On March 1, “an A400M left France to make an air delivery before landing at Niamey air base” in Niger, the ministry said in a release. “A second delivery was made the next day, before the A400M returned directly to France.”

The two airdrops delivered “nearly 40 tonnes of food, water, fuel and ammunition,” and the first leg of the operation marked the first A400M mission from mainland France to airdrop supplies in another country.

La Depeche reported the aircraft was based in Toulouse in southern France, and the ministry said the mission resupplied Operation Barkhane’s Desert Battle Group (GTD) “Altor.”

Comprised primarily of soldiers from the 2nd Foreign Parachute Regiment, GTD Altor deployed from Ivory Coast to the Niger-Mali-Burkina Faso tri-border area on January 14, and has been operating alongside the Armed Forces of Niger (FAN). The long-term action is aimed at isolating terrorist armed groups, degrading their logistics and destroying their command networks, according to the ministry.

GTD Altor has been on the ground in a “continuous presence” outside French bases for more than a month. Joint actions have “neutralized several terrorists, and seized numerous resources” including including weapons, ammunition, equipment for manufacturing IEDs, radios, and a drone. The ministry noted three combat actions conducted on February 21 and 23 that “neutralized nearly a dozen armed combatants and destroyed several motorcycles.”

The joint French-Nigerien force uses various modes of action including infiltrations, ambushes, area control, and helicopter operations, and has “made it possible to fully implement the combat partnership strategy of the Barkhane force,” the ministry said.

Although the A400M airdrop resupply mission from France was a first, it is not the first time the aircraft has been used in airborne operations in the Sahel. In September 2018, an A400M Atlas and two Transall C-160 aircraft dropped 120 French paratroops in the Menaka area of Mali, the first time the A400M was used in an operational parachute drop since its adoption by the French Air Force.

The multinational A400M transport aircraft program

The A400M Atlas program was launched in 2003 by pan-European manufacturer Airbus to develop a large turboprop transport aircraft for Belgium, France, Germany, Luxembourg, Spain, Turkey and the United Kingdom. Malaysia joined the program in 2005.

The wings are manufactured in the U.K., the fuselage in Germany, and the aircraft are assembled in Spain.

The A400M Atlas first flew in 2009 and the first production aircraft was delivered to the French Air Force in 2013.

In terms of size, it is positioned between the Lockheed’s C-130 Hercules and Boeing’s C-17 Globemaster – it can carry heavier loads than the C-130 and is able to use small and unprepared landing strips.

It has a maximum range of 4,800 nm (8,900 km) and can carry up to 37 tons.

More than 80 A400M aircraft have been delivered out of a total of 174 ordered.

But the program has been dogged by repeated technical problems. Last year, Airbus renegotiated contract terms with purchasing countries’ governments over cost overruns and delays, and in November, Germany’s Luftwaffe refused delivery of two A400M aircraft over technical faults.

Growing French presence in the Sahel

The French military presence in the Sahel began in 2013 with Operation Serval in Mali, and evolved in August 2014 into Operation Barkhane, which has a mandate for counter-terrorism operations across the region. The Barkhane force focuses activity in insurgent-hit Mali, Niger and Burkina Faso, working alongside local troops and other international operations, including the regional G5 Sahel Joint Force (FCG5S), which comprises troops from Burkina Faso, Mali, Niger, Chad and Mauritania, and MINUSMA, the U.N. stabiliization mission in Mali.

In February, Armed Forces Minister Florence Parly said that the number of French troops deployed to the Sahel would increase from 4,500 to 5,100.

France and the G5 Sahel states in January injected new urgency into the counter-terrorism fight, announcing a new Coalition for the Sahel which will see increased coordination between French and local forces. Barkhane and FCG5S forces operating under joint command will focus on the Mali-Burkina Faso-Niger tri-border zone, targeting Islamic State as a priority.

Barkhane is already building command coordination with Sahel Coalition partner forces, setting up dedicated coordination mechanisms in Niger’s capital Niamey and Chad’s capital N’Djamena, where Barkhane is headquartered, while Mali has launched Operation Maliko, a new counter-terrorism operation that will take into account cross-border, regional and international cooperation.

France has also been trying to build support for the new special operations Task Force Takuba that will train, advise, assist and accompany local forces in their fight against Islamic State and al-Qaeda affiliates in the region. Takuba will declare initial military capability in the summer and will be fully operational by the autumn.

France hopes that Takuba will comprise around 500 special forces personnel, and the new French deployment will include around 50 special forces personnel who will form the nucleus of Takuba.

So far, Estonia, the Czech Republic, and Sweden have announced plans to contribute to Takuba, and discussions with Finland and Norway are reportedly ongoing, but Germany and the U.S. have declined.

Barkhane already has an international dimension, with European partners contributing troops and equipment. Estonia is to almost double the size of its force protection contingent this year, Denmark has deployed two Merlin helicopters, and three Chinook helicopters from the United Kingdom currently support the operation.

Islamist insurgents in the Sahel

The complex insurgency in the Sahel began in Mali in 2012, when a Tuareg separatist uprising was exploited by al-Qaeda-linked extremists who took key cities in the desert north. Former colonial power France began its Operation Serval military intervention the following year, driving the jihadists from the towns.

But the militant groups morphed into more nimble formations operating in rural areas, and the insurgency gradually spread to central and southern regions of Mali and then into Burkina Faso and Niger.

More than 4,000 people were reported killed in militant attacks in the three countries last year, according to the U.N., and Secretary-General Antonio Guterres has warned that the spiraling violence in the Sahel has spread to coastal states of West Africa.

Many armed groups including Islamic State are active in the Sahel region, but the majority of attacks are attributed to JNIM, which formed in March 2017 from a merger of several smaller groups. JNIM’s leadership has pledged allegiance to al-Qaeda leader Ayman al-Zawahiri.

Since May 2019, ISIS has attributed insurgent activities in the Sahel area to ISWAP, its West Africa Province affiliate that split from Boko Haram in 2016, rather than to Islamic State in the Greater Sahara. ISWAP’s main area of operations is the Lake Chad area of Nigeria, Niger, Chad and Cameroon.

Macron has said the Sahel Coalition would prioritize the fight against ISIS in the Mali-Burkina Faso-Niger tri-border area because it is the most dangerous.

The post A French A400M airdropped 40 tonnes of supplies to troops in the Sahel appeared first on The Defense Post.

On Wednesday, the Russian Telegram channel Directorate 4, which publishes information on defense and security issues, released a video which they said was shot by forces of Libya’s Government of National Accord. It appears to show personal belongings of a Russian Wagner employee found near El-Sbeaa, about 67 km (41 miles) south of the capital Tripoli.

