For the first time since 2015, terrorists managed to strike the heart of the capital, challenging the already fragile stability of the region.

How the Attack Unfolded

Over the past two and a half years, JNIM has been noted as creeping closer to Bamako, indicating that the capital’s relative safety from terrorist violence was unlikely to last forever.

Soon after the sound of gunshots and explosions began echoing through the city on the morning of September 17, it was clear that terrorists had reached Bamako. These sounds marked the beginning of an hours-long JNIM assault on the Malian capital — one of the al-Qaeda affiliate’s most audacious and successful attacks to date.

Two locations were attacked almost simultaneously, with clashes first reported at a gendarmerie training school in Faladié. Fighting at the school, which lasted for over three hours, led to a majority of the purported 70 casualties.

A second group of fighters attacked Air Base 101, a government and military facility located on the southern perimeter of the civilian Modibo Keita International Airport in Sénou. Fighting lasted far longer at this base, and while JNIM killed far fewer security forces there, its fighters inflicted significant damage on buildings and planes.

Among the jets confirmed to have been damaged was the government’s Boeing 737, reported to have recently been used by leader Assimi Goïta, in addition to an aircraft used by the World Food Programme and one belonging to Sky Mali.

The images and footage of JNIM fighters freely wandering beside airplanes, as well as inside one of the country’s most strategically important sites, have served as compelling propaganda for the group.

By nightfall, the Malian military had repelled the attack and regained full control of the city. Malian authorities have not yet reported a casualty figure, admitting only that there had been “some” deaths, nor have they confirmed any of the speculated loss of aircraft.

JNIM, known to inflate its claims, reported having killed or wounded over 100 Malian and Russian military personnel, destroyed six military aircraft (including a drone), and disabled several others.

In final statement on Bamako attack, Al-Qaeda in Sahel (JNIM) claims go have killed and wounded over 100 of soldiers, destroyed 6 military aircraft including a drone, while partially disabling four. In addition dozens of military vehicles were burnt along other equipment #Mali https://t.co/9jtF7h8Vdt pic.twitter.com/jcJceC803E

— Paweł Wójcik (@SaladinAlDronni) September 17, 2024

The Attack’s Unique Dimensions

The attack on two such symbolic military sites sent a message to President Goïta. The assault on his former military base and images of a JNIM fighter setting fire to one of his planes underscore that the group has both the capability and desire to strike at Mali’s center of power.

Moreover, strictly attacking military targets, JNIM has again tried to differentiate itself from the junta, which it frequently accuses of killing civilians.

It is also telling that such a large-scale, coordinated attack was successful despite not targeting softer civilian targets.

JNIM’s success says much about the Malian security apparatus’ deficiencies, yet it equally reflects the group’s offensive capabilities, which have grown immeasurably over the past decade. JNIM’s evolution as a fighting force will undoubtedly continue further, much to the detriment of governments and militaries in the region.

Perhaps the most intriguing aspect was revealed following the attack when JNIM reported that the operation was conducted by two teams of inghimasi (suicide fighters) from the sub-group Katiba Macina.

Salman al-Bambari, an ethnic Bambara of Bamako’s main ethnic group, headed the first unit that struck the gendarmerie school. Abdul Salam al-Fulani, an ethnic Fulani, one of the most prominent ethnic groups in West Africa, targeted the airport.

Fulani involvement in this attack would not alarm a Bamako resident or a government official, for the ethnic group is often associated with jihadists across the region. Yet footage of al-Bambari’s pre-attack vows being recited in Bambara is far more unprecedented.

This footage of the two commanders is an implicit decision by JNIM to underscore their trans-ethnic makeup, as well as demonstrate that their message can resonate with individuals from any background.

JNIM and Goïta’s Junta: Two Contrasting Fortunes

The attack in Bamako is yet another recent high-profile victory JNIM has been able to claim in Mali, with the group participating in the humiliating defeat of Malian and Russian troops in Tinzaouaten close to the border with Algeria toward the end of July.

