, a comprehensive strategy aimed at providing sustainable economic opportunities to the affected areas in northern Benin should also be considered.

Military Cooperation With Neighbors

Benin must also increase military cooperation with Burkina Faso and Niger, the latter of whom the country is currently embroiled in a lengthy diplomatic spat with. With their relationship fraught and Niger facing its own issues with violent extremist organizations, Niamey is unlikely to prioritize terrorist activity near its border with Benin.

This fallout does not only rule out military assistance and cooperation, it has also meant that Niger has kept its side of the border closed for almost a year now. Until reopened, local communities in northern Benin that once relied on cross-border trade will continue to be negatively impacted, further creating socio-economic conditions that are conducive to violent extremists.

While facing its own extensive issues with extremism, Nigeria will be concerned that JNIM militants from the Sahel have transited through Benin and settled in the western Kainji Lake National Park. The threat here is relatively nascent compared to elsewhere in Nigeria, meaning Abuja potentially has a window of opportunity to combat JNIM before it morphs into a far larger threat.

To do so, it will need to cooperate intensely with Benin, and even shoulder more of the burden in attempting to tackle this cross-border threat. Indeed, there is evidence that bandits from Nigeria are now crossing into JNIM-held zones in Benin, underscoring how failing to address this issue will benefit extremist groups traditionally found on opposite sides of the shared border.

Nigeria has ample experience combatting such groups, even if its success in doing so is limited, meaning it must share its experience and knowledge with Benin to implement an effective counter-terrorism strategy that can address all facets of the insecurity multiplying across their shared border.

Islamic State militants in Nigeria
A still from a 2019 ISIS propaganda video, purportedly showing Abu Salamah al-Manghawi delivering a speech alongside Islamic State West Africa Province militants in Nigeria.

Western Community Should Help

Finally, the Western community should play a more proactive role in helping Benin.

This should be done via a mixture of civilian and military initiatives. While improving the capacities and size of the Beninese security apparatus will be helpful in fighting extremist groups, providing an outlet for disenfranchised members to leave their groups will be equally productive in the long run.

The US and EU should set up and sponsor disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration programs immediately, as they do elsewhere in the region.

The fate of Benin remains unclear, although it is evident that if trends of the past few years are allowed to progress at their current rates, the country will likely suffer a similar fate as some of its West African peers — many of whom contain some of the highest levels of terrorism and violence in the world.


Headshot Charlie WerbCharlie Werb is an analyst, writer, and commentator focussing on sub-Saharan African security issues, with a particular emphasis on Islamist extremist groups in the region.


The views and opinions expressed here are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the editorial position of The Defense Post.

The Defense Post aims to publish a wide range of high-quality opinion and analysis from a diverse array of people – do you want to send us yours? Click here to submit an op-ed.

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Dozens Killed in Jihadist Attack in Central Mali: Local Sources https://thedefensepost.com/2023/12/14/jihadist-attack-central-mali/?utm_source=rss&utm_medium=rss&utm_campaign=jihadist-attack-central-mali Thu, 14 Dec 2023 14:47:33 +0000 https://www.thedefensepost.com/?p=68247 An attack in central Mali this week, blamed on jihadists, left dozens of soldiers and civilians dead, local sources said.

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An attack in central Mali this week, blamed on jihadists, left dozens of soldiers and civilians dead, local sources said Thursday.

However, the Malian army reported only that it had repelled a “terrorist” attack on the Farabougou camp on Tuesday without mentioning casualties.

Central Mali is a hotbed of the violence that is plaguing the Sahel region.

As elsewhere in the country, gathering and verifying information is complicated by the difficulty of accessing remote sites or independent sources.

The Mali authorities, dominated by the colonels who took power by force in 2020, are reluctant to talk about losses suffered and claim to have the upper hand over the armed groups.

A local politician, speaking on condition of anonymity for his own safety, told AFP that “the jihadist attack on Farabougou left around sixty soldiers and civilians dead.”

He also reported that some people have been missing since the attack.

The army camp fell into the hands of the jihadists who, following their usual modus operandi, then quickly left the scene, he added.

“If we count the military and civilian dead and the people we haven’t heard from, that’s at least 62 people,” said another resident who also insisted on remaining anonymous.

He himself said he had no news of two of his brothers.

“I don’t know if they have been killed or if they are on the run or in hiding.”

‘Repelled a Terrorist Attack’

A government employee also spoke of “dozens and dozens of victims” and reported that Farabougou, a town of a few thousand inhabitants, had been emptied.

The army acknowledged on Thursday that an attack had taken place, saying in a brief statement that it had delivered “a vigorous response that repelled a terrorist attack targeting the Farabougou camp.”

Since 2012, Mali has been battling an Islamist insurgency that erupted in the north of the vast West African state, claiming thousands of military and civilian lives.

Violence has subsequently swept the country while spilling over into neighboring Burkina Faso and Niger — inflaming ethnic tensions along the way.

After seizing power three years ago, Mali’s junta ditched the country’s alliance with former colonial power France, preferring rapprochement with Moscow.

The junta has also ordered out the UN’s Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA), which had for the past decade maintained around 15,000 soldiers and police in the country.

The withdrawal, which is due to be completed this month, has exacerbated tensions between the military and rebel groups.

Farabougou is in the Niono Cercle region, which has been hard hit for years by violence from the Al-Qaeda-linked coalition Support Group for Islam and Muslims (GSIM), as well as from self-defense groups based on traditional Dozo hunters.

In 2020, the town became a symbol of the unrest when it was besieged by jihadists. Mali’s new strongman, Colonel Assimi Goïia, who had come to power in a putsch a few weeks earlier, visited the area to test the authorities’ ability to restore security.

The army later returned to Farabougou.

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Mali Army Says New Fighting With Separatist Rebels in North https://thedefensepost.com/2023/10/02/mali-army-separatists-north/?utm_source=rss&utm_medium=rss&utm_campaign=mali-army-separatists-north Mon, 02 Oct 2023 07:55:55 +0000 https://www.thedefensepost.com/?p=63817 The Malian army said new fighting had broken out in the north between the military and armed rebel groups, the latest in a series of attacks on the army in the troubled West African country.