Units loyal to Fayez al-Sarraj, prime minister of the United Nations-recognized GNA, fight in the area against Haftar’s LNA, which is backed by Russia, the United Arab Emirates, and Saudi Arabia, among others.

Asharq al-Awsat, the Arabic international newspaper headquartered in London and owned by the Saudi Research and Marketing Group, reported on Wednesday, September 25 that GNA forces repelled an LNA attack on Al-Aziziyah, located about 30 km to the west of El-Sbeaa.

A spokesperson for the Volcano of Rage Operation, which was launched against Hafter’s forces after they made an attempt to take Tripoli in April, told Asharq al-Awsat that GNA forces regained control over Bir Allaq after “criminal gangs and Russian mercenaries fled.”

The video of the Wagner contractor’s belongings shared by Directorate 4 shows a plastic card issued by state-owned Russian bank Sberbank; an individual insurance account number, or SNILS, that is typically issued and used by the Pension Fund of Russia; Russian-manufactured medicine; a manual on mines; laminated paper Orthodox Christian religious icons; a military ruler; and Syrian currency. It also shows photos of a child and a mobile phone that contained selfies of a man in camouflage clothing.

المرتزقة الروس

المقتنيات تتمثل في لاصقات متفجرة وعملات سورية وروسية وبطاقات فيزا روسية#ليبيا #طرابلس pic.twitter.com/AUGQxSZ3zZ

— мєℓα∂ ѕαѕѕι (@falconmesurata) September 25, 2019

One of the photos allegedly showed a medal given to Wagner contractors by the Russian government.

“Presumably, this is the award ‘For the victory over ISIS. Syria,’” Directorate 4 wrote.

The channel used open sources to establish that the man depicted, Vadim B., served in the marine corps of Russia’s Pacific Fleet. He also fought in the Syrian conflict as a Wagner employee.

“At the moment, his fate remains unknown,” Directorate 4 said.

#Russian mercenaries from Wagner Group are fighting for #Haftar's militias in Khalit Al-Furjan, Ain Zara and Wadi Rabea frontlines in southern #Tripoli and are tasked with sniper attacks against #Libya's Army forces under #GNA's command, identical sources reported pic.twitter.com/Fo1vjwfQex

— Libya Febrayer TV (@TvFebruary) September 22, 2019

Earlier on Wednesday, Bloomberg reported, citing “people familiar with the matter,” that more than 100 Wagner contractors arrived in Libya in early September to assist Haftar’s offensive against the GNA in Tripoli that began in April.

Since April, fighting between pro-GNA and pro-Haftar forces has killed more than 1,000 people and wounded nearly 6,000 more, while at least 120,000 others have been displaced, according to the World Health Organization.

A “Russian mercenary commander” told Bloomberg that “some” Wagner contractors have already been killed in Libya.

In November, the co-owner of the Concord group of companies, Evgeny Prigozhin – whose nickname is “Putin’s Chef” because one of his companies provided food services to the Kremlin – was part of the Russian delegation led by Defense Minister Sergey Shoygu during talks with Haftar in Moscow.

https://twitter.com/AnnaEngV/status/1060964188552617986

Prigozhin has repeatedly been named as the head of PMC Wagner, but the businessman denies any involvement in the company. The video that disclosed his presence at the Moscow meeting was posted by the Libyan Defense Ministry on its Youtube channel.

Russian authorities claimed Prigozhin attended the talks simply because he was “organizing the official dinner.”

The first details about Russian mercenaries’ operations in Libya appeared in April, when the U.K.-based Telegraph newspaper reported that 300 Wagner contractors arrived in Benghazi and supplied Haftar’s LNA with equipment, including artillery, tanks, drones and ammunition.

Expanding global footprint: Russia builds on Syria experiments in Central Africa

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According to a Ministry of the Armed Forces release, Desert Tactical Group – Logistics “Charentes” is responsible for testing the feasibility of using the two 3D printers at the large base in Gao to make components.

In general, the specialists at the base a tasked to produce replacements for broken components.

They follow a familiar process – first modelling the part on a computer and then printing, testing, iterating and refining where necessary.

Small parts can be printed in minutes and more complex projects within hours, saving time and effort in transporting equipment to the relatively remote base in central Mali.

“It’s a great tool, able to solve problems quickly,” Quartermaster Quentin (the French military only uses first names for soldiers on active service) explained.

“If we take the example of an ignition button for a P4 vehicle, it is obvious. Instead of having to order a part, immobilize the vehicle for several days and change a entire power system, I make a replica with the 3D printer in a few minutes, the part is changed and the vehicle is back up and running.”

Using the two 3D printers, soldiers have been able to manufacture and test and have approved components including protective shells, seals, and parts for optics.

The 4,500-strong Operation Barkhane force has mandate for counter-terrorism operations across Africa’s troubled Sahel region, focusing activity in insurgent-hit Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger. The force currently includes personnel from Estonia and helicopters from the United Kingdom.

Militaries around the world have been experimenting with additive manufacturing to make parts and complex systems for some time.

Just like the French, the U.S. Marine Corps sent 3D printers to Afghanistan in 2017 in a bid to speed up the parts supply chain.

In 2015, a 3D printed drone was launched from the Royal Navy warship HMS Mersey.

Last October, the first 3D printed metal part for use at sea was approved for testing by the U.S. Navy, and in December, the U.S. Marine Corps printed a concrete footbridge.

And in perhaps the most notorious example, the U.S. Army revealed in 2017 that it had 3D printed the vast majority of parts for the backronymtastic RAMBO – Rapid Additively Manufactured Ballistics Ordnance – a modified M203 grenade launcher.

The post French soldiers deployed to Mali use 3D printers to make spare parts appeared first on The Defense Post.

First reported by Germany’s Der Spiegel and later confirmed by Reuters, the Financial Times and AFP (among others) – although sadly unpublished in full – Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics Ellen Lord (previously the CEO of U.S. defense contractor Textron Systems) and Undersecretary of State for Arms Control and International Security Andrea Thompson on May 1 sent a letter to the E.U.’s chief diplomat, the High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy Federica Mogherini outlining U.S. concerns about access to E.U. funds for American corporations.

The undersecretaries wrote of “poison pills” and “restrictive language” in proposed rules for the E.U.’s Permanent Structured Cooperation on Defence and Security (PESCO) and the European Defence Fund that could potentially prevent states that are not E.U. or European Economic Area members from easily accessing new E.U. funding for defense projects.

The €13 billion European Defence Fund sets aside €4.1 billion for research and €8.9 billion for developing military capabilities for the 2021-2027 financial period, and only collaborative projects involving at least three member states or associated countries can receive funding. Meanwhile PESCO, which was formally established in December 2017, allows participating E.U. states to develop joint defense capabilities, invest in shared projects, and enhance the operational readiness and contribution of their armed forces, and a total of 34 PESCO projects have been adopted so far.