While JNIM continues to enjoy great success in Mali, the Goïta administration is facing its most challenging period yet. Despite a range of threats confronting the junta, it is its recent inaction that has arguably done the most to undermine its hold on power.

The fatal defeat at the hands of JNIM and The Permanent Strategic Framework for Peace, Security, and Development (CSP-PSD) in Tinzaouaten came largely as a result of the junta’s underestimation of the resources and manpower required to reestablish control over the area.

The defeat was a significant blow to the junta’s credibility, both domestically and internationally.

Evidence suggests that Goïta has sent another column from Gao to Kidal, from where it is anticipated to eventually head northward toward Tinzaouaten, with last week’s attack further raising the stakes for the military’s operations in northern Mali.

The importance of reclaiming the country’s north is often noted as being underappreciated by those in the West. However, how the junta has focused attention, personnel, and material on military operations against the CSP-DPA in northern Mali has come at a hefty price, with its heavy focus here playing a part in JNIM’s recent successes — including the attack on Bamako.

What Lies Ahead for Mali?

Tough decisions now lie ahead for the political leadership in Bamako.

Another major misstep could prove to be a fatal blow for Goïta, placing even more pressure on the success of Malian and Russian forces should they continue their touted northern incursion toward Tinzaouaten.

Yet a potential victory there will do little to solve the junta’s more existential threat of JNIM. Having now expanded and entrenched itself in the Koulikoro Region surrounding Bamako, the al-Qaeda affiliate will be difficult to displace, particularly if the government continues to deploy the same ineffective counterterrorism measures.

The attack on Bamako symbolizes the past failures of the Malian political leadership in combatting the violent extremist groups present inside its borders.

Unfortunately for the junta, this attack is likely also a look into the future. JNIM is likely to continue encroaching on the territory surrounding Bamako, gradually applying pressure on the capital via similar violent incursions, as well as through attacks on major roads leading to the city.

While the Malian government likely has the capacity to better defend the capital, doing so may come at the cost of protecting other strategically important locations in the country.

JNIM’s growing presence in southern Mali not only endangers Bamako and other major cities and towns, but also Mali’s gold mines, which are overwhelmingly found in the southern regions of Sikasso, Koulikoro, and Kayes.

The junta must now carefully balance these competing aims, for the loss of a town, city, gold mine, or other valuable sites could be the catalyst for yet another regime change.

Charlie Werb is an analyst, writer, and commentator focussing on sub-Saharan African security issues, with a particular emphasis on Islamist extremist groups in the region.

The views and opinions expressed here are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the editorial position of The Defense Post.

The Defense Post aims to publish a wide range of high-quality opinion and analysis from a diverse array of people – do you want to send us yours? Click here to submit an op-ed.

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Images broadcast on the communication channels of the Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal Muslimeen (JNIM) group showed fighters strolling around and firing randomly into the windows of the presidential hangar in the airport complex.

The country’s general staff later said that the attack killed a number of military personnel but did not give a detailed toll.

It confirmed that a gendarmes’ training center and the city’s airport were targeted.

The hangar usually hosts official guests and the head of state of the West African country, which has been under military rule since coups in 2020 and 2021.

One video showed a fighter calmly firing at the engine of an aircraft, while in others thick smoke could be seen rising from the airport and the hangar of the presidential plane.

“This cowardly and treacherous attack caused some loss of human lives on our side,” including some trainee military police, the general staff said in a statement read out on state television, adding that the attack had been repelled.

“This situation was rapidly brought under control,” it said. “The combing of the area is ongoing.”

Details about the surprise attack were scarce throughout the day, after volleys of gunfire interspersed with explosions broke out at around 5:00 am (0500 GMT).

JNIM said on its communication channels that a “special operation” targeted “the military airport and the training centre of the Malian gendarmes in the centre of the Malian capital” at dawn.

