For the first time since 2015, terrorists managed to strike the heart of the capital, challenging the already fragile stability of the region.

How the Attack Unfolded

Over the past two and a half years, JNIM has been noted as creeping closer to Bamako, indicating that the capital’s relative safety from terrorist violence was unlikely to last forever.

Soon after the sound of gunshots and explosions began echoing through the city on the morning of September 17, it was clear that terrorists had reached Bamako. These sounds marked the beginning of an hours-long JNIM assault on the Malian capital — one of the al-Qaeda affiliate’s most audacious and successful attacks to date.

Two locations were attacked almost simultaneously, with clashes first reported at a gendarmerie training school in Faladié. Fighting at the school, which lasted for over three hours, led to a majority of the purported 70 casualties.

A second group of fighters attacked Air Base 101, a government and military facility located on the southern perimeter of the civilian Modibo Keita International Airport in Sénou. Fighting lasted far longer at this base, and while JNIM killed far fewer security forces there, its fighters inflicted significant damage on buildings and planes.

Among the jets confirmed to have been damaged was the government’s Boeing 737, reported to have recently been used by leader Assimi Goïta, in addition to an aircraft used by the World Food Programme and one belonging to Sky Mali.

The images and footage of JNIM fighters freely wandering beside airplanes, as well as inside one of the country’s most strategically important sites, have served as compelling propaganda for the group.

By nightfall, the Malian military had repelled the attack and regained full control of the city. Malian authorities have not yet reported a casualty figure, admitting only that there had been “some” deaths, nor have they confirmed any of the speculated loss of aircraft.

JNIM, known to inflate its claims, reported having killed or wounded over 100 Malian and Russian military personnel, destroyed six military aircraft (including a drone), and disabled several others.

In final statement on Bamako attack, Al-Qaeda in Sahel (JNIM) claims go have killed and wounded over 100 of soldiers, destroyed 6 military aircraft including a drone, while partially disabling four. In addition dozens of military vehicles were burnt along other equipment #Mali https://t.co/9jtF7h8Vdt pic.twitter.com/jcJceC803E

— Paweł Wójcik (@SaladinAlDronni) September 17, 2024

The Attack’s Unique Dimensions

The attack on two such symbolic military sites sent a message to President Goïta. The assault on his former military base and images of a JNIM fighter setting fire to one of his planes underscore that the group has both the capability and desire to strike at Mali’s center of power.

Moreover, strictly attacking military targets, JNIM has again tried to differentiate itself from the junta, which it frequently accuses of killing civilians.

It is also telling that such a large-scale, coordinated attack was successful despite not targeting softer civilian targets.

JNIM’s success says much about the Malian security apparatus’ deficiencies, yet it equally reflects the group’s offensive capabilities, which have grown immeasurably over the past decade. JNIM’s evolution as a fighting force will undoubtedly continue further, much to the detriment of governments and militaries in the region.

Perhaps the most intriguing aspect was revealed following the attack when JNIM reported that the operation was conducted by two teams of inghimasi (suicide fighters) from the sub-group Katiba Macina.

Salman al-Bambari, an ethnic Bambara of Bamako’s main ethnic group, headed the first unit that struck the gendarmerie school. Abdul Salam al-Fulani, an ethnic Fulani, one of the most prominent ethnic groups in West Africa, targeted the airport.

Fulani involvement in this attack would not alarm a Bamako resident or a government official, for the ethnic group is often associated with jihadists across the region. Yet footage of al-Bambari’s pre-attack vows being recited in Bambara is far more unprecedented.

This footage of the two commanders is an implicit decision by JNIM to underscore their trans-ethnic makeup, as well as demonstrate that their message can resonate with individuals from any background.

JNIM and Goïta’s Junta: Two Contrasting Fortunes

The attack in Bamako is yet another recent high-profile victory JNIM has been able to claim in Mali, with the group participating in the humiliating defeat of Malian and Russian troops in Tinzaouaten close to the border with Algeria toward the end of July.

While JNIM continues to enjoy great success in Mali, the Goïta administration is facing its most challenging period yet. Despite a range of threats confronting the junta, it is its recent inaction that has arguably done the most to undermine its hold on power.