Although open to non-E.U. states, their participation must be accepted unanimously, and the E.U. retains control over future development and – perhaps crucially – the export of systems developed using E.U. funds.

Last year, an E.U. official emphasized that the conditions for participation in projects under the European Defence Fund were reciprocal. “To benefit from U.S. funds, firms have to be based in the United States, exclusively employ American personnel and no information can go back to the parent company if it is not based in the United States,” the official told AFP.

But the letter makes clear U.S. concerns about potentially losing dominance in the European arms market.

“The draft EDF regulation and PESCO general conditions represent a dramatic reversal of the last three decades of increased integration of the transatlantic defense sector,” the letter said, adding that the rules “would not only damage the constructive NATO-E.U. relationship we have built together over the past several years but could potentially turn the clock back to the sometimes divisive discussions about E.U. defense initiatives that dominated our exchanges 15 years ago.”

Hinting at economic sanctions, the letter said: “It is clear that similar reciprocally imposed U.S. restrictions would not be welcomed by our European partners and allies, and we would not relish having to consider them in the future.”

It said that “small changes” to the rules surrounding the European Defense Fund could dispel U.S. concerns.

In an undiplomatically worded cover letter, U.S. Ambassador to the E.U. Gordon Sondland said he “would appreciate your response by June 10, 2019.”

“I hope we can avoid contemplating similar courses of action,” Sondland wrote.

Mogherini responds

Reacting on Tuesday, Mogherini was forthright, saying that “a clear and complete reply to the concerns of the U.S. administration” was being prepared, and noting that the “one point that is still under discussion among Member States” is “the participation of third States in PESCO projects.”

“The E.U. is actually much more than the U.S. procurement market for the European Union companies and equipment,” she said, pointing out that “around 81% of international contracts go to U.S. firms in Europe today.”

“In the E.U. there is no ‘Buy European Act,'” she said, an apparent reference to legislation passed in 1933 that required the U.S. government in certain purchases to prefer American-made products, even if an identical foreign-sourced product is cheaper.

“The European Union is and remains open to U.S. companies and equipment,” Mogherini said.

“As I said, the PESCO projects are not substituting nor changing the procurement rules, and are not substituting any other projects that are already ongoing. They are an additional instrument that is aimed at incentivising, increasing cooperation among the Member States.”

“It is not defined to be an instrument for partnership, we have other instruments for partnership.”

Unease with NATO

American displeasure with the rules surrounding access to PESCO and the European Defence Fund has long been evident.

It echoes earlier loud complaints from U.S. President Donald Trump over low defense spending by NATO members, begging the question: does “ensuring NATO interoperability” really mean “Buy American”?

The heavy-handed U.S. approach – threatening sanctions and escalation of the ongoing skirmishes over trade that are already damaging relations, rather than working alongside important allies – appears more likely to entrench those Europeans who favour closer integration and interdependence, closing rather than opening doors for American corporations.

The five largest arms exporters in the five years between 2014 and 2018 were the United States, Russia, France, Germany and China, according the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute.

The two loudest voices in Europe, France and Germany, are vocal proponents of tighter E.U. integration.

France, which is also the world’s fifth-biggest military spender, has been at the forefront of the E.U. defense push. In August 2018, President Emmanuel Macron even suggested that Europe should adopt NATO-style collective defense to give the E.U. “strategic autonomy.”

“Europe can no longer rely on the United States for its security,” Macron said.

But Germany has also called for enhanced defense integration. In 2018, Foreign Minister Heiko Maas urged the E.U. to “form a counterweight” to the U.S., arguing that Europe “can no longer rely on Washington to the same extent” and this presents a historic opportunity to redefine the E.U.’s role and build a “balanced partnership.”

The €13 billion over seven years set aside for the EDF is but a proverbial drop in the ocean in terms of global defense spending – the U.S. alone spends $700 billion per year, while SIPRI estimated that global military spending in 2018 rose to $1,822 billion.

America has apparently decided that it must coerce its allies into accepting its conditions, but from an E.U. perspective, why would an integrated group of 27 neighboring states that all benefit from their interdependence favor what some perceive as an increasingly unreliable ally, a progressively distant hegemonic power with a growing penchant for using its military and economic clout to benefit itself and itself alone?

Or perhaps a better question is: why now?

The current European Commission, the Union’s powerful executive body that includes Mogherini, will be replaced in November, and the horse trading between member states for the plum jobs will only increase as that deadline draws near. There is also a push from some E.U. nations towards the creation of a Commissioner for defense, separating that role from the foreign policy department, a shift that Mogherini opposes.

And campaigning in elections to the increasingly sidelined European Parliament is already underway, with right-wing eurosceptic parties favoring the anti-immigrant rhetoric that proved successful during the divisive campaign that ultimately ended with the U.K. voting to Leave the Union, as well as the election the the current U.S. president.

Those same eurosceptic voices, perhaps loudest among the ex-Warsaw Pact states that seek a strong U.S. presence in Europe, also warn of a future “E.U. army,” something long-resisted by member states who jealously guard their sovereign power over defense.

Perhaps dividing the E.U. is the most straightforward way for America to retain its “Leader of the Free World” name-badge for the next G20 meeting, and there are clear cracks within the E.U. that the U.S. can exploit by driving wedges between European haves and have-nots.

Leadership either inspires allegiance or instils fear, and the U.S. administration’s apparent preference for the latter, coupled with its focus on “Great Power Competition” leaves an obvious question: does it view the E.U. as a “Great Power” that it must compete rather than cooperate with?

Or put another way: Does America view the E.U. with the same lens it views China?

EU allocates €525 million for defense projects including Eurodrone

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The U.S. has claimed that intelligence indicated Iran was planning to target Americans or U.S. interests in the region, possibly against U.S. forces in Iraq or Syria, without giving details and with political and military leadership at times contradicting each other and themselves.

“This face-off is not military because there is not going to be any war. Neither we nor them seek war,” the official website of Iran’s Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei cited him as saying in a meeting. “They know it will not be in their interest,” he said, referring to the United States, which has in recent days sought to increase its “maximum pressure” campaign against the Islamic Republic with ship movements and the deployment of a missile defense system to the region.

His comments came a day after Iranian President Hassan Rouhani proclaimed Iran was “too great to be intimidated by anyone” as tensions between the U.S. and Iran escalated in the Persian Gulf.

On May 5, National Security Advisor John Bolton announced that the U.S. was deploying the USS Abraham Lincoln Carrier Strike Group and a bomber task force to the Middle East, claiming “a number of troubling and escalatory indications and warnings.”

On Friday, the Pentagon said that it would be joined by the amphibious assault ship USS Arlington and a Patriot missile battery “in response to indications of heightened Iranian readiness to conduct offensive operations against U.S. forces and our interests.”