It said the attack caused “huge human and material losses and the destruction of several military aircraft.”

Unverified videos circulating on social media showed charred bodies on the ground.

Bamako is normally spared the sort of attacks that occur almost daily in some parts of the West African country.

Jihadists struck a nearby military camp in 2022. In 2016, gunmen attacked a Bamako hotel housing the former European training mission of the Malian army, with no casualties reported among the mission staff.

Heavy Exchanges of Fire

With the flow of information restricted under the ruling junta, details on how Tuesday’s attack was carried out and its results are sketchy.

Heavy exchanges of fire took place early afternoon near the police station controlling access to the civilian airport terminal, security, and airport officials told AFP on condition of anonymity.

An intelligence source said the attackers used rocket launchers.

The firing seemed to have stopped by mid-afternoon, an AFP correspondent said.

Earlier, the army said that the situation was “under control” after what it called a foiled infiltration attempt by “terrorists” into the military police base.

The junta-led authorities generally use the term “terrorists” to describe jihadists and separatists in the north of the country.

“The terrorists have been neutralised. The sweep is continuing,” the army’s chief of staff, General Oumar Diarra, said on state television.

Images broadcast by the public TV channel showed around 20 blindfolded prisoners sitting on the floor with their hands tied.

The army urged the population to remain calm.

Diarra spoke only of “slightly complex infiltration attempts” at the training center, with no mention of the claimed assault on the military airport.

The police training camp is a few minutes from the airport district, where the military facility neighbors the civilian one.

Regional Unrest

Poor and landlocked Mali has since 2012 been ravaged by different factions affiliated with Al-Qaeda and the Islamic State group, as well as by self-declared defense forces and bandits.

The violence has spilled over into neighboring Burkina Faso and Niger.

Mali has been ruled by a military junta since back-to-back coups in 2020 and 2021.

Under junta leader Colonel Assimi Goita, Mali broke a long-standing alliance with European partners and former colonial power France, turning instead to Russia and its Wagner mercenary group for support.

The military government last year also ordered the withdrawal of the UN stabilization mission, MINUSMA, and in January ended a 2015 peace agreement with separatist groups in the north.

Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger — the latter two also now under military leadership — formed their own Sahel alliance a year ago, and all pledged to leave the regional bloc ECOWAS.

The worsening security situation in Mali has been compounded by a humanitarian and economic crisis.

The military leaders have pledged to regain control of the entire country.

The post Al-Qaeda-Linked Jihadist Group Claims Rare Attack on Mali Capital appeared first on The Defense Post.

The Britain-based Syrian Observatory for Human Rights said “12 members of the regime forces, including an officer, were killed following suicide attacks carried out by special forces from the Hayat Tahrir al-Sham group (HTS), targeting regime forces positions in the north of Latakia province” adjacent to Idlib, the last major rebel stronghold in the northwest.

The death toll is the “highest among the regime forces in the region since last September,” according to the observatory.

Rami Abdel Rahman, head of the Observatory, told AFP that the attack was part of “an escalation by HTS since Monday, which included attacks on regime forces on several fronts.”

The Idlib region is subject to a ceasefire brokered by Russia and Turkey after a regime offensive in March 2020. Despite being repeatedly violated, the ceasefire is still largely holding.

HTS controls swathes of Idlib province and parts of neighboring Aleppo, Hama, and Latakia.

More than five million people, most of them displaced, live in areas outside government control in the Idlib region.

HTS, considered a terrorist organization by Damascus, the United States, and the European Union, regularly clashes with Syrian and allied Russian forces.

It is the main rebel organization active in northwest Syria, but there are other groups, some backed by Turkey.

Syria’s war broke out after President Bashar al-Assad repressed anti-government protests in 2011, and has killed more than 500,000 people, displaced millions, and battered the country’s infrastructure and industry.