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The Malian army said on Sunday that new fighting had broken out in the north between the military and armed rebel groups, the latest in a series of attacks on the army in the troubled West African country.

The army reported on social media “intense fighting” against “terrorists” in the early hours of the morning in the area of Bamba, which separatist rebels claimed to have taken control of.

The rebels said they had seized the northern locality in a social media message published on behalf of the Permanent Strategic Framework, which is dominated by the Coordination of Azawad Movements (CMA).

The CMA is an alliance of predominantly Tuareg groups seeking autonomy or independence from the Malian state.

No further details on the fighting were provided by either side.

Tuareg-dominated separatist groups said on Saturday that they had inflicted heavy losses on the Malian military in an attack in the center of the country, claiming to have killed 81 soldiers.

Since the end of August, the north of Mali has seen a resumption of hostilities by the CMA and an intensification of jihadist attacks against the Malian army.

On September 7, the army was attacked in Bamba in an operation claimed by the Al-Qaeda-linked alliance, the Support Group for Islam and Muslims (GSIM).

The escalation in violence coincides with the ongoing withdrawal of the UN stabilization force MINUSMA, which has been pushed out by the ruling junta.

Mali’s junta, which seized power in 2020, faces a multitude of security challenges throughout the poor and landlocked country.

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Al-Qaeda-Linked Group Claims Mali Attack on UN Troops https://thedefensepost.com/2023/08/15/al-qaeda-mali-attack/?utm_source=rss&utm_medium=rss&utm_campaign=al-qaeda-mali-attack Tue, 15 Aug 2023 15:24:03 +0000 https://www.thedefensepost.com/?p=61087 An al-Qaeda-linked jihadist group has claimed responsibility for an attack that wounded members of the UN's peacekeeping force in Mali.

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An al-Qaeda-linked jihadist group has claimed responsibility for an attack that wounded members of the UN’s peacekeeping force in Mali, which is pulling out of the country, monitors said.

At least four members of MINUSMA were hurt on Sunday when they came under attack on a road in northern Mali between Timbuktu and Ber, according to the claim by the Support Group for Islam and Muslims (GSIM) monitored by SITE.

The GSIM, on its Al-Zallaqa propaganda outlet, also claimed on Monday an attack on Sunday against a Mali army position near Korioume, south of Timbuktu, in which a soldier was killed, the US monitoring group said.

MINUSMA — the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali — is one of the UN’s biggest and most perilous peacekeeping operations.

Its deployment began in 2013 after separatist and jihadist rebellions broke out in northern Mali the previous year.

But, under pressure from Mali’s ruling junta, the 13,000-man mission is to withdraw by year’s end, a move that follows the pullout of French troops in 2022.

MINUSMA’s withdrawal from its dozen bases began in early August at Ogossagou in the center of the country.

After Sunday’s attack, MINUSMA said it would bring forward its departure from its base at Ber “due to the deteriorating security situation in the area (and) the high risks” facing its troops.

It said the MINUSMA troops were attacked twice and three wounded peacekeepers had been evacuated to Timbuktu for treatment.

The future of the base at Ber has heightened tensions between the Malian army and former rebels in the region.

The Coordination of Azawad Movements (CMA) — an alliance of predominantly ethnic Touareg groups — says moves by the junta to take over the vacated base would breach the terms of a ceasefire reached in 2014.

The CMA signed a peace deal with Mali’s then-civilian government in 2015, but the pact has come under increasing strain since a coup in 2020 that toppled the elected president, Ibrahim Boubacar Keita.

The CMA say their forces in Ber were attacked on Friday by government troops and paramilitaries from Russia’s Wagner group.

The army, for its part, says its troops in the area have been fighting jihadists — six troops in a unit that were to deploy at the base were killed last Friday in fighting armed Islamists, it says.

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Mali Jihadist Leader in Secret Talks With Northern Groups https://thedefensepost.com/2023/02/01/mali-jihadist-leader-talks-northern-groups/?utm_source=rss&utm_medium=rss&utm_campaign=mali-jihadist-leader-talks-northern-groups Wed, 01 Feb 2023 07:39:36 +0000 https://www.thedefensepost.com/?p=50624 An Al-Qaeda leader in the Sahel has been in talks with armed groups in northern Mali which, like him, are fighting Islamic State militants.

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A powerful Al-Qaeda-affiliated leader in the Sahel has been in secret talks with armed groups in northern Mali which, like him, are fighting Islamic State-backed militants, sources close to the meetings said.

The jihadist is Iyad Ag Ghaly, an ethnic Tuareg who heads the Support Group for Islam and Muslims (GSIM), which has been battling the self-described Islamic State (IS) for influence in the Sahel.

He has recently held clandestine meetings in northern Mali, including with leaders of armed groups which have been fighting bloody battles with IS jihadists, the sources said.

They confirmed the talks had taken place but did not comment on mounting speculation that the GSIM would join forces with these groups.

Northern Mali is the birthplace of a jihadist insurgency that has destabilized the entire region and stoked fears that it could spread to countries further south on the Gulf of Guinea.

Across the Sahel, thousands have died and millions have fled their homes to escape the violence.

“I was received on an individual basis and alone by Iyad Ag Ghaly lkala in the Kidal region last week. Others went in small groups. He said the same thing to everyone, about uniting the sons of the Kidal region,” a local leader told AFP, asking not to be identified.

Kidal is a crossroads region in the north that is not under the control of the Malian state but by a coalition of predominantly Tuareg groups called the Coordination of Azawad Movements (CMA).

The CMA launched a fight for regional independence in 2012 that was joined by jihadists, and which they later fanned into their insurgency.

In 2015, the CMA signed a peace agreement with the Malian government and pro-state armed groups.

Separate Forces Against IS

Today, the Kidal region is relatively unscathed from the violence sweeping Mali.