USS Arlington is a San Antonio-class ship that transports U.S. Marines, amphibious vehicles, landing craft and rotary aircraft to support amphibious assault, special operations or expeditionary warfare missions.

The timeline and who exactly ordered the deployment are unclear. The White House released Bolton’s statement, but then it was reported that CENTCOM Commander General Kenneth McKenzie and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Joseph Dunford requested the movement, with Acting Secretary of Defense Patrick Shanahan signing off and then for some reason deciding the White House should make the announcement.

But the Lincoln Carrier Strike Group was already headed to the Persian Gulf. On April 8, the aircraft carrier arrived in Europe in the first leg of its round-the-world trip to change homeports. At the time Naval Today reported that the carrier strike group would operate in the Mediterranean Sea and Persian Gulf before heading for the Indian Ocean, South China Sea and Pacific Ocean en route to its new home in San Diego, California.

(Joining the carrier strike group was the Spanish frigate Mendez Nunez – which has now been recalled as tensions increase in the Gulf.)

And on Tuesday British Army Major-General Chris Ghika, Deputy Commander-Stability for Operation Inherent Resolve said the Coalition against Islamic State had seen “no increased threat from Iranian-backed forces in Iraq and Syria” or any change “in the posture or laydown” of the Hashd al-Shaabi – or Popular Mobilisation Units – a collection of Shia militias supported by Iran but largely part of the Iraqi Security Forces that operates with the Coalition.

Asked repeatedly about Iran during a now-rare public briefing at the Pentagon, Ghika said: “We monitor threats, there are a range of them.”

Later Tuesday, Secretary of State Mike Pompeo, who has taken a hardline stance on Iran, said during a trip to Moscow that the U.S. would respond if its interests were attacked but stressed “we fundamentally do not seek a war with Iran.”

This despite an apparent Houthi drone attack that forced Saudi Arabia’s Aramco to stop pumping crude oil along a major pipeline, and what the kingdom and its ally the United Arab Emirates claimed was an attack that damaged four oil tankers in the Gulf.

Even President Donald Trump seemed to stand down on Tuesday, after boasting a day earlier that Iran would “suffer greatly” were it to “do anything.”

“I’m hearing little stories about Iran,” he said Monday. “If they do anything, it would be a very bad mistake.”

The New York Times reported – citing anonymous sources – that Shanahan had drawn up plans to deploy up to 120,000 U.S. forces to the region if Iran were to attack American interests or develop nuclear weapons, a number far too small to launch a land invasion but around the same number of U.S. troops sent to invade Iraq in 2003.

Asked about the report on Tuesday, Trump said: “I think it’s fake news, okay? Now, would I do that? Absolutely. But we have not planned for that. Hopefully we’re not going to have to plan for that. And if we did that, we’d send a hell of a lot more troops than that.”

Trump’s denial of anything is hardly proof that it didn’t happen, and the Times makes clear that he may not have even been briefed on the plans – which were apparently ordered by Bolton – but in fact the source(s) for most stories regarding Iran have been anonymous U.S. officials (in one case a single unnamed official).

Since May 5 media reports have delivered the Trump administration’s assertions with a surprising amount of credulity, given the national security advisor’s history of advocating for regime change and the president’s well-documented loose relationship with the truth.

Yet publicly both Trump and Pompeo have now backed off the hardline stance, with Iranian leadership doing the same, begging the question: just who is running this show?

The post US and Iran sound the retreat after beating drums of war appeared first on The Defense Post.

Its actions are extensively covered in news and analysis by The Defense Post.

The group’s leadership pledged allegiance to ISIS leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi and it became Islamic State’s West Africa province.

But the group later split into two factions, and journalists, analysts and others refer to those factions in different ways.

So this presents a journalistic conundrum: What is “Boko Haram” called, and how do we refer to its separate factions?

Explaining the problem fully requires a brief, incomplete and likely very debatable history of Boko Haram.

Western education is forbidden

The moniker “Boko Haram” is a phrase in the Hausa language and roughly translates as “western education is forbidden,” a local nickname referring to the strict Islamist ideology of a group founded in 2002 by Salafist cleric Mohammed Yusuf, whose kunya was Abu Yusuf al-Barnawi.

The group’s formal name is جماعة أهل السنة للدعوة والجهاد or Jama’at ahl al-sunna li-Da’wah wa-l-qital wal-Jihad (transliteration preferences dependent), which roughly translates as “People committed to the propagation of the Prophet’s teachings and jihad.” (Some references omit the word jihad.)

Yusuf’s goal was the creation of a fundamentalist Islamic state in Nigeria.

In the beginning the group concentrated on preaching and proselytization, building schools, camps and compounds for followers, although violence was certainly not unheard of. As is common, it began to radicalize. Confrontations with the Nigerian police and military increased, and they in turn adopted heavy-handed tactics, fueling escalations in the violence.

In 2009, hundreds of Boko Haram members were killed in military operations aimed at suppressing the group, including Yusuf who died in police custody.

Under new leader Abubakar Shekau, Boko Haram began its infamous campaign of extreme violence in earnest, notably using to great but grisly effect its trademark suicide bomb attacks that other African Islamist militant groups avoided, and Shekau made connections with al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (although according to some analysts, the group had already made connections with al-Qaeda under Yusuf’s leadership).

In 2014, Shekau declared a caliphate, and by 2015, the group controlled territory roughly the size of Belgium, but military counter-offensives inflicted massive losses and much of its territory was recaptured.

Shekau pledged bayat (allegiance) to ISIS leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi in March 2015 and Boko Haram became Islamic State’s West Africa wilayat or province.

But Shekau’s ruthless brutality, his definition of takfir and what constituted apostasy, and his targeting of Muslims among other things caused rifts to fester within the group.

In August 2016 he was replaced as leader, with ISIS appointing Abu Musab al-Barnawi, Yusuf’s son, who was the group’s spokesperson, in his stead. Some analysts say that Shekau was replaced because ISIS found him difficult to control.

Shekau rejected Barnawi’s appointment. Some contend that Shekau simply does not consider ISIS a legitimate authority, although he has not repudiated ISIS or rescinded his bayat to Baghdadi.

Boko Haram split into two major factions, with Shekau leading one faction and Barnawi the other.

Update March 16 Audio recordings have revealed that ISIS has replaced Abu Mus’ab al-Barnawi, appointing Abu Abdullah Idris bin Umar also known as Ibn Umar al-Barnawi as ISWA leader. ISIS has not yet made a public statement confirming the change.

Both factions claim to act as the Islamic State in West Africa, but only Barnawi’s faction is recognized by ISIS, and only actions carried out by Barnawi’s faction are reported by the ISIS central propaganda machine, although Shekau’s faction continues to release ISIS-style propaganda.