The post 12 Syrian Soldiers Killed in Suicide Attacks: War Monitor appeared first on The Defense Post.

“Around 150 suspected Boko Haram terrorists armed with rifles and RPGs (rocket-propelled grenades) attacked Mafa ward on more than 50 motorcycles around 1600 hours on Sunday,” said Abdulkarim Dungus, a Yobe state police spokesman.

“They killed many people and burnt many shops and houses. We are yet to ascertain the actual number of those killed in the attack.”

Dungus said it appeared to be a revenge attack “for the killing of two Boko Haram terrorists by vigilantes from the village.”

Bulama Jalaluddeen, a local official, added: “From these figures it has been established that at least 81 people were killed in the attack.”

“Fifteen bodies had already been buried by their relations by the time soldiers reached Mafa for the evacuation of the corpses.

“In addition to these, some unspecified number of dead victims from nearby villages who were caught up in the attack were taken and buried by their kinsmen before the arrival of the soldiers. Many people are still missing and their whereabouts unknown.”

Boko Haram and other jihadist groups have waged a 15-year insurgency in northeast Nigeria that has killed more than 40,000 people.

Central and northwest Nigeria have been plagued for years by gangs of criminals known as “bandits,” who raid villages, kill and abduct residents, and burn homes after looting them.

By working alongside these gangs, jihadist groups have increasingly established a presence in central Niger state, officials and analysts say.

The post At Least 81 Killed in Nigeria in Suspected Boko Haram Attack: Officials appeared first on The Defense Post.

Relations between Nigeria and its northern Sahel neighbor Niger have been tense since the military took over in Niamey in 2023 and broke away from the regional bloc ECOWAS.

Nigeria’s President Bola Ahmed Tinubu, who is head of the Economic Community of West African States, initially took a hardline but has since been trying to persuade the three junta-led states Niger, Mali, and Burkina Faso to return to the group.

Nigeria’s chief of defense staff, General Christopher Musa, on Wednesday met in Niamey with General Moussa Salaou Barmou to discuss security cooperation, a Nigerian military statement said.

“Both parties reaffirmed their commitment to resuming and strengthening collaboration, with a view to ensuring regional stability and security,” it said on Thursday.

The statement said Niger’s chief of staff would visit Nigeria to finalize cooperation, and a Niger advisory group would be created to improve communication between the two militaries.

“Niger affirmed its readiness to resume active participation in security cooperation under the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJT),” the statement said.

The task force, involving Nigeria, Niger, Cameroon, and Chad, has been key in battling jihadists active along the border areas of the four countries.

Niger’s military government is battling jihadists linked to the Islamic State group, Al-Qaeda, and Boko Haram in the western Tillaberi region and in the southeastern Diffa area near Nigeria.

The post Nigeria, Niger Armies Discuss Security Cooperation appeared first on The Defense Post.

Jihadist rebels affiliated with Al-Qaeda and the Islamic State group have waged a grinding insurgency since 2015 in Burkina Faso that has killed thousands and displaced two million people.

The latest attack was carried out by armed men in the village of Barsalogho in north-central Burkina Faso on Saturday, multiple sources said.

Denouncing the “cowardly and barbaric attack,” Communications Minister Rimtalba Jean Emmanuel Ouedraogo said it was carried out by “hordes of criminals.”

The assailants targeted “women, children, elderly, men, making no distinction,” Ouedraogo said on national television.

A local resident told AFP by phone that the assault happened around 9:00 am on Saturday, when “terrorist groups attacked the village, killing numerous civilians and security personnel.”

A security source who asked not to be named said there were “several dozen dead,” including civilians and security forces.

Most of the “numerous wounded” were taken to a hospital in the regional capital of Kaya, some 45 kilometers (28 miles) away, the source added.

No one has yet claimed responsibility for the attack.

According to another local resident, the victims were mainly “young civilians, who came out in large numbers to help the soldiers dig trenches around the town, to protect themselves from possible attacks by armed terrorist groups.”