The fatal defeat at the hands of JNIM and The Permanent Strategic Framework for Peace, Security, and Development (CSP-PSD) in Tinzaouaten came largely as a result of the junta’s underestimation of the resources and manpower required to reestablish control over the area.

The defeat was a significant blow to the junta’s credibility, both domestically and internationally.

Evidence suggests that Goïta has sent another column from Gao to Kidal, from where it is anticipated to eventually head northward toward Tinzaouaten, with last week’s attack further raising the stakes for the military’s operations in northern Mali.

The importance of reclaiming the country’s north is often noted as being underappreciated by those in the West. However, how the junta has focused attention, personnel, and material on military operations against the CSP-DPA in northern Mali has come at a hefty price, with its heavy focus here playing a part in JNIM’s recent successes — including the attack on Bamako.

What Lies Ahead for Mali?

Tough decisions now lie ahead for the political leadership in Bamako.

Another major misstep could prove to be a fatal blow for Goïta, placing even more pressure on the success of Malian and Russian forces should they continue their touted northern incursion toward Tinzaouaten.

Yet a potential victory there will do little to solve the junta’s more existential threat of JNIM. Having now expanded and entrenched itself in the Koulikoro Region surrounding Bamako, the al-Qaeda affiliate will be difficult to displace, particularly if the government continues to deploy the same ineffective counterterrorism measures.

The attack on Bamako symbolizes the past failures of the Malian political leadership in combatting the violent extremist groups present inside its borders.

Unfortunately for the junta, this attack is likely also a look into the future. JNIM is likely to continue encroaching on the territory surrounding Bamako, gradually applying pressure on the capital via similar violent incursions, as well as through attacks on major roads leading to the city.

While the Malian government likely has the capacity to better defend the capital, doing so may come at the cost of protecting other strategically important locations in the country.

JNIM’s growing presence in southern Mali not only endangers Bamako and other major cities and towns, but also Mali’s gold mines, which are overwhelmingly found in the southern regions of Sikasso, Koulikoro, and Kayes.

The junta must now carefully balance these competing aims, for the loss of a town, city, gold mine, or other valuable sites could be the catalyst for yet another regime change.

Charlie Werb is an analyst, writer, and commentator focussing on sub-Saharan African security issues, with a particular emphasis on Islamist extremist groups in the region.

The views and opinions expressed here are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the editorial position of The Defense Post.

The Defense Post aims to publish a wide range of high-quality opinion and analysis from a diverse array of people – do you want to send us yours? Click here to submit an op-ed.

The post Bamako Breached: JNIM’s Capital Strike Signals Dangerous New Chapter for Mali appeared first on The Defense Post.

Benin, which only recorded its first incident of extremist violence in 2019, is among the continent’s countries being increasingly impacted by terrorism. The number of recorded attacks has risen year-on-year since, reaching 20 incidents in 2022 before doubling last year. The Beninese military labeled 2023’s drastic uptick as “the sharpest rise in extremist attacks in Africa.”

An overwhelming share of this activity has occurred in the Park W-Arly-Pendjari Complex, a vast 1.7 million hectares (4.2 million acres) of land that makes up West Africa’s largest protected wilderness.

The sheer size of this area, alongside its location on the periphery of one of the world’s most violent regions, means Benin has struggled to halt the growing presence of Jama’at Nasr al-Islam wal Muslimin (JNIM), and to a lesser extent Islamic State-Sahel.

Kidnappings in Benin

Evidence of JNIM’s growing presence in Benin is also visible in the country’s increasing rate of kidnappings.

Last year saw northern Benin record at least 75 kidnapping (or attempted kidnapping) incidents, just over triple the number recorded in 2022, which itself witnessed a total higher than the combined number of recorded cases nationwide between 2016 and 2021.

The implications are grave, with kidnappings serving as one of the initial tactics violent extremist organizations frequently deploy to assert presence. Indeed, both JNIM and Islamic State-Sahel typically begin their encroachment into fresh territory by forging alliances with local actors. However, for those less willing to cooperate, methods designed to coerce and intimidate, such as kidnappings, will be used.

This is because they can provide much-needed intel on the local terrain, strike fear into local communities, and announce the presence of an extremist organization as a legitimate violent actor, as well as an additional source of income.