Both groups remain active, but Barnawi’s faction is by far the largest and is believed to be behind a significant surge of deadly attacks in recent months.

Neither faction has a new name, and this has led to some confusion and misattribution in reporting.

The (misattributed) attack in Rann

A notable case in point is the January 14 attack in Rann, around 175 km (110 miles) northeast of the Borno state capital, Maiduguri, near the border with Cameroon.

The attack began late in the afternoon. Nigerian government forces reportedly fled after militants attacked Rann and set fire to shelters for people made homeless by the conflict.

Many reports, including those from AFP and Reuters, attributed the incident to Islamic State West Africa province – which both news agencies use to mean the Barnawi faction – and many analysts and observers accepted those attributions.

The Defense Post report noted the attributions for the incident (full disclosure – we subscribe to AFP’s wire service and used its copy as the basis for our report), but we were not convinced that ISWA was responsible.

The attack, which focused on an IDP camp, appeared to better fit Shekau’s modus operandi – ISWA (for now) focuses on the military, while Shekau’s faction often hits softer targets.

Our report also noted an attack in Rann on December 6, saying it was unclear which faction was responsible for that incident – again large fire was set, apparently burning homes and a UNICEF clinic, pointing towards Shekau.

AFP’s attribution relied on a single aid aid worker 175 km away in Maiduguri who said colleagues in Rann blamed ISWA, while Reuters cited unnamed military sources saying ISWA was responsible without quoting them.

Two days later on January 16, Medecins Sans Frontieres (Doctors Without Borders) said that 14 people including three soldiers were killed in the assault on Rann, and that about 10,000 IDPs who were living in the camp had fled to the border.

Then, on January 17, Shekau’s faction claimed in a video that its fighters carried out the January 14 attack on Rann. An extract of the video published by Nigerian journalist Ahmad Salkida who broke the story appeared to show militants looting supplies from a storage facility and multiple structures on fire.

Reuters corrected its original attribution in its report on the video, but we haven’t seen many other corrections.

The problem of attribution seems to lie in the fact that both factions sprang from the same organization that has two names (or three if you’re pedantic), and both names could potentially describe either faction.

Nigerian media uses Boko Haram as a general term to describe the jihadist insurgency in the country.

Most branches of the military use the phrase Boko Haram terrorists (abbreviated to BHTs) to refer to militants, although the Nigerian Air Force appears to distinguish Islamic State West Africa province from Boko Haram.

Some journalists and analysts prefer to use the name Boko Haram to refer to the Shekau faction exclusively, while using ISWA to mean Barnawi’s faction, seemingly at odds with general usage.

Others use the acronym JAD for Shekau’s faction, based on the transliteration of the original formal name of the group.

Others appear to prefer to call the whole group ISWA, and split that into Shekau and Barnawi factions.

Boko Haram

We have decided to follow what is common in Nigerian media, using Boko Haram – which is only a nickname – as the overarching phrase to describe both factions when specific attribution is unclear. Both factions sprang from that group, and it’s informal, so it seems an obvious choice.

Islamic State West Africa

We use Islamic State West Africa province specifically to mean the Barnawi faction which is accepted by ISIS as its West Africa affiliate. We abbreviate that to ISWA, a relatively common initialism among analysts. (ISIS itself drops the “province” in much of its propaganda material.)

When we have evidence that an incident involves ISWA we say that, but we only attribute in headlines when we have sources pointing to ISWA, and usually only with a claim of responsibility from ISIS.

Abubakar Shekau faction

That leads us to the question of dealing with an incident attributed to the faction led by Abubakar Shekau – it did not create a new name for itself, so how should it be described?

It is not an “official” ISIS branch, so does it makes sense to describe it as an ISWA faction, even though it split from that group, and it’s actions are not recognized by ISIS central? It could be called an ISWA splinter group, but is that clear for the average reader?

Should it just be described as Boko Haram, without a nod to the split? Or as JAD?

After much debate, and to be clear for a general audience, we decided to refer to Shekau’s faction of Boko Haram, although using JAD has merit.

Barnawi also leads a Boko Haram faction, but in addition it’s ISWA.

I hope it’s clear, because this post has taken far too long to write and therefore contains too many words, although on the upside I was forced to refresh my knowledge of Boko Haram, however debatable that might be.

Another downside (or upside if you like to debate words as much as we do) – it leaves a hole where a post should be explaining how we use the terms “militant Islamist” and “jihadist” and probably many more.

P.S. I’m @ferguskelly over on Twitter if you want to debate…

Islamic State enforced leadership change in West Africa province, audio reveals

The post Boko Haram or Islamic State West Africa … or both? appeared first on The Defense Post.

The remote island of Jolo is a stronghold for the militant Islamist Abu Sayyaf group. Formed in the 1990s, it operates as a network of factions.

Police, military and political figures have all blamed Abu Sayyaf for the bombing, with many pointing to a subgroup called Ajang-Ajang.

According to the Manila Times, Ajang-Ajang means “orphans” in Sulu’s Tausug language, and the group is made up of young people and children of Abu Sayyaf members led by Hatib Sawadjaan, the father-in-law of Amin Baco, a Malaysian suspected by some to be the leader of Islamic State East Asia.

Abu Sayyaf commander Isnilon Hapilon pledged allegiance to ISIS leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi in 2014, and in July 2018 the group became part of the newly declared Islamic State East Asia province. Hapilon was killed in 2017.

“Not all members of Ajang-Ajang group are pro-ISIS, but all of them are Abu Sayyaf group,” Rommel Banlaoi, chairman of the Philippine Institute for Peace, Violence and Terrorism Research told the Manila Times. “It’s not IS-affiliated.”

Defense Secretary Delfin Lorenzana blamed the attack on Sawadjaan, saying he has pledged allegiance to ISIS, AP reported on January 29.

Before Duterte’s comments

But although they agree on the likely perpetrators, the same people disagree on how the bombings were carried out, with some saying the devices were remotely detonated and others saying there may have been at least one suicide bomber, not least among them President Rodrigo Duterte.

Not long after the attack, Islamic State claimed fighters from its East Asia province affiliate carried out suicide bombings at the church. ISIS said that “two martyrs of the Islamic state carried out a double suicide attack.” The first detonated an explosive belt near the entrance to the church and the second detonated an explosive belt in the parking area.

But the sequence of events is not a perfect match for what appears to have happened, and precisely what occurred is unclear.

On the day of the attack, the AFP news agency reported that the second bomb, which detonated outside the church, was left in the utility box of a motorcycle, citing a military report.

AFP reported that security officials said on January 29 that one of the explosive devices was left inside the church by a woman and the other was hidden on a motorcycle outside.