A second security source said that “the response of the soldiers” and auxiliary troops “made it possible to neutralise several terrorists and avoid a greater tragedy.”

According to a hospital source in Kaya, more than 100 wounded people were taken to the city’s largest medical center.

The chief of the center called on all personnel to come in to deal with the “emergency linked to a massive influx of patients since the morning of (Saturday) August 24,” according to an internal note seen by AFP.

Security Minister Mahamadou Sana said civilians were killed in the attack, despite “a response and air support.”

Soldiers and members of a civilian force that supports the military — Volunteers for the Defence of the Fatherland (VDP) — were also killed according to Sana.

After taking power in a putsch in September 2022, Burkina’s coup leaders expelled troops and diplomats from former colonial ruler France, and have turned to Russia for military assistance.

The post Dozens Killed in Attack in Burkina Faso: Sources appeared first on The Defense Post.

The attack in Niger state shows the growing reach of jihadists from the country’s northeast as they forge closer ties with criminal gangs in central and northwestern Nigeria.

The gunmen raided the Anguwan Mai-Giro community in Shiroro district on motorbikes on Wednesday and opened fire on farm workers. Three women were among those killed, the sources told AFP.

Bologi Ibrahim, spokesman for the Niger state governor, condemned the attack and blamed “underworld” gunmen without saying how many people had died.

A security source and a UN staff member working in the region both told AFP that 13 people were killed and said Boko Haram jihadists were responsible.

“The attackers were obviously Boko Haram terrorists and they killed 13 people working on a private farm outside Magami village,” the security source told AFP.

“Most of the victims were shot in the head, which shows the terrorists attacked to kill,” added the same source, who asked not to be named.

Boko Haram and other jihadist groups have waged a 15-year insurgency in northeast Nigeria that has killed more than 40,000 people.

Central and northwest Nigeria have been plagued for years by gangs of criminals known as “bandits,” who raid villages, kill and abduct residents, and burn homes after looting them.

By working alongside these gangs, jihadist groups have increasingly established a presence in central Niger state, officials and analysts say, having previously seized villages and made camps in the area near where the attack took place.

In April, Boko Haram fighters killed two soldiers as well as vigilantes protecting nearby Allawa village. Troops were then withdrawn from the village, forcing residents to flee in fear of attack.

The UN source said the victims of Wednesday’s raid were residents of Allawa who had been displaced six months ago.

“They fled their homes to escape from the insurgents but ended up being killed by the same people they were avoiding,” the source said.

The post Suspected Boko Haram Gunmen Kill 13 Farmers in Nigeria appeared first on The Defense Post.

Tshisekedi emphasized the critical role of US leadership in addressing the DRC’s security challenges. He requested US assistance to achieve lasting stability and ended by advocating for stronger US-DRC and US-Africa partnerships for mutual development.

This development could be the United States’ green light to stop a regional war in one of Africa’s largest countries.

Why DRC Needs Support

For decades, the eastern region of the DRC has been a battlefield, with approximately six million people killed and over six million more internally displaced since 1996.

While the conflict’s roots are deep and complex, violence from Rwandan-linked rebel groups, such as the March 23 Movement (M23), continues to undermine the security of the Congolese population.

To exacerbate the crisis, over 100 non-state armed groups remain active, raising fears of a devastating regional conflict between the DRC and Rwanda.

As of July 2024, the M23 — an ethnic Tutsi-led insurgent group fighting against Congolese forces — is the primary force in ongoing violence, continuing its push over Goma, a key city in eastern DRC, and disrupting regional security dynamics.

This has compelled DRC’s armed forces to refocus its efforts on Goma and reduce presence in other areas. The Southern African Development Community Mission in the DRC (SAMIDRC) escalated its support, deploying extra troops and resources to help stabilize the area.