Perhaps most importantly, kidnappings help gradually erode the belief that the state is the primary security provider.

Pre-Existing Grievances

JNIM has found success in northern Benin over recent years, but this says as much about the group’s capabilities as it does about some of the Beninese government policies. JNIM’s expansion would have been far more difficult without the pre-existing grievances in the W-Arly-Pendjari Complex and surrounding areas.

A series of land reforms and sedentarization laws aimed at modernizing its agro-pastoral industry and conserving the local ecosystem, as well as the closure of the Park Complex to the public after two French tourists were kidnapped several years ago, have all been accused of exacerbating farmer and pastoral grievances and conflicts.

JNIM has been able to leverage some of these frustrations to expand deeper into the Park Complex, in turn allowing it to become an increasingly dominant actor in Benin.

Underscoring this notion is a recent study carried out in the Atakora Department, which houses the Pendjari National Park and the largest section of Benin’s border with Burkina Faso. Fieldwork found that 20 percent of participants personally knew someone who had joined JNIM, while 45 percent reported seeing JNIM in their community, and 30 percent had personally interacted with JNIM militants.

Benin now finds itself at a crossroads, although there are several steps the country should take to try to tackle the growing threat posed by violent extremist organizations in its territory.

Address Socio-Economic Pressures

In the Park W-Arly-Pendjari Complex, the government should better address the socio-economic pressures facing farmer and pastoralist communities, even if it comes at a slight environmental cost.

This can be done by declassifying segments of the park’s buffer zones for these communities to use, which would likely alleviate overall levels of conflict and competition.

While this could be a short-term solution, a comprehensive strategy aimed at providing sustainable economic opportunities to the affected areas in northern Benin should also be considered.

Military Cooperation With Neighbors

Benin must also increase military cooperation with Burkina Faso and Niger, the latter of whom the country is currently embroiled in a lengthy diplomatic spat with. With their relationship fraught and Niger facing its own issues with violent extremist organizations, Niamey is unlikely to prioritize terrorist activity near its border with Benin.

This fallout does not only rule out military assistance and cooperation, it has also meant that Niger has kept its side of the border closed for almost a year now. Until reopened, local communities in northern Benin that once relied on cross-border trade will continue to be negatively impacted, further creating socio-economic conditions that are conducive to violent extremists.

While facing its own extensive issues with extremism, Nigeria will be concerned that JNIM militants from the Sahel have transited through Benin and settled in the western Kainji Lake National Park. The threat here is relatively nascent compared to elsewhere in Nigeria, meaning Abuja potentially has a window of opportunity to combat JNIM before it morphs into a far larger threat.

To do so, it will need to cooperate intensely with Benin, and even shoulder more of the burden in attempting to tackle this cross-border threat. Indeed, there is evidence that bandits from Nigeria are now crossing into JNIM-held zones in Benin, underscoring how failing to address this issue will benefit extremist groups traditionally found on opposite sides of the shared border.

Nigeria has ample experience combatting such groups, even if its success in doing so is limited, meaning it must share its experience and knowledge with Benin to implement an effective counter-terrorism strategy that can address all facets of the insecurity multiplying across their shared border.

Western Community Should Help

Finally, the Western community should play a more proactive role in helping Benin.

This should be done via a mixture of civilian and military initiatives. While improving the capacities and size of the Beninese security apparatus will be helpful in fighting extremist groups, providing an outlet for disenfranchised members to leave their groups will be equally productive in the long run.

The US and EU should set up and sponsor disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration programs immediately, as they do elsewhere in the region.

The fate of Benin remains unclear, although it is evident that if trends of the past few years are allowed to progress at their current rates, the country will likely suffer a similar fate as some of its West African peers — many of whom contain some of the highest levels of terrorism and violence in the world.

Charlie Werb is an analyst, writer, and commentator focussing on sub-Saharan African security issues, with a particular emphasis on Islamist extremist groups in the region.

The views and opinions expressed here are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the editorial position of The Defense Post.

The Defense Post aims to publish a wide range of high-quality opinion and analysis from a diverse array of people – do you want to send us yours? Click here to submit an op-ed.

The post Benin at Crossroads: Urgent Measures Needed to Combat Rising Terrorism appeared first on The Defense Post.