Reuters reported that military and police officials said on January 29 that both bombs appeared to have been detonated remotely.

Two people wounded in the attack said a woman left a bag in a pew and left before the explosion, Armed Forces of the Philippines Public Affairs chief Colonel Noel Detoyato said on January 29, ABS-CBN reported, noting that Detoyato said the witnesses could not accurately describe the woman.

“… it was remotely detonated so that will dispel [reports that it was a] suicide bombing,” Detoyato said.

The Manila Times reported Detoyato as saying that bomb was detonated by mobile phone.

The Armed Forces of the Philippines West Mindanao Command (WestMinCom) on January 29 released CCTV images of a suspect who they said was known as “Kamah, a known bombmaker and brother of the slain Abu-Sayyaf sub-leader Surakah Ingog.”

WATCH: CCTV footage showing 3 members of the Ajang-Ajang group fleeing just after the explosions. Authorities believe they are responsible for the twin blasts that happened in Jolo, Sulu. | via @maan_macapagal #JoloBlast pic.twitter.com/VlrHNSYAzJ

— ABS-CBN News (@ABSCBNNews) January 29, 2019

Kamah had a item in his hand that could have been used to detonate the bombs and ran from the church moments after the explosion along with several companions, WestMinCom spokesperson Colonel Gerry Besana said, ABS-CBN reported.

Duterte’s comments

Comments made by President Duterte on January 29 about suicide attacks seemed to contradict the earlier official statements, although the military was investigating the possibility it was a suicide bombing, according to a January 28 report by ABS-CBN.

The AFP news agency in a story headlined “‘Suicide bomber’ among Philippines blast suspects: Duterte” reported:

Duterte told reporters a woman who remains at large left a device that exploded during mass at the cathedral in the remote Muslim-majority island of Jolo on Sunday, and her husband later blew himself up outside.

The president’s account differed from earlier statements by security officials.

He said military intelligence told him Tuesday the second bomb was strapped on to the body of the male suspect who detonated it as survivors of the first explosion ran for their lives.

“They (investigators) could not find any part of the body because it exploded, because that was terrorism and that was a suicide,” the president said.

Reuters reported Duterte as saying the explosions may have been a suicide attack, according to the briefing he had received earlier.

“It exploded. That is terrorism and suicide. You cannot carry plastic bags, you will be questioned by the military, police when you have backpack,” Duterte said when asked by reporters to clarify an earlier remark.

He added: “But you could see all around bits and pieces of flesh. We even stepped on it.”

Phillipine news site Rappler went much further in a story headlined “Duterte says wife, husband suicide bombers behind Jolo bombing,” reporting:

“Either he was just passing by before blowing himself up. Ang problema kasi, yung babae was wearing a cross pa eh. Malaking cross sa dibdib niya eh,” said the President.

(Either he was just passing by before blowing himself up. The problem was the woman was wearing a cross. It was a big cross on her chest.)

Asked if he was thus confirming it was a case of suicide bombing, he said, “Yes, blowing them up. Babae. Lalaki yung isa, mag-asawa (One was a man, they were a couple).”

…

Told that some military officers were denying the bombing was the work of suicide bombers, Duterte said it was possible that the man detonated the bomb remotely.

“Yes, that’s a possibility. But the eyewitnesses said it’s the other way around. May kasama siguro, may support system (They had companions, a support system, maybe),” said Duterte.

Defense Secretary Delfin Lorenzana later appeared to at least partially support Duterte’s comments.

“The first bomb that exploded inside the church was apparently left behind by a certain woman. This is according to the hazy recollection of a survivor sitting four pews behind the explosion,” Lorenzana told reporters in a text message, The Manila Times reported.

“The second [bomb] that exploded at the entrance about a minute and a half after may have been a suicide bomber as indicated by body parts strewn all over including half a face and neck and two feet,” Lorenzana said.

“It is more likely that the second bomb was caused by a suicide bomber,” he added.

On January 30, Lorenzana said the second explosion was “probably” a suicide bombing, but that it was not clear if ISIS was responsible, because it had not yet revealed the bomber’s identity, Reuters reported.

“The final conclusion is not there yet. It’s still being investigated,” Lorenzana said, AFP reported.

To this interested observer it’s as clear as mud.

But denial, downplaying attacks and misinformation is not unusual for the Philippines:

Misinformation and intelligence failures: How the Philippines underestimates ISIS

Update February 1 Philippines Interior Secretary Eduardo Año said a husband and wife team of Indonesian suicide bombers linked to Islamic State were behind the cathedral bombing, emphasizing that this information has yet to be verified, Rappler reported.

“Ang talagang nagpasabog doon ay Indonesian suicide bombers [Those behind the bombings are Indonesian suicide bombers],” he said.

“Hindi pa tapos yung ginagawang investigation but I have sources na itong pagsabog ay project ng Abu Sayyaf at itong foreign terrorist na related sa ISIS (Islamic State group) [The investigation is not over but I have sources who said the bombing was a project of Abu Sayyaf and this foreign terrorist related to ISIS.],” he later told reporters.

“The Lamitan, Basilan bombing and the Jolo cathedral bombing, they are connected. Itong nagpaputok sa Basilan, si Abu Kathir Al-Maghribi, galing ‘yan sa Jolo, sa Sulu. Bumaba lang ‘yan, pumunta lang ‘yan saBasilan before the bombing [The one behind the explosion in Basilan, Abu Kathir Al-Maghribi, came from Jolo, in Sulu. He just went to Basilan before the bombing.],” he said.

The post Was the Philippines cathedral bombing a suicide attack? appeared first on The Defense Post.

The United States and key players in the Americas, including Argentina, Brazil, Canada, and Colombia, have recognized Guaido as Venezuela’s president, but other states including Russia and China, as well as the Venezuelan military, continue to stand by Maduro.

“The [U.S.] policy concerning Venezuela, as with many other countries, is destructive in my opinion,”  Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov said on Friday, January 25. “This [U.S.] behavior is unacceptable. It undermines the principles of the U.N. Charter and the international community’s standards,” he said, adding Russia will defend its position at the Security Council.”

Lavrov’s comments came after Russian President Vladimir Putin spoke to Maduro on January 24 expressing his “support for the legitimate authorities of Venezuela in the context of an exacerbated domestic political crisis provoked from outside.”

Telephone conversation with Nicolas Maduro. Vladimir Putin expressed his support for the legitimate Venezuelan authorities https://t.co/2zqLg2q6Go

— President of Russia (@KremlinRussia_E) January 24, 2019

As Russia’s authorities expressed their position toward the situation in Venezuela, Reuters published an exclusive article saying that Russian private military contractors have been flown to Caracas in the past several days to beef up Maduro’s security.