Shifting Landscape of Support

When the Congolese government ended the UN mission in the country in July 2023 and ordered all troops to leave by the end of 2024, the peacekeeping burden shifted to regional actors. Countries such as Burundi, Angola, South Africa, Kenya, Uganda, and South Sudan are now taking steps to mediate the conflict and promote stability.

On the diplomatic front, an open-ended ceasefire was announced on July 30 at the initiative of Angola and the African Union, which came into effect on August 4. The US stated it was prepared to assist in the enforcement and supervision of the ceasefire.

As the UN phases out its operations, the Armed Forces of the DRC (FARDC), the Southern African Development Community Mission in the DRC, and The Wazalendo — a group of irregular fighters allied with FARDC and opposed to M23 — are stepping in to fill the security void.

The FARDC is tasked with maintaining stability and countering armed groups. At the same time, SAMIDRC’s regional force aims to support these efforts and ensure a coordinated approach to peacekeeping and conflict resolution in the region.

With increased military assistance, Washington would strengthen its diplomatic relationships, contribute to regional stability, reaffirm its commitment to global security, and prevent a potential regional war with Rwanda.

US Intervention Would Be Hit for Moscow

The United States should not allow Russia to establish a foothold in the DRC as it has in other conflict regions.

Russian paramilitaries are notorious for committing atrocities against civilians in their counter-terrorism operations. Nevertheless, countries like Libya, Mali, and the Central African Republic are increasingly turning to Moscow as their primary security partner.

The US investing in the DRC would counterbalance Russia’s expanding influence on the continent, preventing it from securing a stronger position in Central Africa. By forging closer relations with the DRC, the United States could deter the country from pursuing military alliances with Russia, which is known to provide affordable yet potentially destabilizing military aid.

By providing the security the DRC desperately needs, the US could demonstrate its genuine commitment to the well-being of African nations beyond the pursuit of resources like oil and gold, as Russia has historically done.

By providing the Congolese military with assistance, including training, weapons, intelligence, and equipment, the US can give the DRC an alternative to Russia and create a safer environment for Congolese citizens.

Improving DRC-US Ties Could Be Mutually Beneficial

Improving relations between the US and the DRC could benefit both nations.

President Tshisekedi urgently needs support to fight rebels, and US investment in the DRC could help build a strong partnership that promotes trade, democratic values, and peace.

Supporting the DRC in its fight against armed groups would also help curb the spread of violence and extremism in Africa, preventing global repercussions.

For reference, the ISIS-affiliated Allied Democratic Forces has been a significant source of violence and instability in eastern DRC. In 2023, the militant group was responsible for over 1,000 fatalities, making it the deadliest threat to civilians in the region.

Moreover, a stable DRC can become a more reliable trading partner, contributing to the diversification of supply chains and reducing dependency on less stable regions.

Economically, the DRC holds an estimated $24 trillion in untapped mineral reserves, including significant quantities of cobalt and copper essential for electric vehicle batteries and other technologies vital to the green energy transition.

In return, the US can support the DRC through infrastructure, healthcare, and governance investments. In 2022, a memorandum of understanding between the US, DRC, and Zambia aimed to develop a cross-border value chain for electric vehicle batteries, highlighting the mutual benefits of such partnerships. This agreement helps the DRC economically and assists America in securing a stable supply of cobalt and copper, reducing reliance on China.

Additionally, Washington can help combat the illicit trade and exploitation of minerals like gold and tantalum, which finance the conflict in the DRC. Reports by the UN and civil society show that traders, sometimes aided by armed groups, transport and export significant quantities of these minerals from the DRC.

By investing in the stabilization and development of the DRC, the US can proactively mitigate these risks at their source.

Looking Forward

The DRC deserves a brighter future, free from violence and instability. By providing targeted military aid and policies aimed at humanitarian and diplomacy efforts, the US can become a powerful force for peace.

This strategic investment can significantly weaken Moscow’s influence in Africa while empowering the Congolese people to build a secure and prosperous nation.