But south of the region, in the Gao and Menaka areas, the CMA, pro-state groups and the GSIM have separately been fighting IS for months.

Soldiers of the UN peacekeeping mission in Mali
Soldiers of the UN peacekeeping mission in Mali MINUSMA patrol in the streets of Gao, Mali, July 24, 2019. Photo: AFP

Hundreds of civilians have died and there has been a mass exodus of people fleeing their homes.

The source who met Ag Ghaly said “he paid tribute to the expected amalgamation” of the CMA’s diverse groups, which could take place in February.

Ag Ghaly has been considered by many Malian commentators and officials as an unavoidable figure in efforts to end the country’s prolonged crisis.

He was in contact with the government years ago, but the question of a dialogue between jihadists and the authorities has been off the political radar since the 2020 coup.

The recent meetings “aren’t new,” another leader in the north told AFP, saying that Ag Ghaly had always been in touch with powerful men in his region.

Russian ‘Mercenaries’

Ag Ghaly also met representatives of the civilian populations, telling them of his willingness to “defend sharia and protect them from the Malian army and Russian mercenaries,” a local government official said.

The ruling junta has forged close ties with the Kremlin, bringing in operatives that France and others say are from the Wagner paramilitary group.

Ag Ghaly “wants to impose himself as the uncontested leader of the northern Sahel,” said a foreign diplomat, adding that the question was how the junta would respond to “this worrying new landscape.”

The 2015 peace agreement has often been deemed crucial to efforts to end Mali’s bloodshed, but after much fanfare following its signing, it remains dormant.

In December, the CMA and other groups suspended participation in the deal, blaming what they called the junta’s “inertia” in tackling the crisis in the northeast.

An international team is expected to head to Kidal on Wednesday with the aim of reviving contacts over the agreement, diplomatic sources said.

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French actions ‘neutralize 50 terrorists’ near Mopti in central Mali https://thedefensepost.com/2020/02/21/mali-france-barkhane-50-terrorists-mopti/?utm_source=rss&utm_medium=rss&utm_campaign=mali-france-barkhane-50-terrorists-mopti Fri, 21 Feb 2020 10:38:36 +0000 http://overjoyed-robot.flywheelsites.com/?p=15965 The France-led Operation Barkhane targeted ISIS and al-Qaeda affiliated fighters near Mopti in central Mali, 'neutralizing' around 50 militants

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Around 50 militants were “neutralized” in actions carried out by the France-led Operation Barkhane targeting Islamic State and al-Qaeda affiliated fighters in Mali, according to an Armed Forces Ministry release.

The operations, conducted in two phases between February 9 and 17 around the central town of Mopti, were the result of “preparatory work and intelligence gathering that made it possible to characterize with certainty the activity of armed terrorist groups,” the Thursday, February 20 release said.

Around 30 motorcycles and two pickup trucks were destroyed, and weapons, telephones and electronic equipment were seized during the actions.

In the first operation, carried out northwest of Mopti between February 9 and 10, airstrikes conducted by Reaper drones and Mirage 2000 jet fighter aircraft along with combat helicopter engagements “neutralized some 20 armed combatants” including an Islamic State in the Greater Sahara officer.

The French Armed Forces groups fighters killed, injured or taken prisoner under the terms “neutralized” or taken “out of action,” according to AFP.

A second action was carried out between February 16 and 17 south of Mopti, “in a region where Katiba Macina is rampant.”

Katiba Macina is one of the constituent groups of JNIM, which has pledged allegiance to al-Qaeda.

Airstrikes and helicopter fire were accompanied by a helicopter-borne assault, and “some 30 jihadist fighters were put out of action.”

“These two operations, with their very heavy material and human toll, weaken the offensive potential of the armed terrorist groups in this region,” the ministry said.

FAMa ‘captures 3 foreign terrorist leaders’ near Mopti

On February 18, the day after the French action south of Mopti, the Malian Armed Forces (FAMa) tracked “terrorists” in the Somadougou area of the Mopti region, a FAMa release said.

“FAMa helicopters carried out precision airstrikes in the Somadougou sector as far as the village of Diallo on the Bankass road,” the release said.

Somadougou is around 28 km (17 miles) south of Mopti town, and Diallo is around 25 km further southeast.

“Several terrorists were killed, some weapons were abandoned, others destroyed,” and three “foreign terrorist leaders” were captured.

It is unclear whether the Barkhane and FAMa operations were related.

French soldiers in Mali
French military personnel deployed to Operation Barkhane in Mali. Image: @EtatMajorFR/Twitter

Earlier this week, the French ministry released information on two other Barkhane actions on February 8 and 13 near Hombori, which is around 280 km east of Mopti town.

Between February 6 and 7, the Barkhane force ‘neutralized’ around 20 terrorists “in the west of the Gourma region,” in an area where the “katiba is rampant.”

In mid-January, the ministry said more than 30 “terrorists” were “put out of action” in two commando operations in Mopti that apparently targeted Katiba Macina.

Growing French presence in the Sahel

The French military presence in the Sahel began in 2013 with Operation Serval in Mali, and evolved in August 2014 into Operation Barkhane, which has a mandate for counter-terrorism operations across the region. The Barkhane force focuses activity in insurgent-hit MaliNiger and Burkina Faso, working alongside local troops and other international operations, including the regional G5 Sahel Joint Force (FCG5S), which comprises troops from Burkina Faso, Mali, Niger, Chad and Mauritania, and MINUSMA, the U.N. stabiliization mission in Mali.

Earlier this month, Armed Forces Minister Florence Parly said that the number of French troops deployed to the Sahel would increase from 4,500 to 5,100.

France and the G5 Sahel states in January injected new urgency into the counter-terrorism fight, announcing a new Coalition for the Sahel which will see increased coordination between French and local forces. Barkhane and FCG5S forces operating under joint command will focus on the Mali-Burkina Faso-Niger tri-border zone, targeting Islamic State as a priority.