“The contractors are associated with the so-called Wagner group whose members, mostly ex-service personnel, fought clandestinely in support of Russian forces in Syria and Ukraine, according to Reuters interviews with dozens of contractors, their friends and relatives,” the Reuters report said citing three sources, two of whom were anonymous.

The story’s only named source was Yevgeny Shabayev, who was introduced in the article as the “leader of a local chapter of a paramilitary group of Cossacks with ties to Russian military contractors.”

“Citing contacts in a Russian state security structure, Shabayev said the contingent flew to Venezuela at the start of this week, a day or two before opposition protests started. He said they set off in two chartered aircraft for Havana, Cuba, from where they transferred onto regular commercial flights to Venezuela,” the report cited Shabayev as saying.

“The Cuban government, a close ally of Venezuela’s ruling socialists for the last two decades, did not immediately respond to a request for comment,” the report said.

In the Russian media Shabayev is known as a “representative” of dozens of organizations registered under his name, with the Cossacks group being only one of them. He has been listed as the President of the Otrada Veterans Charitable Foundation in Moscow, First Secretary of the Victory Generation All-Russian Public Organization and the head of the Committee of the All-Russian Officers’ Assembly, to name a few.

Shabayev has also called himself a representative of the Donetsk People’s Republic’s public movement and the plenipotentiary representative of the DPR in Moscow, although people familiar with his statements have called him a liar and a fake veteran.

On his Facebook page, Shabayev posted an account of events different than that described by Reuters.

“On Monday, January 21, a group of security specialists I know, who protect top officials and recently returned from Gabon, received an urgent order to put together a group of 400 people,” Shabayev wrote.

“On Tuesday – Wednesday 22-23, they took a charter flight to Havana. They did not know the place and the time of their work. One of them called relatives from Havana and said that they are being put on a regular flight to Caracas.”

“[Their] Relatives approached me asking to clarify what happened with their loved ones [by asking] foreign correspondents. I got in touch with Reuters before Guaido was proclaimed the president. I didn’t need any other info[rmation] in any other way.”

“Reuters found the proof on the ground. Once again – I was interested in the info before the events, not after. And not me, but relatives. This info was confirmed not by me, but by local correspondents.”

However, the only other two anonymous sources mentioned in the Reuters story were individuals “close to the Wagner group,” and there was no explicit mention of sources on the ground in Venezuela. Moreover, the article said another person believed to work for Wagner “did not respond to a message asking for information.”

Even though Reuters used Shabayev’s comments as proof of Wagner’s presence in Venezuela, he himself never mentioned the group by name. On the contrary, in an interview with a Russian outlet Lenta.ru, Shabayev said the “mercenaries” sent to Venezuela had nothing to do with Wagner and its alleged head Evgeny Prigozhin, whose nickname is “Putin’s Cook” because one of his companies provided food services to the Kremlin.

“On the evening of January 21, a certain group of guys was instructed to quickly recruit a group. They carried out orders from private military companies,” he said.

The second interview with Shabayev published by Lenta on Friday, January 25, does not include the Wagner connection denial, but it doesn’t name any private military company either.

In an interview with RIA Novosti, the Russian ambassador to Venezuela, Vladimir Zayemsky, called the news about Russian private military companies in the country “a canard.”

“I know nothing about any Russian private military companies in Venezuela. This is another canard,” he said on Friday.

Russia arrests PMC Wagner expert Vladimir Neelov on treason charges

The post Are Russian ‘mercenaries’ in Venezuela? What we know appeared first on The Defense Post.

The contract includes the export of 900 light armored vehicles but in March, the Globe and Mail discovered the contract included heavily weaponized armored vehicles, a detail which the government had no disclosed to the public.  Although the Liberal government has put a ‘pause button’ on approving permits for arms exports to Saudi Arabia, it is clearly not enough from a government that prides itself on promoting and defending human rights.

Parliament last week sanctioned 17 Saudi individuals linked to the murder of journalist Jamal Khashoggi; however, the $15 billion arms deal is still ‘business as usual’ for the Canadian government.

The Liberal government has stated that it is prepared to freeze the Saudi arms deal if it’s found that the Canadian-made armored vehicles are being misused; however, the Globe and Mail reported in July 2017 that Foreign Affairs Minister Chrystia Freeland was ‘deeply concerned’ about videos that appeared to show Saudi forces using Canadian-made armored vehicles against Saudi citizens in a security operation.

Although the vehicles in question were not built by General Dynamics but by another Canadian company called Terradyne Armored Vehicles, it just goes to show that Canada’s arms industry is unchecked by the government.

Where are the investigations and the follow-up to Canadian-made arms exports to a government that continually violates international human rights standards? While the Liberal government rightfully continues voice concern over possible war crimes in Yemen, human rights violations against Saudi citizens, and the horrendous murder of  journalist Jamal Khashoggi, there is still no serious commitment to ending this arms deal.

The Liberal government has estimated that ending the $15 billion contract will cost Canadians $1 billion (US $750 million), but what is the price tag on ensuring international human rights standards are upheld?

Richard S. Matthews, a Canadian and Associate Professor of Medical Ethics at Bond University, said in a recent Facebook post: “A deal can be broken. There are always costs, of course. Trudeau has just warned against leaving Canadians with a billion dollar price tag for walking away from the arms deal with Saudi Arabia. Those weapons are used, among others, in the massacres currently being inflicted in Yemen. A conservative estimate says that 8 million people are under threat. More liberal estimates put the number at 13 million of so. Let’s do some numbers. 1 billion divided by 8 million gives you $125 dollars per person threatened. 1 billion divided by 12 million gives you $76.92 per person threatened. That is roughly how much Canada values the lives of those harmed by its portion of the sale of means of violence to that government.”

He further commented, “To do that properly I would have needed a statistician and then to include all of the different players and the money they extract. The point about commodification and the price on human life holds nonetheless, but the actual figures may be quite different.”

As Canadians don’t we thrive on the fact that we promote human rights here at home and abroad?

Matthews explains that how “what a state actor or a state actually believes is reflected in what they do, not in what they say” is one piece of evidence of the Trudeau-Liberal government’s restrictive notion of human rights.

He elaborates: “Although they know that the arms are used for torture and massacre, and they know that thereby they contribute to all of those deaths, nonetheless they value the profit making involved in the arms sales (and the geo-political allegiances associated with them) far more highly than they do the lives of those killed by the arms we make. On the models of human rights that I believe in, it is morally impermissible to commodify and thereby devalue human life in the way in which such arms sales proceed.”

Shouldn’t we be holding our government accountable for possible violations of the international Arms Trade Treaty, which is an attempt to regulate the global trade of weapons for the purpose of contributing to international peace? Although the Canadian government has voted in favour of the treaty, parliament still has yet to ratify it. According to Amnesty International Canada, the current form of Bill C-47 – introduced in Parliament in April 2017 to prepare Canada to ratify the ATT – fails to meet critical obligations of the treaty and proposed amendments fail to apply to to the majority of Canada’s arms exports.