Investing in the DRC aligns with the values of life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness, extending these ideals beyond America’s borders and contributing to a better world.

Avery Warfield is an analyst at a sub-Saharan Africa-based consulting firm.

He has extensive international experience living and working in the United States, France, Mauritania, Uganda, Kenya, and Senegal.

Avery holds a degree in Politics & International Affairs from Wake Forest University.

The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not reflect the opinions of the US government or any other entity.

The views and opinions expressed here are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the editorial position of The Defense Post.

The Defense Post aims to publish a wide range of high-quality opinion and analysis from a diverse array of people – do you want to send us yours? Click here to submit an op-ed.

The post Funding DRC’s Army Would Prevent a Regional War, Not Start One appeared first on The Defense Post.

Benin, which only recorded its first incident of extremist violence in 2019, is among the continent’s countries being increasingly impacted by terrorism. The number of recorded attacks has risen year-on-year since, reaching 20 incidents in 2022 before doubling last year. The Beninese military labeled 2023’s drastic uptick as “the sharpest rise in extremist attacks in Africa.”

An overwhelming share of this activity has occurred in the Park W-Arly-Pendjari Complex, a vast 1.7 million hectares (4.2 million acres) of land that makes up West Africa’s largest protected wilderness.

The sheer size of this area, alongside its location on the periphery of one of the world’s most violent regions, means Benin has struggled to halt the growing presence of Jama’at Nasr al-Islam wal Muslimin (JNIM), and to a lesser extent Islamic State-Sahel.

Kidnappings in Benin

Evidence of JNIM’s growing presence in Benin is also visible in the country’s increasing rate of kidnappings.

Last year saw northern Benin record at least 75 kidnapping (or attempted kidnapping) incidents, just over triple the number recorded in 2022, which itself witnessed a total higher than the combined number of recorded cases nationwide between 2016 and 2021.

The implications are grave, with kidnappings serving as one of the initial tactics violent extremist organizations frequently deploy to assert presence. Indeed, both JNIM and Islamic State-Sahel typically begin their encroachment into fresh territory by forging alliances with local actors. However, for those less willing to cooperate, methods designed to coerce and intimidate, such as kidnappings, will be used.

This is because they can provide much-needed intel on the local terrain, strike fear into local communities, and announce the presence of an extremist organization as a legitimate violent actor, as well as an additional source of income.

Perhaps most importantly, kidnappings help gradually erode the belief that the state is the primary security provider.

Pre-Existing Grievances

JNIM has found success in northern Benin over recent years, but this says as much about the group’s capabilities as it does about some of the Beninese government policies. JNIM’s expansion would have been far more difficult without the pre-existing grievances in the W-Arly-Pendjari Complex and surrounding areas.

A series of land reforms and sedentarization laws aimed at modernizing its agro-pastoral industry and conserving the local ecosystem, as well as the closure of the Park Complex to the public after two French tourists were kidnapped several years ago, have all been accused of exacerbating farmer and pastoral grievances and conflicts.

JNIM has been able to leverage some of these frustrations to expand deeper into the Park Complex, in turn allowing it to become an increasingly dominant actor in Benin.

Underscoring this notion is a recent study carried out in the Atakora Department, which houses the Pendjari National Park and the largest section of Benin’s border with Burkina Faso. Fieldwork found that 20 percent of participants personally knew someone who had joined JNIM, while 45 percent reported seeing JNIM in their community, and 30 percent had personally interacted with JNIM militants.

Benin now finds itself at a crossroads, although there are several steps the country should take to try to tackle the growing threat posed by violent extremist organizations in its territory.

Address Socio-Economic Pressures

In the Park W-Arly-Pendjari Complex, the government should better address the socio-economic pressures facing farmer and pastoralist communities, even if it comes at a slight environmental cost.