Barkhane is already building command coordination with Sahel Coalition partner forces, setting up dedicated coordination mechanisms in Niger’s capital Niamey and Chad’s capital N’Djamena, where Barkhane is headquartered, while Mali has launched Operation Maliko, a new counter-terrorism operation that will take into account cross-border, regional and international cooperation.

France has also been trying to build support for the new special operations Task Force Takuba that will train, advise, assist and accompany local forces in their fight against Islamic State and al-Qaeda affiliates in the region. Takuba will declare initial military capability in the summer and will be fully operational by the autumn.

France hopes that Takuba will comprise around 500 special forces personnel, according to Le Monde. The new French deployment will include around 50 special forces personnel who will form the nucleus of Takuba, Le Monde reported.

So far, Estonia, the Czech Republic, and Sweden have announced plans to contribute to Takuba, and discussions with Finland and Norway are reportedly ongoing, but Germany and the U.S. have declined.

Belgium is to contribute three staff officers to Takuba according to the Belga news agency, but the current caretaker government’s Foreign Minister Philippe Goffin told AFP on February 13 that committing troops to such an operation would require a government with a full mandate, plus the approval of parliament.

Barkhane already has an international dimension, with European partners contributing troops and equipment. Estonia is to almost double the size of its force protection contingent this yearDenmark has deployed two Merlin helicopters, and three Chinook helicopters from the United Kingdom currently support the operation.

French soldier fires during Operation Aconit
A French soldier fires a machine gun mounted to a Panhard VBL light armoured vehicle during the France-led Operation Aconit, which targeted Islamic State militants in Mali and Niger between between June 7 and 19, 2019. Image: État-major des armées

Islamist insurgents in the Sahel

The complex insurgency in the Sahel began in Mali in 2012, when a Tuareg separatist uprising was exploited by al-Qaeda-linked extremists who took key cities in the desert north. Former colonial power France began its Operation Serval military intervention the following year, driving the jihadists from the towns.

But the militant groups morphed into more nimble formations operating in rural areas, and the insurgency gradually spread to central and southern regions of Mali and then into Burkina Faso and Niger.

More than 4,000 people were reported killed in militant attacks in the three countries last year, according to the U.N., and Secretary-General Antonio Guterres has warned that the spiraling violence in the Sahel has spread to coastal states of West Africa.

Many armed groups including Islamic State are active in the Sahel region, but the majority of attacks are attributed to JNIM, which formed in March 2017 from a merger of several smaller groups. JNIM’s leadership has pledged allegiance to al-Qaeda leader Ayman al-Zawahiri.

Since May 2019, ISIS has attributed insurgent activities in the Sahel area to ISWAP, its West Africa Province affiliate that split from Boko Haram in 2016, rather than to Islamic State in the Greater Sahara. ISWAP’s main area of operations is the Lake Chad area of Nigeria, Niger, Chad and Cameroon.

Macron has said the Sahel Coalition would prioritize the fight against ISIS in the Mali-Burkina Faso-Niger tri-border area because it is the most dangerous.

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AFRICOM shifts strategy from degrading to containing West Africa insurgents, OIG report says https://thedefensepost.com/2020/02/12/africom-strategy-west-africa-degrade-containment-oig/?utm_source=rss&utm_medium=rss&utm_campaign=africom-strategy-west-africa-degrade-containment-oig https://thedefensepost.com/2020/02/12/africom-strategy-west-africa-degrade-containment-oig/#comments Wed, 12 Feb 2020 10:07:03 +0000 http://overjoyed-robot.flywheelsites.com/?p=15896 United States Africa Command has shifted its strategy from degrading violent extremist organizations in West Africa to simply containing their spread

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United States Africa Command has shifted its strategy from degrading violent extremist organizations in West Africa to simply containing their spread, the U.S. Department of Defense Inspector General said in a report to Congress.

The report comes amid a “Blank Slate Review” of AFRICOM by the Pentagon that could see a reduction in the U.S. military presence across the continent.

“The threat posed by VEOs in West Africa is growing,” said the Office of the Inspector General report on counterterrorism operations in East Africa, and North and West Africa published on February 11.

The purpose of the U.S. operations is to degrade al-Qaeda and Islamic State affiliates and other violent extremist organizations, but AFRICOM told the OIG that VEOs in West Africa are “not degraded nor contained to the Sahel and Lake Chad region,” and that if not contained, they “have the potential to spread through the region and impact Western interests.”

The challenges in the region, which is roughly the size of the United States, are linked to extreme poverty, lack of stability, and economic fragility, AFRICOM said.

In the quarter ending on December 31, AFRICOM switched from a “degrade” strategy to a “containment” strategy.

AFRICOM told the OIG that a “degrade” mission aims to reduce extremist groups’ effectiveness so that they cannot project power. The command’s January 2019 Campaign Plan states that it considers a VEO degraded if it meets several conditions, including that command-and-control is disrupted, and that the group cannot conduct effective operations, including information operations.

The “degrade” strategy “requires U.S. and partner forces to apply consistent counterterrorism pressure” on VEOs to prevent resurgence, the report said, but AFRICOM relies on partner forces in Africa that will likely require advice and assistance “for a long period of time” before they are able to counter threats on their own.

The numerous and dynamic terrorist threats in Africa often require “U.S. forces and their allies to step in and execute immediate responses,” the report said. “This need for ongoing operations, coupled with the often slow development of partner forces, could require ongoing commitment of U.S. military resources.”

The report said that in its 2019 Posture Statement, AFRICOM said its Line of Effort to support partners in the Sahel and Lake Chad region is to “conduct engagements, exercises, and limited operations,” and to provide security assistance to “increase partners’ willingness and capabilities” to counter extremists.

It describes a desired end state in which “threats from VEOs and transnational criminal organizations are reduced to a level manageable by internal security forces” belonging to the partner countries.

The OIG report said intermediate objectives listed in the January 2019 AFRICOM Campaign Plan include ensuring that G5 Sahel Partners have the capacity and capability to contain Islamic State in the Greater Sahara, the al-Qaeda-linked JNIM group, and other VEOs in the Western Sahel; and that partners in the Lake Chad region can contain Islamic State West Africa Province, Boko Haram, and other groups there.