Saudi Arabia is notorious for its human rights violations, so why are we allowing the hypocrisy to continue? Matthews concludes, “Human rights, as a result, ends up a decision of the privileged, and applying only to privileged populations and those they believe necessary to apply them to. Anyone else.…. sale is on.”

While the Trudeau government continues to delay the call to end the $15 billion contract, Germany has led the way in showing the moral example.

In January 2016, Germany began to review its arms exports to Saudi Arabia over human rights concerns in Yemen. During the same time the Liberal government stood by the deal despite human rights concerns over Saudi executions. In January 2017, Germany halted exports to Saudis due to the escalating war in Yemen. During this same time the Canadian government’s discourse was only on the possibility of Canadian-made armored vehicles being used by the Saudi government in domestic human rights violations.

Just recently Germany announced it will end arms sales to Saudi Arabia over the killing of Khashoggi, and banned 18 Saudis who are suspected of involvement in the journalist’s murder. The export ban binds all 26 members of the European Union’s passport-free Schengen zone to prevent the 18 Saudis from entering the zone. Germany is clearly using its influence to push for a tougher stance on Saudi Arabia.

Last month Finland said it would not not issue new arms export authorizations to Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates due to concerns over the humanitarian situation in Yemen, following Denmark’s similar suspension of arms sales to Riyadh.

On November 9, Norway said it would freeze all defense material export licenses to Saudi Arabia, including those for dual-use items.

The Liberal government cannot scapegoat the former Harper-Conservative government for this deal, or claim that it is ‘too difficult’ to suspend or cancel it. As a nation that perceives itself to be a leader in human rights, we need to end this deal despite the monetary cost that comes with it; morally and ethically it is the right thing to do.

The Liberal and Conservative parties ought to join Federal NDP leader Jagmeet Singh’s call to cancel the sale; Canada ought to become a stronger leader on the international stage in promoting and defending human rights at home and aboard by ratifying the ATT; and the Trudeau-Liberal government ought to follow the steps of Germany and take concrete and direct action in holding the Saudi government accountable for their human rights violations, as well as holding their own Canadian arms industry to a higher ethical standard.

The post The hypocrisy of the $15 billion Canada-Saudi arms deal appeared first on The Defense Post.

“Everywhere, all the time, Barkhane is ready to act,” the French Armed Forces said in a Facebook post that confirmed the operation had taken place.

Paratroops from 2nd REP, the 2nd Foreign Parachute Regiment, part of the French Foreign Legion, have been in Mali since June. They are attached to Desert Battle Group – Infantry (GTD-I) deployed to France’s Operation Barkhane in the Sahel.

French journalist Jean-Marc Tanguy, who first reported on the operation, wrote that 80 paratroopers, mainly from the 2nd REP, were dropped by an Airbus A400M Atlas and two C-160s. A GTD-I infantry company was also operating on the ground.

Tanguy says that airborne operations have been conducted several times since the GTD-I was deployed, but this was the first major drop.

Later, citing French armed forces spokesperson Colonel Patrik Steiger, Le Figaro reported that 120 paratroopers took part in the operation. Around 80 were dropped from the two C-160s and 40 from the A400M into a region where Malian forces and a company from Barkhane are already present, Steiger said.

“We combine different capabilities to create a surprise effect among armed terrorist groups and to show the population that we are able to come quickly,” Steiger said.

In its weekly situation report, the French Armed Forces said that 80 paratroopers were dropped by two C-130s and “40 commandos [were] dropped at high altitude,” without specifying the aircraft used.

The ground operation involved “two motorized sections of the Malian armed forces and a motorized Barkhane company,” and after their jump the paratroops continued their mission on the ground.

This is the first time that the Airbus A400M military transport aircraft has been used in an operational parachute drop since its adoption by the French Air Force in 2013. The aircraft remains unable to drop parachutes via its side doors.

On September 8, the 2nd REP tweeted that parachute commandos had undertaken a “high altitude operational jump in the region of Gao in Mali.” Operation Barkhane’s main support base in Mali is in Gao, alongside others in Niamey in Niger and N’Djamena in Chad.

The Menaka area, where Thursday’s drop was carried out, is one of the most unstable in Mali. At least 12 Tuareg civilians were killed by armed assailants in the region, local sources said on September 25.

Philippe Chapleau notes that several skirmishes have taken place in the past week, with several militants killed and three French troops injured. On August 26, a French airstrike in the Menaka region killed a senior Islamic State in the Greater Sahara official, a bodyguard and two civilians.

Islamic extremists linked to al-Qaeda took control of the desert north of Mali in early 2012, exploiting a Tuareg separatist uprising. France began a military intervention the next year that evolved into the current Operation Barkhane deployment with a mandate for counter-terror operations across the Sahel region, encompassing Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali, Mauritania and Niger.

Le #2REP, qui arme le groupement #Altor, poursuit les opérations menées dans la région du Liptako (Niger). Il lutte contre les groupes armés terroristes aux côtés des forces armées nigériennes , tout en restant en contact avec la population

Niger | 2REP pic.twitter.com/meaCmEc1Qc

— 2e REP – 2ème régiment étranger de parachutistes (@2REPOfficiel) July 11, 2018

Around 4,500 French personnel are deployed with Operation Barkhane, and they work alongside the G5 Sahel joint counter-terrorism force that aims to train 5,000 troops, as well as peacekeepers deployed to the United Nations Minusma stabilization mission in Mali.

#Photooftheday ! The Canadian Armed Forces @CanadianForces  has deployed an Air Task Force to #Gao to support MINUSMA with aeromedical evacuations while building the Mission's transport and logistics capacities. #Mali pic.twitter.com/vC77HVkMIe

— MINUSMA (@UN_MINUSMA) September 27, 2018

The European Union also has a training mission in Mali. Its mandate was this year extended to May 2020 and expanded to include the provision of advice and training support to the G5 Sahel Joint Force.

Estonian infantry platoon ESTPLA-26, participating in Operation #Barkhane in Mali, commenced their task at the Gao base in the northeast of the country with legionnaires from the #2REP #ALTOR

Read more : https://t.co/p12iK2S9jl … … pic.twitter.com/UcV1mcU6LY

— Légion étrangère (@LegionEtrangere) September 10, 2018

The United Kingdom has deployed three Royal Air Force Chinook heavy lift helicopters and 90 personnel to support Operation Barkhane, and Estonia deployed around 50 soldiers who are tasked with ensuring the security of the Gao military base.

French desert troops take to boats in Mali

This post was updated on September 27 to include additional information from the French Armed Forces weekly situation report.

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