This can be done by declassifying segments of the park’s buffer zones for these communities to use, which would likely alleviate overall levels of conflict and competition.

While this could be a short-term solution, a comprehensive strategy aimed at providing sustainable economic opportunities to the affected areas in northern Benin should also be considered.

Military Cooperation With Neighbors

Benin must also increase military cooperation with Burkina Faso and Niger, the latter of whom the country is currently embroiled in a lengthy diplomatic spat with. With their relationship fraught and Niger facing its own issues with violent extremist organizations, Niamey is unlikely to prioritize terrorist activity near its border with Benin.

This fallout does not only rule out military assistance and cooperation, it has also meant that Niger has kept its side of the border closed for almost a year now. Until reopened, local communities in northern Benin that once relied on cross-border trade will continue to be negatively impacted, further creating socio-economic conditions that are conducive to violent extremists.

While facing its own extensive issues with extremism, Nigeria will be concerned that JNIM militants from the Sahel have transited through Benin and settled in the western Kainji Lake National Park. The threat here is relatively nascent compared to elsewhere in Nigeria, meaning Abuja potentially has a window of opportunity to combat JNIM before it morphs into a far larger threat.

To do so, it will need to cooperate intensely with Benin, and even shoulder more of the burden in attempting to tackle this cross-border threat. Indeed, there is evidence that bandits from Nigeria are now crossing into JNIM-held zones in Benin, underscoring how failing to address this issue will benefit extremist groups traditionally found on opposite sides of the shared border.

Nigeria has ample experience combatting such groups, even if its success in doing so is limited, meaning it must share its experience and knowledge with Benin to implement an effective counter-terrorism strategy that can address all facets of the insecurity multiplying across their shared border.

Western Community Should Help

Finally, the Western community should play a more proactive role in helping Benin.

This should be done via a mixture of civilian and military initiatives. While improving the capacities and size of the Beninese security apparatus will be helpful in fighting extremist groups, providing an outlet for disenfranchised members to leave their groups will be equally productive in the long run.

The US and EU should set up and sponsor disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration programs immediately, as they do elsewhere in the region.

The fate of Benin remains unclear, although it is evident that if trends of the past few years are allowed to progress at their current rates, the country will likely suffer a similar fate as some of its West African peers — many of whom contain some of the highest levels of terrorism and violence in the world.

Charlie Werb is an analyst, writer, and commentator focussing on sub-Saharan African security issues, with a particular emphasis on Islamist extremist groups in the region.

The views and opinions expressed here are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the editorial position of The Defense Post.

The Defense Post aims to publish a wide range of high-quality opinion and analysis from a diverse array of people – do you want to send us yours? Click here to submit an op-ed.

The post Benin at Crossroads: Urgent Measures Needed to Combat Rising Terrorism appeared first on The Defense Post.

The attacks, which took place on Saturday in the Beni territory in the troubled North Kivu province, were blamed on ADF rebels affiliated with the Islamic State group.

The toll of those killed “has been revised from 10 to 18 people”, Kinos Katuo, a civil society leader of the area where the attacks took place, told AFP.

He added that 14 people are missing, with four houses and two motorcycles also burned.

Another local leader, Charles Endukado, told AFP the number of people killed in the attacks is “more than 18.”

“No one can go to recover the bodies that are still lying on the ground,” he said.

The ADF, originally mainly Muslim Ugandan rebels, have established a presence over the past three decades in eastern DRC, killing thousands of civilians.

The group pledged allegiance in 2019 to the Islamic State group, which portrays them as its central African branch.

The ADF was also blamed for an attack that killed 20 at the end of July.

Local authorities in Beni told AFP in mid-June that since the beginning of the same month, 150 people had been killed in attacks attributed to the ADF in eastern DRC.

Since the end of 2021, the Congolese and Ugandan armies have been conducting joint operations against the ADF in North Kivu and the neighboring province of Ituri but have so far failed to stop the deadly attacks on civilians.

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