Islamic State militants in Nigeria
A still from a June 15, 2019 ISIS propaganda video, purportedly showing Abu Salamah al-Manghawi delivering a speech alongside Islamic State West Africa Province militants in Nigeria.

Militant Islamist groups in the Sahel and Lake Chad regions

West Africa faces violence on two main fronts – the sub-Saharan Sahel region and the area further southwest around Lake Chad.

The complex insurgency in the Sahel began in Mali in 2012, and the Malian Armed Forces (FAMa) has struggled to contain the militants despite help from regional and international partners, allowing the insurgency has spread into neighboring Burkina Faso and Niger.

More than 4,000 people were reported killed in militant attacks in those three countries last year, according to the United Nations.

Many armed groups including Islamic State affiliates are active in the Sahel, but the majority of attacks are attributed to Jama’a Nusrat ul-Islam wa al-Muslimin, or JNIM, which formed in March 2017 from a merger of several smaller groups. JNIM’s leadership has pledged allegiance to al-Qaeda leader Ayman al-Zawahiri.

The U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency told the OIG that JNIM is the most active and effective insurgent group in the Sahel, and that it has between 1,000 and 2,000 fighters. The DIA said JNIM’s goal is to unite terrorist groups in the Sahel and eliminate Western influence, especially former colonial power France, which has been conducting counter-terror operations in the region since 2013.

According to the DIA, al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb uses North Africa as a support zone for JNIM operations, and moves and shares funds to affiliates in the Sahel.

A January report to the United Nations Security Council said that JNIM “continues to represent the principal international terrorist threat” in the region. U.N. Secretary-General Antonio Guterres has warned that the spiraling violence in the Sahel has spread to coastal states of West Africa, and the U.N. noted that JNIM has “increased its presence in littoral countries.”

Violence in the Lake Chad area began in Nigeria in 2009, when the jihadist group known as Boko Haram began its bloody insurgency. It has since spread into neighboring Niger, Chad and Cameroon.

Boko Haram split into two factions in mid-2016. The faction also known as JAS is headed by long-time leader Abubakar Shekau, but ISIS central gives formal backing to the other faction, which it calls Islamic State West Africa Province. ISWAP’s main area of operations is the Lake Chad area of Nigeria, Chad and Niger, and to a lesser extent Cameroon, but the group has intensified attacks on military locations further west in recent months.

The DIA and AFRICOM estimated that Boko Haram has 1,500 fighters operating in the Lake Chad region, the OIG report said, chiming with a report to the U.N. Security Council dated February 4 that said the Shekau faction strength was estimated at between 500 and 2,000 fighters.

DIA analysis of ISWAP propaganda “shows tight links with the group’s central command,” and that although ISWAP has “established pockets of governance and imposes taxes” in northeast Nigeria, the group may still receive funds from ISIS central.

DIA estimates there are around 3,500 ISWAP fighters in the Lake Chad region, while the February U.N. report estimated ISWAP’s total strength to be around 5,000.

ISIS fighters in Burkina Faso
An undated image of ISIS fighters in Burkina Faso released on March 22, 2019. The ISGS fighters were placed in Islamic State West Africa Province, and the image was likely taken in December 2018.

“Up to 300” ISIS-affiliated militants are active in the Burkina Faso-Mali-Niger tri-border region, DIA said, an estimate that appears low, given frequent successful counter-terror operations in the area, particularly those conducted by the France-led Operation Barkhane. However, the February U.N. report said that ISGS “faced significant attrition from counterterrorism operations but the group retains a stronghold in the tri-border area.”

“The operational efficiency of terrorist groups in the region is enhanced by deconfliction and operational collaboration between the groups in high-profile attacks,” the U.N. report said. DIA said that ISGS “has actively cooperated with JNIM in Mali since January 2018,” but that relationship may be strained as ISIS attacks gain more media coverage.

Further complicating matters, since May 2019, ISIS has attributed insurgent activities in the Sahel area to ISWAP rather than to Islamic State in the Greater Sahara. But ISGS likely has “increased ties and communication” with ISWAP, the OIG report said, while the U.N. report said that ISGS “benefits from a closer relationship” with ISWAP, and has “embraced tactics that proved efficient against the military forces of Nigeria.”

“The presence of joint facilitators for Islamic State in the Greater Sahara and Islamic State’s West African Province could presage an enhanced operational connection between the Sahel and the Lake Chad Basin theatres,” the U.N. report said, adding that ISGS leader Adnan Abu Walid al-Sahrawi “will likely remain operationally independent” from new ISWAP leader Abu Abdullah Idris Ibn Umar Al-Barnawi.

Flintlock 2019 closing ceremony, Burkina Faso
A Burkinabé honor guard stands at attention during the closing ceremony in Ouagadougou, Burkina Faso of Exercise Flintlock 2019, which included members of the G5 Sahel and the Multinational Joint Task Force, March 1, 2019. Image: US Navy/MC2 (SW/AW) Evan Parker

AFRICOM efforts in West Africa

The OIG report notes that “the U.S. military does not have direct action authority to conduct unilateral counterterrorism operations” across West Africa.

Instead, the report said the U.S. provides support to partner nations and regional efforts including the G5 Sahel Joint Force (FCG5S) – which consists of approximately 4,500 troops from Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali, Mauritania, and Niger – and in the Lake Chad area to the Multinational Joint Task Force, which is composed of troops from Benin, Cameroon, Nigeria, Chad, Niger, Benin and Cameroon.

AFRICOM told the OIG that it deploys “limited and light U.S. footprint” training and equipping activities conducted bilaterally with the G5 Sahel countries. The report said that U.S.-funded support to the FCG5S “includes training and equipping of battalions in Niger, Burkina Faso, Mauritania, and Chad.”

AFRICOM did not provide specifics on funding. U.S. equipment deliveries to the FCG5S states started in the summer of 2019 and will continue through winter 2020, the report said, adding that AFRICOM “did not provide details on the types of equipment and how many were allocated.”

A U.S. State Department official told The Defense Post in November that, using Fiscal Year 2017 and 2018 funding, the U.S. obligated approximately $242 million in bilateral security assistance to the G5 Sahel states, of which $111 million is going directly to FCG5S-designated forces. The official said information on FY 2019 security assistance would be available “in the near future.”

U.S. capacity-building efforts in West Africa vary, and the OIG report detailed some of those activities.

A small contingent of U.S. personnel work in the Intelligence Fusion Center in Nigeria, “from which some advise and assist activities” are conducted. Special Operations Command Africa personnel train with the Cameroonian Navy and the Rapid Intervention Battalion on maritime and riverine operations, and engagements in Chad are also limited to riverine operations. U.S. Army Africa in Benin provided transport to the MNJTF headquarters in Chad, and began planning for counter-improvised explosive device training scheduled for this month, the report said.

Niger Armed Forces at Nigerien Air Base 201
Niger Armed Forces members clear a corridor during a training exercise with the 409th Expeditionary Security Forces Squadron air advisors at Nigerien Air Base 201 in Agadez, Niger, July 10, 2019. Image: US Air Force/Staff Sgt. Devin Boyer

In Burkina Faso and Mali, “most advise and assist activities are conducted through civil-military elements,” while Niger is the focus of the most significant U.S. military efforts: the country of 21 million people reportedly hosts around 700 U.S. troops, but the OIG did not confirm this, saying only that there were approximately 800 U.S. personnel in West Africa.

During the quarter, a U.S. Special Forces Operational Detachment provided advise-and-assist support to the 51st Special Intervention Battalion in Diffa in the Lake Chad region. Another detachment provided similar support to the 11th Special Intervention Battalion, which is conducting operations in the tri-border region between Mali, Niger, and Burkina Faso. A third detachment “oversaw train, advise, and assist activities with a counterterrorism force in Arlit” in north-central Niger.

The U.S. also maintains a significant aerial capability in the country. Armed and unarmed U.S drones fly from Air Base 101 at Niamey, and in November, AFRICOM said U.S. intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance flight operations had begun from Nigerien Air Base 201 in the northern city of Agadez.

Work on the large and controversial air base began in 2016, and the six-year transition from Air Base 101 to Air Base 201 cost an estimated $110 million, the OIG said, citing a Military Times report.

In January, the U.S. handed over to the Niger Air Force a hangar in Agadez that will house two C-130 transport aircraft.

Burkina Faso SPEAR unit training
Burkina Faso Special Program Embassy Augmentation Response unit moves a “terrorist” during a simulated attack in Ouagadougou, February 27, 2019. Trained and equipped by the US State Department’s Anti-terrorism Assistance program, SPEAR manages emergencies involving US diplomatic facilities or personnel. Image: US Army/Staff Sgt. Anthony Alcantar

AFRICOM blank slate review

After taking up the post last year, Defense Secretary Mark Esper initiated a review of U.S. military operations and posture worldwide, beginning with a “Blank Slate Review” of AFRICOM. The review aims to align resources with objectives of the 2018 National Defense Strategy, which shifted the focus of U.S. efforts from counter-terrorism to countering Russia and China, the so-called “great power competition.”

China focuses on strengthening political and economic ties in West Africa, but AFRICOM and the DIA told the OIG that these activities “do not pose direct threats to U.S. access or influence in West Africa.”

Both AFRICOM and DIA assessed that China’s expanding telecommunications presence in the region could increase the risk of Chinese surveillance against Western and host nation personnel and interests. Both told the OIG that Russia is most active along NATO’s southern flank in North Africa, where it seeks to “demonstrate itself as an alternative partner to the West.”

Senior Pentagon officials have said that a reduction of forces deployed in West Africa is one option under consideration, although Esper said last month that no decision about U.S. force levels in Africa had been made.

A potential U.S. drawdown in West Africa has sparked concern from partners, notably France. Armed Forces Minister Florence Parly said at a press conference with Esper in late January that “U.S. support is critical to our operations and its reduction would severely limit our effectiveness against terrorists.”

The France-led Operation Barkhane has a mandate for counter-terrorism operations across the Sahel region but focuses activity in insurgent-hit MaliNiger and Burkina Faso, working alongside local troops and other international operations, including MINUSMA and the FCG5S. On February 2, Parly said that the number of French troops deployed to the Sahel would be increased to 5,100.

U.S. forces based in Niger provide intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance to their partners in the Sahel, as well as strategic transport and air-to-air refueling.

According to Elie Tenenbaum, a researcher at the French Institute for International Relations (IFRI) in Washington, the U.S. supplies 40% of Barkhane’s strategic transport and in-flight refueling, and 50% of its ISR, including interception of cellular communications. The Pentagon assesses AFRICOM support for Barkhane at $45 million per year, according to Tenenbaum.

This “limited U.S. support” in the Sahel “leverages an immense effort carried out by France and Europe,” Parly said, but Esper suggested that European allies could “offset whatever changes we make as we consider next steps.”

Danish Merlin helicopters deployed to Operation Barkhane
Danish Merlin helicopters deployed to the France-led Operation Barkhane in the Sahel. Image: @EtatMajorFR/Twitter

French partners already contribute to the Barkhane effort. According to Tenenbaum, Spain provides almost 40% of French strategic transport. Estonia is to almost double the size of its force protection contingent this yearDenmark has deployed two Merlin helicopters, and three Chinook helicopters from the United Kingdom currently support the operation.

France and the G5 Sahel states recently injected new urgency into the counter-terrorism fight, announcing a new Coalition for the Sahel which will see increased coordination between French and local forces. Barkhane and FCG5S forces operating under joint command will focus on the Mali-Burkina Faso-Niger tri-border zone, targeting Islamic State as a priority.

Barkhane is already building command coordination with Sahel Coalition partner forces, setting up dedicated coordination mechanisms in Niger’s capital Niamey and Chad’s capital N’Djamena.

France has also been trying to build support for the new special operations Task Force Takuba that will train, advise, assist and accompany local forces in their fight against Islamic State and al-Qaeda affiliates in the region. Takuba will declare initial military capability in the summer and will be fully operational by the autumn.

So far, Estonia, Belgium, the Czech Republic, and Sweden have said they will contribute to Takuba, and discussions with Finland and Norway are reportedly ongoing, but the U.S. has declined.

“U.S. Africa Command will continue to support our French and other partners as they strive to improve security in West Africa through the establishment of TF TAKUBA,” spokesperson Becky Farmer told The Defense Post in November. “However, AFRICOM is not considering additional deployments to participate in TF TAKUBA.”

Rethinking US objectives in Africa

There are approximately 6,000 U.S. military personnel deployed across Africa, including around 3,000 in Djibouti at the largest U.S. base in AFRICOM’s area of responsibility, around 800 in West Africa and 500 special operations forces in Somalia, the OIG report said.

AFRICOM commander General Stephen Townsend told Congress last month that he believes the U.S. can achieve its counter-extremist objectives in Africa at the current force level, saying that around 5,100 troops were deployed. Townsend argued that U.S. military training of African partner forces is central to the strategic competition with Russia and China because it builds “long-term strategic alliances” with local governments.

AFRICOM told the OIG that “there is resourcing competition” within the command – it has limited resources to deploy for the multiple operations in its large area of responsibility, including personnel, support services, and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance assets.

The OIG said that it has sought budget and spending data about the two counter-terrorism operations since it began reporting but it has not yet received any data and is therefore unable to estimate their cost.

AFRICOM told the OIG that it does not have visibility on expenditures for the operations, noting that counter-terrorism is funded through “multiple lines of accounting, some of which are outside of the DoD.”

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French operations in Mali put 30 militants ‘out of action,’ as Barkhane builds Sahel Coalition coordination https://thedefensepost.com/2020/02/08/france-barkhane-operations-mali-sahel-coalition/?utm_source=rss&utm_medium=rss&utm_campaign=france-barkhane-operations-mali-sahel-coalition https://thedefensepost.com/2020/02/08/france-barkhane-operations-mali-sahel-coalition/#comments Sat, 08 Feb 2020 16:26:30 +0000 http://overjoyed-robot.flywheelsites.com/?p=15867 French military operations against Islamic State and al-Qaeda groups in Mali put 30 militants "out of action" as Barkhane builds Sahel Coalition mechanisms

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French commando operations and airstrikes against groups linked to Islamic State and al-Qaeda in Mali put 30 militants “out of action,” the Armed Forces Ministry said.

The operations come as the France-led Operation Barkhane builds command coordination with local partner forces in sub-Saharan Africa’s Sahel region, setting up dedicated coordination mechanisms for the new Sahel Coalition in Niger’s capital Niamey and Chad’s capital N’Djamena.

Operations against ‘terrorists’ in Liptako-Gourma

Between February 6 and 7, forces deployed to Operation Barkhane conducted an “operation of opportunity”  which “resulted in the neutralization of some 20 terrorists and the destruction of several vehicles,” the ministry said, in a Friday, February 7 release.

A Reaper drone, a Mirage 2000 fighter jet patrol, a Tigre attack helicopter and a Cougar transport helicopter “took part in two targeted strikes in an area where terrorist fighters had been spotted,” it said.

The action was carried out “in the west of the Gourma” region, in an area where the “katiba is rampant,” the release said. The ministry did not give further detail, but the likely target was Katiba Macina, one of the constituent groups of JNIM, which has pledged allegiance to al-Qaeda.

Also this week, Barkhane forces continued operations in the Liptako, where two separate commando actions led to a dozen terrorists being “put out of action” in areas where “Islamic State in the Greater Sahara” is active, the release said, without giving further details.

French military spokesperson Colonel Frederic Barbry said that 10 militants were “neutralized” in the actions, AFP reported.

The French Armed Forces groups those killed, injured or taken prisoner under the terms “neutralized” or taken “out of action,” according to AFP.

The French operations are the latest against Islamist militant groups in the region.

On January 23, the ministry said more than 30 “terrorists” were put out of action in operations in the Liptako-Gourma region. Commando operations targeted Katiba Macina fighters in Mali’s Mopti region, while Islamic State fighters were struck by a drone further east, near the border with Niger.

On January 16, the ministry said more than 1,000 troops from Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger, and Barkhane had taken part in a joint operation in the Liptako-Gourma region since early January and that 15 “terrorists” were put out of action. A week earlier, it said more than 50 “terrorists” were put out of action in a series of operations conducted in Mali between December 20 and January 5.

Denmark AW101 helicopter in the Sahel
French troops deployed to Operation Barkhane in the Sahel prepare to board a Danish AW101 Merlin helicopter. Image: État-Major des Armées

Joint FAMa-Barkhane actions south of Gao

Separately, Desert Battle Group 1 (GTD-1) “Steel” conducted an air-land maneuver on the western bank of the Niger River south of Gao, the latest in a series of joint operations in the area carried out in cooperation with the Malian Armed Forces (FAMa).

Some of the units deployed during the surprise action were transported by French Caiman and Danish Merlin helicopters, while others traveled by road.

“This mode of action allows the Barkhane force to act quickly and at distance, creating uncertainty among armed terrorist groups,” the ministry said in a February 6 release.

The joint forces were “tasked with the reconnaissance of a village and its surroundings” in southern Gao, where the population comes under occasional pressure from armed terrorist groups, the release said. FAMa troops “contributed to the sealing off of the area,” and their local knowledge and ability to quickly discern the presence of militants among the population was invaluable, the ministry said.

During the operation, “points of interest were searched and some resources were seized from caches, making it possible to direct future operations,” the release said.

French Panhard VBL during Operation Aconit
A French Panhard VBL light armoured vehicle during the France-led Operation Aconit, which targeted Islamic State militants in Mali and Niger between between June 7 and 19, 2019. Image: État-major des armées

Growing French presence in the Sahel

The French military presence in the Sahel began in 2013 with Operation Serval in Mali, and evolved in August 2014 into Operation Barkhane, which has a mandate for counter-terrorism operations across the region. The Barkhane force focuses activity in insurgent-hit MaliNiger and Burkina Faso, working alongside local troops and other international operations, including the regional G5 Sahel Joint Force (FCG5S), which comprises troops from Burkina Faso, Mali, Niger, Chad and Mauritania, and MINUSMA, the U.N. stabiliization mission in Mali.

On February 2, Armed Forces Minister Florence Parly said that the number of French troops deployed to the Sahel would increase from 4,500 to 5,100. Around 220 of those troops have already deployed to the region, and the remaining 400 soldiers are expected to arrive by the end of February, according to Mali’s Communications Minister Yaya Sangare.

Around 30 heavy armored vehicles, 30 light armored vehicles and 20 logistics vehicles will also be deployed, the French ministry said, bringing the total number of military vehicles that have been sent to the Sahel to around 900, according to Philippe Chapleau.

G5 Sahel Joint Force patch
G5 Sahel Joint Force patch

Barkhane develops Sahel Coalition coordination mechanisms

France’s President Emmanuel Macron and the leaders of the G5 Sahel states injected new urgency into the counter-terrorism fight on January 13, announcing a new Coalition for the Sahel which will see increased coordination between French and local forces focused on the Mali-Burkina Faso-Niger tri-border zone and targeting Islamic State as a priority.

The new Sahel Coalition will see Barkhane and FCG5S forces operating under joint command.

“Barkhane is actively working to strengthen coordination” between its chain of command and partner forces operating in the tri-border zone, in particular the FCG5S, the French Armed Forces Ministry said in its weekly update published on February 6.

In coming days, a “dedicated structure” will be set up in Niger’s capital Niamey. The integration of liaison officers will “make it possible to coordinate and synchronise actions in the fields of intelligence, planning and conduct, and to improve response times in the event of an alert,” the ministry said.

In early February, Barkhane’s Joint Theater Command Post (PCIAT) in Chad’s capital N’Djamena integrated FCG5S liaison officers from Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger.

But the ministry stressed that the command coordination mechanism “is not a mechanism for merging chains of command.”

“While Barkhane is the only force capable of integrating external contributors to the Sahel, especially TF Takuba, the Joint Force is the only one that can ensure the command of units of the local forces,” it said.

In a move that looks set to enable joint operations in the tri-border area, Mali is to launch Operation Maliko, a new counter-terrorism operation that will take into account cross-border, regional and international cooperation, President Ibrahim Boubacar Keïta decreed last week. The PCIAT for Maliko’s East Theater is in Gao, which is also home to the only permanent base in Mali for Operation Barkhane.

G5 Sahel military chiefs of staff last week agreed to allow forces from one country to “support another force in another zone,” and to allow the forces from each state to pursue terrorist fighters up to 100 km into neighboring countries. Chad will soon deploy an additional battalion within the FCG5S in the tri-border zone.

Estonia troops in Mali
Estonia troops from the Estpla-32 infantry unit deployed to Operation Barkhane in Mali patrol in Gao, September 26, 2019. Image: Kaitsevägi

France prepares to welcome Takuba partners to the Sahel

The “nature and missions” of the French reinforcements are likely to evolve over the next six months, in order to prepare in particular for the reception of European partners involved in the new international special operations Task Force Takuba, the French Armed Forces Ministry said in its weekly update published on February 6.

France has for months been trying to build support for Task Force Takuba, an international operation that will train, advise, assist and accompany local forces in their fight against Islamic State and al-Qaeda affiliates in the region.

The new French deployment will include around 50 special forces personnel who will form the nucleus of Takuba, Le Monde reported.

Takuba will declare initial military capability in the summer and will be fully operational by the autumn, Chief of the General Staff of the French Armed Forces General François Lecointre said on January 22.

France hopes that Takuba will comprise around 500 special forces personnel, according to Le Monde.

About a dozen European states have expressed interest in taking part, but concrete commitments to the new mission have been slow to materialize.

Estonia was the first French partner to confirm a deployment to Takuba. In November, a defense ministry spokesperson told The Defense Post that special forces will deploy to Mali in the second half of 2020. Belgium will send three staff officers to the mission, Belga reported in November, and the Czech Republic is planning to send 60 troops to join Takuba, the government said in late January.

On Wednesday, the Swedish Armed Forces said planning has begun for a possible deployment including helicopters, but both government and parliament must approve the plans.

Barkhane already has an international dimension, with European partners contributing troops and equipment. Estonia is to almost double the size of its force protection contingent this yearDenmark has deployed two Merlin helicopters, and three Chinook helicopters from the United Kingdom currently support the operation.

Islamist insurgents in the Sahel

The complex insurgency in the Sahel began in Mali in 2012, when a Tuareg separatist uprising was exploited by al-Qaeda-linked extremists who took key cities in the desert north. Former colonial power France began its Operation Serval military intervention the following year, driving the jihadists from the towns.

But the militant groups morphed into more nimble formations operating in rural areas, and the insurgency gradually spread to central and southern regions of Mali and then into Burkina Faso and Niger.

More than 4,000 people were reported killed in militant attacks in the three countries last year, according to the U.N., and Secretary-General Antonio Guterres has warned that the spiraling violence in the Sahel has spread to coastal states of West Africa.

Many armed groups including Islamic State are active in the Sahel region, but the majority of attacks are attributed to JNIM, which formed in March 2017 from a merger of several smaller groups. JNIM’s leadership has pledged allegiance to al-Qaeda leader Ayman al-Zawahiri.

Since May 2019, ISIS has attributed insurgent activities in the Sahel area to ISWAP, its West Africa Province affiliate that split from Boko Haram in 2016, rather than to Islamic State in the Greater Sahara. ISWAP’s main area of operations is the Lake Chad area of Nigeria, Niger, Chad and Cameroon.

Macron has said the Sahel Coalition would prioritize the fight against ISIS in the Mali-Burkina Faso-Niger tri-border area because it is the most dangerous.

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